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PREFACE
Social Philosophy
Social philosophy could he one of the most important and most
exciting subjects in our universities at the present time. In fact
it scarcely exists. There are two main branches of social philosophy,
one consisting of traditional topics and the other of more modern topics.
The traditional topics are principally the philosophy of education, the
philosophy of law, the philosophy of history and political philosophy.
The more modern topics are the philosophy or philosophical critique
of such activities as psychiatry, social work and possibly personnel
management as well as the philosophy of the social sciences and of
action.
The traditional topics are certainly all taught in our universities
but their vital interconnections are usually entirely obscured by the
academic structures of our universities which keep them completely
separate from each other. The philosophy of law tends to be taught
to law students in law faculties and the philosophy of education to
education students in education departments. Political philosophy
usually forms a rather strange sort of appendix to moral philosophy for
philosophy students and it is usually taught under the title of 'political
theory' to politics students. Only some philosophy students and some
history students study the philosophy of history. Plato however saw
a long time ago that the philosophy of education and the philosophy of
politics are closely linked and must be studied together. In traditional
language law is the will^or the expression of the will, of the sovereign
and the sovereign may be a monarch or some kind of parliament or council.
Alternatively we can say that law is the residue of politics or is the
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means by which political decisions are put into effect. Whatever
language is used it is clear that the study of law cannot be divorced
from the study of politics and the philosophy of law equally cannot
be divorced from the philosophy of politics.
Those who study the philosophy of the social sciences without
reference to the philosophy of history make a grave mistake. Many
sleepless nights are spent by some people who worry about the fact
that the methodology of sociology is not the same as the methodology
of physics and chemistry. Words are the tormentors that drive away
sleep in this area. Since physics and chemistry are regarded as paradigm
cases of science it is sometimes assumed that since sociology is called
a social science it must either exhibit the same structure and use the
same methods as physics and chemistry or suffer eternal damnation and
be dismissed as a pseudo science. History is not called a science
but it is an empirical subject that should be of interest to the social
scientist. The historian can never confirm or disprove his hypotheses
by experiment and very often the sociologist at any rate is in the
same position. Also the historian is much more concerned with
idiographic than with nomothetic matters and the social scientist
may from time to time he in the same position. We shall discuss some
of the differences between idiography and nomotheticity in chapter ?.
The philosophy of social science must make as much use of the
philosophy of history as of the philosophy of science.
The emergence of political psychiatry in the USSR has alerted
people to the political, moral and legal problems associated with
psychiatry and with the concept of mental illness. Prof Szasz is no
longer a voice crying in the wilderness. And even if he were he would
deserve to be famous simply for pointing out that although psychiatrists
tend to think that people should not commit suicide they also have a
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higher than average suicide rate themselves. Social casework which
is the centre of social work can be described as a form of psychotherapy
and so social philosophers must pay almost as much attention to social
work as to psychiatry.
So far our point of view has been extremely narrow and it is time
to broaden our horizons to a certain extent. Although we have now
probably indicated in a brief sort of way the extent of the concerns
of the social philosopher it is necessary to point out that there are
areas on the fringes of social philosophy which the social philosopher
cannot entirely ignore even if they are not his primary concern. Let
us in a few words point out two of these areas. The first is of very
considerable importance and the second is of much less importance but
it does deserve to be mentioned.
Ideologies are always with us and they are likely to confront
the social philosopher at every turn especially in the philosophy
of politics and the philosophy of education and in the philosophy of
psychiatry and social control. It is almost beyond belief that the
critical and comparative study of ideologies is not a major subject
in our universities which make a bad situation worse by awarding
degrees in the study of Christianity, quite improperly called simply
theology, but not is for example either.Judaism or communism. Religious
studies departments try to place Christianity in a religious context
by contrasting it with Buddhism. In a degree devoted to the critical
and comparative study of ideologies Christianity would be seen in the
much more meaningful context of Judaism, communism and fascism which
are its ideological kith and kin. A study of the life and work of
Hegel would clearly form an important part of the work for such a
degree. At this point it is necessary to say that the so called
radical philosophers have nothing to offer us in this area. As far as
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one can make out they simply wish to remove Wittgenstein from the
philosophical curriculum and to replace him by Marx. Replacing one
boring form of narrow mindedness with another hardly seems a desirable
move. The cult of the later Wittgenstein will die in due course and
may already be weakening but it is to be hoped that the recovery of
philosophy which should follow its death will not be delayed by an
invasion of the followers of the cult of Marx. The establishment
of university departments devoted to the critical and comparative
study of ideologies seems to be urgently required along with the
establishment of quite separate departments devoted to the study of
individual ideologies such as Judaism and communism.
At first sight the theory of physical activities in the sense
of sports, games and dance might not seem to be a matter of any
importance for any type of philosophy but it could I think be a
useful adjunct to the philosophy of action which as we shall see
in chapter ¥1 is part of social philosophy. The philosophical
importance of physical activities is perhaps best brought out by
asking what one needs to know in order to understand e.g. the Varsity
Match or the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games. In order to understand such
events one needs to know about a surprising number of things and
one needs to be able to see how they relate to each other. If one
wishes to understand the varsity match a knowledge of the physiology
of exercise and of the laws of rugby will not take one very far. One
also needs to understand the significance of Oxford, Cambridge and London
in order to make sense of a situation in which teams from two universities
outside London play each other not at either of their own excellent
rugby grounds but at the most prestigious rugby ground in London. The
complexities of the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games have been well described
by Dr R D Mandell in his excellent book The Nazi Olympics which manages
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to combine the best features of journalism and scholarship. In his
Preface he writes (p x ) *..» I shall claim that much of the success
of the 1936 Olympics was due to the pursuit by the National Socialists
of supremacy in mass pageantry . Hitler's success as a whole is
inconceivable without the application of the contrived festivity
that envelpped Nazism from beginning to end'. And later on he writes
(p 29l) 'Hie confident loosing of ambitions of the new Germans was
the worst consequence of the onerous symbolic burdens that the Olympic
Games and their athletic participants had taken on since the Games were
revived in 1896'.
After our fairly wide ranging survey of the field of social
philosophy it is necessary to state that in this work we are concerned
with only one small corner of the field, namely the corner that is
concerned with action.
Before we turn to our main concerns perhaps we should just note
in passing that a few tentative steps have been taken towards the
foundation of social philosophy. Some of the papers,'in Prof R T De George's
book Ethics and Society are important and so are some of the papers in
Prof A Mclntyre and Prof Dorothy Emmet's book Sociological Theory and
Philosophical Analysis. In addition to Prof Szasz's work in the field
of the philosophy of psychiatry one should note Prof Flew's book Crime
or Disease? and Dr A J P Kenny's British Academy lecture Mental
Health in Plato's Republic
v
INTRODUCTION
Section 1 General - What the problem is
This work is concerned with a very important and very old question
viz 'In/hat is a person?' 'What is a human being?' 'What is a man? or
even What is man?' That question has been of interest to philosoph~rs
and to practically everyone else for a very long time. The present
discussion of the question arises from two very powerful philosophical
stimuli that appeared at both the beginning and the end of the brilliant
original period of linguistic analytical philosophy. Prof G Ryle's
major work. The Concept of Mind may be said to have marked the beginning
of that period. Possibly the only obscure and unfortunate passage in
that work runs as follows (p 328)
Man need not be degraded to a machine by being denied to
be a ghost in a machine. He mifeht, after all, be a sort
of animal, namely,a higher mammal. There has yet to be
ventured the hazardous leap to the hypothesis that perhaps
he is a man.
Man, Prof Ryle tells us, is a man, or rather, man is perhaps a man.
One is not taking a hazardous leap if one suggests that most of us
knew that before we read Ryle. At the beginning of the period then
the question was raised but not very much light was shed on it.
The end of the period cannot be as clearly marked as the beginning
but Prof A J Ayer's and Prof P Strawson's important discussion of the
concept of a person can be regarded as providing the period with a
worthy close. Their discussion, however was limited to the
epistemological aspects of the concept. It could be claimed that the
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concept is primarily a social and moral concept and only secondarily
an epistemological one. Since that discussion things have not been
quite what they were but we must notice Prof Downids and Miss Telfer's
book Respect for Persons which gives us a modern restatement of the
fundamental principle of Kant's moral philosophy. Certainly the
principle of respect for persons is the most important one that has
yet been ennunciated in either morality or moral philosophy.
The present work concentrates on the social aspect of the concept
because it is both fundamental and strangely neglected. A complete
account of the concept and hence a complete answer to the question
mentioned above would require a discussion of the moral and epistemological
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aspects of the concept and of the complete field of a certain branch of
philosophy known by one or other of two equally unsatisfactory titles
viz philosohical psychology and the philosophy of mind. Certain matters
from the social and biological sciences would also be relevant to the
discussions along with the matters raised in this work. We are then
trying to consider one aspect or set of related aspects of a very
important and complex concept.
The concept of a person is not the only one which has various
aspects which are of interest to different branches of philosophy. Proper
names have long been of interest to logicians but they are also of
interest to social philosophers. Entities of social importance have
proper names. Ships, towns, cities and pets have proper names and so
do people. Prisoners, privates in the army and many of the products
of factories have numbers and are often referred to by their numbers.
Any complete account of proper names would have to take account of their
social as well as of their logical function. It certainly cannot be
claimed that the concept of a proper name is as complex as that of a
person but it has at least two aspects and so it can serve as a simple
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model when one is thinking about the idea of a concept having more
than one aspect. Similarly the concept of promising or of a promise
has long been of interest to moral philosophers who have been interested
in moral obligations and prima facie duties. More recently linguistic
philosophers have taken up the performative utterance aspect of the
concept.
Section 2 - Specific - How the problem will be tackled
One cannot understand what a person is without understanding what
he does ie without understanding human action. If inhabitants of another
planet were to land on the earth and remove some humans and take them
for laboratory study they would doubtless learn a great deal about
human anatomy, physiology and possibly also psychology. Psycho-physics
and physiological psychology could certainly be adequately studied in
some remote celestial laboratory. But only if those extra-terrestrial
visitors set up a base on this planet and adopted the methods of the
social anthropologist and the sociologist i*ould they come to understand
people. And we cannot understand what one person does without taking
into account what other people do. If the specimens in the celestial
laboratory were allowed to meet each other and to indulge in activities
with each other the laboratory attendants might learn more about people
than the scientific staff. But even the laboratory attendants would
learn a lot if they set up camp in Edinburgh or Sydney and set out to
observe the strange things people do in these places.
The flundamental concept involved in understanding human action
is that of a social role. Part I (chapter 1 - 3) is devoted to that
concept which is almost as complex as that of a person or at least if
one says that it is one is indulging in a pardonable exaggeration. The
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fatal error is to imagine that it is a simple concept. A sociologist
might be surprised to hear this solemn announcement that the concept of
a role is fundamental to the understanding of human action. The obvious,
he might say, does not need to be stated. But what is obvious to him
may not be obvious to philosophers and possibly to psychologists so
Part I can be regarded as very necessary.
If we talk of roles we must also talk of those who occupy the
roles and so we must talk of human individuals. Before we talk of
human individuals it is useful to look at other types of individuals
such as machines and animals. Part II (chapters IV and V) deals with
these matters. The final part is concerned with some philosophical
views of action seen in the light of the views put forward in Part I
and with some of the implications of Parts I and II. In a sense the
whole work is concerned with the concept of a role because only if we
understand that concept can we hope to understand the social aspect
of the concept of a person.
Section 3 - The nature and style of the work
This work is concerned with synthetic, synoptic and contextual
philosophy. It is not concerned with the important and valuable method
of philosophical training known as linguistic analysis or analytical
philosophy. Very briefly synoptic and contextual philosophy is based
on the premise that understanding something is a matter of seeing it
in relation to a context. Analysing things into their component parts
is simply a step towards synopsis because the components must be seen
in the context of each other if the thing of which they are components
is to be understood. Alternatively the components themselves may be
understood by being placed in another context as chemical elements are
understood by being placed in the periodic table. The point was well
expressed in his inaugural lecture at Oxford in 1937 by Prof H J Paton
when he spoke on the important subject of Fashion and Philosophy and
said (p 6 ) *1 hold that the business of philosophy is to be synoptic ....
Philosophical analysis seems to me to be valuable, not primarily for
its own sake, but as a means to this wider end*. In the present work
we are concerned with trying to understand human action by placing it
in its social context. And indeed we are also concered with understanding
people by placing them in their social context.
It would not be appropriate to embark on a complete examination
of synoptic and contextual philosophy here but such an examination would
have to pay attention to immense Humean and Kantian questions. In such
an examination attention would have to be paid to the views of the neo-
Hegelian idealist philosophers which to a certain extent live on under
the guise of structuralism. Particular attention would have to be paid
to the idealists strange desire to fit everything into one all embracing
context. Paton seems to have shared that desire to a certain extent
because in the part we left out of the passage quoted above he talks
of fitting 'our different experiences and our different theories as
far. as may be into a consistent whole' In this work we are not advocating
support for the more monolithic and grandiose versions of contextualism
From what has been said already it should be clear that the present
work is on the outer fringes of British academic philosophy or rather
of the present fashions in British academic philosophy. Talk about
the centre and fringes of academic subjects has been clarified in
relation to science by Dr M J Mulkay in his book The Social Process of
Innovation where he writes (pp 28-9)
Let me summarise the argument presented in this section. People
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enter science from various social backgrounds and with a
variety of motives. Despite social variation among its
members, the scientific community is able to maintain
certain uniformities of thought and behaviour. This it does,
in the first place, by rigorously excluding those unwilling
or unable to conform intellectually and by insisting on a
narrowly focused education calculated to produce strong
commitment to the established body of knowledge. The mental
sets created thereby are exceptionally stable. During
graduate study the rigidity of scientific education is
usually reduced as the neophyte is brought into contact with
research developments whose status as scientific knowledge is
not conclusively established and as he learns which topics
can legitimately be regarded as problematic.
Qnoe his research competence has been explicity recognised,
usually by the award of a PhD, the young scientist is formally
free to pursue his own intellectual interests - unless he is
engaged in large-scale group research. Informally, however,
he remains subject to humerous social pressures; in particular,
he is faced with the expectation that he will produce research
findings acceptable to others working in the same field. Control
over the content of his research output is exercised in several
ways. In the first instance, close colleagues will warn him
if his interests are becoming too deviant, as they warned
Pasteur on several occasions. Secondly, funds will be forth¬
coming only if acceptable research proposals are presented.
Finally, the editors and referees of the professional journals
act-as 'gatekeepers', rejecting submissions which do not conform
to current cognitive and technical norms and, as we saw in the
actions of Berzelius, Liebig and Wohler described above, using
their position to condemn significantly deviant papers which
slip through the screen. In such xfays, then, do members of
the research community strive to ensure that their colleagues
conform to existing cognitive and technical norms. As a
result most researchers are led to furnish acceptable
information. Such information is rewarded with professional
recognition which, in turn, brings other rewards such as
promotion, increases in salary, additional research funds,
tenure of positions of authority, honorific awards from the
wider society, and so on. Thus the exchange of information
for recognition is the main institutional mechanism whereby
rewards are distributed and intellectual conformity maintained.
Philosophy, many people will want to say, was never as bad as that.
Certainly philosophers are free from the horrors of large scale group
research and from the need for expensive equipment and materials. But
in certain places in recent years there may have been strange pressures
towards conformity in philosophical circles. The conformity has been
much more concerned with the way in which problems are tackled than
xi
with the choice of problems. Certainly in the better parts of Scotland
in recent years there has been plenty of philosophical freedom but in
certain parts of provincial England and in the outer darkness of Wales
things may well have been different.
Talking about philosophy without reference to problems of truth
and falsity is never entirely satisfactory but is sometimes valuable.
In his British Academy lecture on Absolute Idealism Mr A M Quinton is
not much concerned with truth and falsity and for that reason his
lecture is in many ways not a serious discussion of his subject but he
does throw light on some of the institutional problems of philosophy.
He tells us that what he calls 'the very high level of technological
unemployment of idealists within the philosophical profession' was
helped by the fact that many of them became vice chancellors. At
present unfortunately those who appoint vice chancellors are no longer
as interested in philosophers as they once were. We can learn about
the centre and fringes of philosophy from both Mulkay and Quinton.
The philosophical problems of the centre and fringes of philosophy
are clearly shown in the philosophy of religion where whaterer
satisfies philosophers tends not to satisfy theologians and vice
versa. Similarly works in social philosophy are likely to satisfy
neither social scientists nor 'pure' philosophers. But despite the
problems associated with them both social philosophy and the philosophy
of religion raise important issues and deserve attention.
There is a certain reluctance in the present work to rash into
philosophical argument and that is something of an understatement.
The further away philosophers are from matters of pure logic the more
careful they have to be before they rush into philosophical arguments
and in social philosophy they are usually very far away from pure logic.
In the course of our discussion we shall come across two clear cases of
philosophers rushing into argument and being tripped up by facts
in such a way that the arguments have little value. In one case we
shall find a philosopher asserting that imprisonment is the deprivation
of liberty and does not cause distress. In a philosophy seminar such
a remark might seem perfectly satisfactory but if one has actually had
to deal with distressed prisoners and their even more distressed wives
and parents one is liable to find the remark totally absurd. But even
in a philosophy seminar it is to be hoped that the philosopher* s further
remark that capital punishment is simply the deprivation of life and
does not cause distress would not sound sensible. The second case concerns
role theory which as has already been indicated is a major concern in
this work. In his book Roles and Values Prof R £ Downie' sajrs (p 133)
that it is 'as a person* that one 'accepts the rights and duties of a
given role' and he goes on to say 'The morality of role acceptance is
therefore necessarily not reducible to that of the role which is
accepted. It is as persons plain and simple that we are responsible for
the role we accept or reject.' As we shall see Downie's views are
unsound even in relation to achieved roles but they do not begin to apply
to ascribed roles of whose existence Downie gives the impression
of being unaware.
A lot of space in this work is devoted to pointing out the
details of role theory and so we may perhaps with luck avoid Downie's
kind of mistake. In general we can say that pointing things out has
an important part to play in philosophy. The philosophical study of pain
illustrates this point very well. In his book Pain and Emotion
Dr R Trigg points out with the help of empirical evidence the distinction
between pain and the emotional reaction to pain. In fixture philosophical
discussions of the subject it will not really be possible to ignore that
distinction. Another important distinction in the same field concerns
pain and pain behaviour. That distinction is really only clear in
the case of those under the influence of the drug curare and I have
tried to draw attention to the relevant facts in the appendix to my
unpublished Oxford B Litt thesis Private Experiences, In this work
Chapters I - III are all concerned to a greater or lesser extent with
pointing out the details of role theory although a variety of
philosophical points arise out of these details. The main philosophical
point about roles is not reached until chapter VI and even then it
comes rather early in the day.
Before we start on the work itself it should perhaps be said
that it contains many long quotations and many fairly short digressions.
One cannot do justice to an important point of view simply by quoting
a sentence or two. Often it is necessary to quote a paragraph or two.
As far as digressions are concerned one can onl^ say that the digressions
in Beowulf are an inspiration to us all.
xiv
Chapter X
, ROIBS IN GENERAL
f Section 1 - Towards a Definition
Analogies are sometimes important. Their importance in psychology-
is explained by Professor J Cohen in his book Homo Ps.vcholovicus where
he writes (p 20)
The origin of many ideas in psychology can be traced to
models based on analogies with ideas which were or are
current in other disciplines. First, technology and then
physics, chemistry, geology, mathematics, embryology and
epidemiology, have each proved a source of stimulation.
Even economics has had its uses in this respect.
And he continues (p 21) 'The history of psychology may indeed be
regarded as a sequence of conceptions based on such analogies, the
analogy being dram with the dominant science of the time*. Later
on he gives particular examples and one of them runs as follows
Piaget's imposing theory of intellectual growth might be
described as an embryological psychology, for it traces the
appearance, development and maturation of mental structures
in the way the embryologist describes the development of
bodily structures. Piaget began his career in zoology.
If we turn to philosophy we find that in that subject also
analogies are important. Plato's cave (Republic Book VII), social
contract theory, the argument from design and Wittgenstein's language
games all remind us of that fact. The famous analogy which compares
human society to a biological organism has a lot to answer for,
including social surgery and much talk of the body politic. In his
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book 'Metaphysics' (p 170) Professor W H Walsh says of metaphysicians
that "they make frequent use of analogical reasoning; they have an eye
for likenesses of structure more acute than that of most of us and a
tendency to extrapolate readily from partially discerned to overall
patterns" and that comment reminds us what an analogy is. It is a comparison
and preferably an illuminating and important comparison. At its
simplest, if I say that A is an analogy of B I am saying A is like B
especially as regards structure and function. Dictionaries may no
longer be as important as they once were in philosophy, but for what it
is worth Chambers Dictionary defines 'analogy' as 'an agreement or
correspondence in certain respects between things otherwise different;
a resembaaice of relations: parallelism; relation in general: a likeness'.
Further light is thrown on the matter by Professor Max Black who in his
book 'Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy' says
"An analogue object is some material object, system or process designed
to reproduce as faithfully as possible in some new medium the structure
or web of relationship in an original".
Social roles are best defined analogically. A role is like a part
in a play or a team position in a team game. If we wish to explain what
an actor does on the stage we must make reference to the text of the play
he is acting in because at the simplest level the actor is speaking the
lines and carrying out the stage directions contained in that text. He
pays primary attention to the lines and stage directions which relate
to the character he is playing and which constitute his part.
Similarly if we want to understand what a scrum half in rugby does we
must refer to the rules of rugby football, for there we shall find a
statement of the aims of the scrum half and the means which may and may
not be used to try to achieve these aims. In the same way, if we wish
to understand what a policeman does, we must refer to, amongst other
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things, his instructions and standing orders because they will state
some of the aims of police work and by what means these aims may and
may not be achieved. It is as if the policeman were playing some very
elaborate kind, of game. Perhaps at first sight it might seem that games
are more useful in this context than stage performances because off
stage we do not normally speak lines and carry out stage directions,
rather we try to cariy out general and not very specific rules and
instructions and try to achieve general goals and aims. But we must not
forget improvisation which plays an important part in. an actor's training.
The instructor in an improvisation class may say to a student "Imagine
you are an aging syphilitic lavatory attendant in Istanbul. A
prostitute dressed in sea weed enter®s your latrine and has a miscarriage
in front of you. Let us see how you cope with the resulting situation
in your establishment." Only by the use of such methods was it possible
to train actors for the Theatre of the Absurd. Filling a social role
is more like carrying out a stage improvisation exercise such as the
one given above than going on stage to act the part of Hamlet in
Shakespeare's play. There are however, ritualistic roles which are more
easily understood by using the Hamlet rather than the improvisation
analogy. On ceremonial occasions people speak lines and carry out stage
directions as it were.
It might seem at this point that roles are a very simple matter
because we have just explained them without very much effort. Biit
there is a great deal more to be said. Not all of what remains arises
directly from the analogical definition because life off stage and away
from the sports ground is considerably more complicated than life at
these places. Yet throughout this chapter, this part of the work and
indeed, the whole work, it will be impossible to forget the analogical
definition of a social role because it is basic and fundamental. A part
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in a play and a team position in a team game are, as it were,
simplified analogue models of a social role. The models are extremely
useful because they enable us to see the basic structure of a complex
concept. At the same time, these conceptual models are not so simple
that they are in any danger of becoming caricatures. Indeed, a fair amount
of our time will be taken up with pointing out and elaborating some of the
extremely useful and illuminating features of these models.
Before we go on however, we must pause and consider an important
objection to what we have said so far. Mr A R Louch in his book
Explanation and Human Action writes (p 215) "We mean by acting a
performance at variance with a genuine role or the normal appearance of
a person. The analogue in daily life to a stage performances is, in
other words, dissembling. But for a person to dissemble is for him to
play a role which is not his or which he does not normally play. There
must be a legitimate sense in which we can speak of him as acting.
Consequently, the diagnosis of a person's actions as a performance
depends upon the various activities that the individual (or team)
generally engages in". Certainly it is the case that if we wish to under¬
stand what acting is we must meet or at least know about actors when they
are off stage and not acting. But when we do that we are simply extending
our knowledge of the role of the actor and we are confirming rather than
refuting the dramaturgical explantion of action. And we can distinguish
between genuine action in which the agent believes and histrionic action
in which he does not. Roles are equally relevant to the understanding
of either because we must understand the role which the agent is either
genuinely or not genuinely playing before we can understand the actions
in question. Possibly the man in the street talks more often about
acting a part in the sense of dissembling than about role-theory, hut
role theory is in no way discredited because of that uninteresting fact
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about ordinary life and ordinary language. The most common entrance
to the stage of human life, if one may talk in an unavoidably dramatic
manner, is the Homo sapiens vagina and the most common exit is the grave
or the incinerator. We are, as it were, actors on a stage which we cannot
leave until we die and on which we were born. In saying that however,
we are not attempting to abandon all philosophical restraint and there
is no intention of beginning to talk in the manner of an unfortunate
series of Gifford Lectures which was published under the title of
'The Human Situation'. Roles are assigned even to those who try to escape
from human society and so we talk of hermits, recluses, castaways and
drop-outs. We might say that these roles show that the attempt to
escape from roles is futile and impossible, or that the attempt to leave
the stage is impossible. Perhaps we might say that sleepers and the
unconscious do in a sense manage to go off stage. Ordinary language does
not support us here since we talk about sleeping judges, surgeons and
night watchmen, i.e. we talk about sleeping as if it were part of one's
role performance, but clearly it is not unless perhaps one is a subject
in some psychological or physiological experiment on sleep. If it is
objected that sleeping people are not doing anything while actors often
do quite a number of bizarre things off stage, then the point about the
impossibility of escaping from the stage of life has been grasped because
whenever we do anything or act, in the philosophical as opposed to the
histrionic sense of the term, we are performing a role and we are on
stage. Although we have just been noting a difference between our
model and real life, there is a sense in which the model can still cope
with the situation. An actor who falls asleep and not merely pretends
to fall asleep during a play, goes in effect off stage, even if he
remains on stage, because he withdraws from the play, unless he is from
the point of view of the play already dead, but even then, snoring can
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be a serious problem. At this point we shall leave the problem of
the definition of the concept of a role but shall return to it again
in chapter II. Perhaps we now understand enough about roles to be able
to turn to the extremely important topic of the relationship between roles
and their occupants.
Section 2 - Expectations and Attitudes
In this section we must first of all consider how the role performer
is actually aware of the relevant rights, duties and conventions which
constitute his role and which are, as it were, the improvisation
instructor's directions. Naturally, he can alxfays consult the official
statement of rights "and duties and he may be explicitly told about the
conventions, as new recruits to most roles usually are, but there are
more interesting and more subtle points to be considered. And although
it may sometimes be true, and obviously true, that a role has no effect
on its performers, yet that is, if anything, the exception rather than
the rule. If one holds a role for any length of time, it is likely to
affect one quite considerably, and in some cases, quite profoundly. The
average person spends brief spells as a patient and is quite unaffected
by them, but chronic patients are not so lucky and neither in a similar
sort of way are those who have careers in medical work. It would be
completely wrong to imagine that most roles are like clothes which can
be slipped on and slipped off without leaving any mark. An actor's many
parts may not leave any mark on him, but his role as an actor certainly
will.
In most role situations people are likely to find that they are
surrounded by those who expect them to act in accordance with the
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conventions of the role. This is not 3imply a matter of superiors
threatening dire consequences*if the conventions are not obeyed, it is
very often a matter of subordinates, colleagues, equals and people in
related roles being uncooperative unless the role occupant in question
acts in ways that they consider normal. A bus conductor who spent his
time distributing political pamphlets instead of collecting fares would
be likely to find that not only his superiors but also his passengers
would be displeased. Pupils expect their teachers to behave like teachers,
secretaries expect their bosses to behave like bosses and actors expect
their directors to behave like directors. And teachers, bosses and
directors cannot expect pupils, secretaries and actors to behave in
accordance with the conventions of their roles unless they accept the
conventions of their ownielated roles. A type of social contract operates
here. If I abide by the conventions of my role people in related roles
will abide by the conventions of their roles. But if I do not, they will
not and chaos will follow because I shall have no idea what they are
likely to do and they will have no idea what I am likely to do. It is
because of that social contract that we can say with Drs N Gross, ¥ S Mason
and A ¥ McEachern in their 'Explorations in Role Analysis: Studies of
the School Superintendering Role' (p 17) that "Individuals in social
locations behave with reference to expectations". And by that we mean
the expectations of those who surround them in these locations. Later
on in the book (P 319) we find the view " human behaviour is in part
a juncture of the positions an individual occupies and the expectations
held for incumbents of that role ....." That view is really a generalised
version of the previous one and it is to be supported. A concise
expression of the importance of expectations in roles can be found in
Prof. R Dahrendorf's essay 'Homo Socioloaricus' where he writes "Between
must, shall and can - expectations on the one hand and law, custom and
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habit on the other, there is more than an analogy, the two sets of
concepts apply to identical phenomena". Earlier in the essay he sheds
useful light on these three types of expectations when he writes
"Must expectations are the hard core of any social role".
"... most social roles include certain shall expectations, which
are scarcely less compulsory than must expectations" and "...
compliance with can-expectations is frequently a condition of
advacement".
Now that we have seen how role occupants are made aware of their
roles it is necessary to consider how roles affect people their occupants.
The most important point to be made here about roles is that they
influence attitudes which in turn influence action, both inside and
outside the relevant role situation, and attitudes may remain long after
the individual concerned has given up the role which influenced and
possibly even formed them. It is partly because of their effect on
attitudes that roles are extremely important and not, as we noted earlier,
like clothes which can be slipped on and slipped off without any effect
on the wearer. First of all we must try to see what attitudes are.
Chambers Dictionary gives a definition that is so astoundingly bad that
it deserves to be noticed. It runs as follows
"posture or positions: a studied or affected posture:
(of aircraft; position relative to the normal line of flight,
ground or wind: any condition of things or relation of persons
viewed as expressing some thought feeling, etc.".
'Doubtless very sound on aircraft but very weak on people' is really
the only possible comment on that definition. Prof. C L Stevenson in
his paper on 'Ethical Fallibility' gives us a very brief but somewhat
simple minded and crude definition when he says "By attitudes I refer to
tendencies to be for or against something, as typified by liking, dislikinv,
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approving, disapproving, favouring, disfavouring, and so on". That is
true as far as it goes, but there is so much more to be said. The late
Prof. J Drever in his Dictionary of Psychology does very much better.
He defines "attitude" as "a more or less stable set or disposition of
opinion, interest or purpose, involving expectancy of a certain kind of
experience, and with an appropriate response; sometimes used in a wider
sense, but rather less definitely, as in "aesthetic attitude" in the
sense of a tendency to produce artistic results, or a social attitude
in the sense of being sensitive to social relations, social duties or
social opinions...." Indeed Drever's definition seems to be as good as
those which Dr T M Heweomb tells us in his paper On the Definition of
Attitude have probably been the most influential in psychology. They
are Allport's "An attitude is a mental and neural state of readiness,
organised through experience exerting a directive or dynamic influence
upon the individual's response to all objects and situations with which
it is related" and D Krech's and R S Crutchfield's "An attitude can be
defined as an enduring organisation of motivational, emotional, perceptual
and cognitive processes with respect to some aspect of the individual's
world". The psychologists do not seem to give enough attention to the
evaluative aspects of the concept but Stevenson is wrong to emphasise
that aspect to the exclusion of all others.
A very good account of the cognitive aspect of attitudes is given
by Dr S E Asch in his paper, 'Attitudes as Cognitive Structures' where
he writes:
"An attitude contains a more or less coherent ordering of a variety
of data. It sometimes makes sense, for example, to say that a
person has a certain position on civil liberties, on public owner¬
ship, on the rights of minorities, or on a current political
crisis. What we mean by this statement is that the variety of
observations and arguments that he brings forward are in some
measure unified and that they converge to make a case. They
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stand in an ordered relation to each other; they are
distinguishably different from an aggregation of statements
that happen to refer to the same problem. What the person
says at one point is understandably connected with what he
has stated earlier or will say later, in the same way that
the parts of a story are sensibly connected. It is on this
basis that we undertake to foretell how a person is likely
to respond to a new development".
And he gives a good example of what he means when he writes slightly
later on
"When someone defends the system of capitalistic enterprise on
the ground that it has raised living standard that it promotes
individual initiative and offers the best conditions for the
expression and reward of talent, and that it is most compatible
with the liberties of individuals, the strength of the position
derives, it would seem, precisely from, the mutal support that
the various assertions offer one another".
Perhaps we can. now begin to see what attitudes are and how important
they are. Conceptual geography is part of an old fashioned syndrome.
Those who make use of it are likely to be found doing absurd things
such as unpacking concepts and even talking about the furniture of the
universe. But if we are aware of its dangers we can use its language
quite safely and say that attitudes are to be found in the same area
as views, opinions and beliefs. Pacts, values and emotions are all
involved in attitudes. The facts are seen in the light of the
individual's values which are closely connected . with his emotions. A
fair amount of emotion is likely to be involved in the expounding and
defending of attitudes. The importance of attitudes should now be quite
obvious. If we know and understand someone's attitudes we know and under¬
stand a very great deal about that person.
The influence exerted by roles on attitudes is a matter of common
knowledge and observation. The danger is that in doing justice to it
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one is liable to end up talking about caricatures and stereotypes,
which make no allowance for individuality and idiosyncracy. Not all
schoolmasters are boys amongst men though one does hope that they all
manage to be men amongst boys. A vice chancellor once told a conference
of university administrators that although professors raade a great deal
of fuss about the time they had to waste on committees, they made a great
deal more fuss when they were not elected to them. Certainly all who
attended the conference knew the truth of what he was saying, but even
university administrators have to admit that it is possible to meet a
few genuine scholars in any university. The sincere dislike of genuine
scholars for committees and. administration is quite different from the
false dislike which the majority of academics voice endlessly. Role
pressure is very strong in this matter. Any academic who openly said he
enjoyed administration would be exposing the myth of the academic world
that all who hold academic posts are genuine scholars. And so the most
enthusiastic committee men are required to moan at great length about
the fact, or rather alleged fact, that they cannot get on with their real
work because of time wasting administration. One might say fairly
confidently that the writings of Cardinal Newman, T S Eliot and the Spanish
mystics such as St. John of the Cross, would be most unlikely to appeal
to a presbyterian clergyman. Yet I was brought up by such a clergyman
who had a very considerable interest in precisely these writings and
published papers on some of them. And doubtless there are socialist
stockbrokers. Not all judges, one may surmise, are totally narrow minded
and reactionary and so on. The best appreciation of role attitudes
possibly arises when they are wrongly but reasonably assumed to apply to
oneself. An assistant prison governor who would rather expose the police
than cover up for them may be shocked to find that borstal boys' parents
may simply assume without question that he is in league with the police.
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The shock is likely to be intensified when he appreciates that the
parents' belief is entirely reasonable. Yet, after one has made due
allowance for individuality and idiosyncrasy, one must acknowledge the
very considerable influence exerted by roles in attitudes. A certain
theologian who had spent almost his entire life in Oxford was said to
find it difficult to take seriously any form of organisation between the
college and the cosmos. The results of a survey amongst certain under¬
graduates showed that they would pay vice chancellors considerably more
than civil service permanent under secretaries. Evidently it has been
found that army officers do not fit into posts in industry easily without
special courses of introduction and reorientation because they tend to
see workers as other ranks who should accept orders without question.
It is difficult for an ex officer to accept the idea of discussing matters
with shop stewards and negotiating with trade union officials. If one
prefers experiment to anecdote, then there is the case quoted by Dr. Asch
in his paper on Attitudes as Cognitive Structures of an experiment in
which two groups of people were used. One of the groups consisted of
employees in a labour organisation, the other was composed of business
men. They were selected on the assumption that they were likely to be
biased in opposite directions on given issues. The results indeed pointed
clearly in the predicted directions. The business men judged the facts
erroneously according to their general position, and so did the labout*
group. The whole matter has been expressed extremely vividly and
extremely well by another psychologist, Dr. A C Elms who writes in the
preface to the volume he edited entitled Role Playing. Reward and
Attitude Change.
"Role playing is one of the great natural persuaders. We learn
early to mouth opinions which are not our own; and if we express
them often enough, they seem almost inexorably to become our own.
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In many instances this process of self-persuasion appears even
more powerful than the direct attempts of others to influence us.
As Pascal said "We are more easily persuaded, in general, by the
reasons we ourselves discover than by those which are given co us
by others".
The effects of role playing are pervasive. Role playing may well
be one of the central processes by which children internalize the
attitudes emphasized by their family and their society. Military
recruits come to feel more combative, and young executives more
businesslike, in part through the outward portrayal of roles
assigned to them by their seniors in command. Arguments are still
heard that civil rights legislation and Supreme Court decisions
may change public behaviour, but can't "change the hearts and minds
of men". Such arguments ignore substantial evidence that legally
enforced changes in the public behaviour of Southern whites toward
Negroes - role playing in other words - have been followed by
significant positive changes in attitudes toward integration.
Psychological practitioners have made frequent, use of role playing:
to alter patients' self-concepts through psychodrama therapy; to
produce faster acceptance of "professional attitudes" by student
teachers and student nurses; to promote greater mutual under¬
standing on the part of management and union leaders in collective
bargaining sessions".
Prom the philosophical point of view attitudes are extremely
important because they show us that it is not always possible to separate
and sharply distinguish, between reasons and causes in relation to belief
and action. People are normally prepared to argue vehemently and at
length in defence of their attitudes which they regard as important.
And in the course of these arguments they are likely to quote role
experience which has acted causally upon them as reasons for holding
the attitudes in question. A particular example may help to make matters
clear. Those who like myself believe that criminals are neither wicked
and. deserving of punishment,nor sick and requiring treatment, are likely
to regard that attitude as an important one at the present time., because
it is not yet widely held and so we are prepared to argue fairly vehemently?
and at fair length about the matter. And in the course of the argument
role experience is likely to be quoted amongst one's reasons for holding
the attitude^despite the causal nature of the influence of role expeiencs.
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In my own case I would wish to argue, as I expect would most others
who hold the attitude .in question, that deviance theory is sounder than
traditional criminology. Saying that means rejecting the idea that there
is some characteristic which we can call criminality which is found in
criminals but not in others. Indeed if we wish to make use of the concept
of criminality at all we must regard it as a label which is applied to
certain people by the police and the courts within the general framework
of the criminal law. In the General Conclusion we shall return to this
point when we consider the common sin of individualising social phenomena.
In looking at reasons for holding that attitude and at the cause
and role experience which are involved in these reasons I shall have to
make use of my own case however tiresome that may he. The roles of student
of philosophy and assistant prison governor have a lot to answer for as
far as my own holding of the attitude outlined above is concerned. In
the course of my philosophical studies I came to adopt a modified,
utilitarian position on moral matters and to adopt the view that punishment
cannot be justified. These views constitute reasons for rejecting any
policy of punishing people who have been found guilty of offences against
the criminal law. But only as a result of being a student of philosophy
was I given a chance of considering and adopting and supporting the
arguments involved in these views. As far as I can remember when I
became an assistant prison governor after I had been a student of
philosophy for a number of years I held the view that criminals are in
some sense or other disturbed and in need of some kind of treatment
given either by psychiatrists or social workers. In other words I held
the only popular alternative to the view that criminals are wicked and
deserving of punishment. As an assistant prison governor however,I soon
became aware of two types of prisoners. One type is described in prison
files and the other type walks about prisons. Only by reading prison
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files can we discover the phantom criminality. The more one
interviews prisoners the less one is likely to believe in its
existence unless one allows all one's interviewing experience to be
coloured by a belief in its existence. That point is well illustrated
by the fury of a senior prison social worker when he read a report by
one of his subordinates which described a prisoner as normal and well
balanced etc. He told his subordinate that she simply had not probed
deeply enough in her interview because in his view the man would not
be in prison unless there was something wrong with him.
Only a prison official can read prison files and possibly only one
who has had the good fortune to study philosphy can appreciate the
purely evaluative force of such terms as 'inadequate', 'immature' and
'personality defect' which are used endlessly to condemn prisoners and
to sustain a belief in criminality which is extremely common amongst
those who write reports on prisoners. Clearly the senior social worker
mentioned above wanted these terms or roughly similar ones used in order
to produce the usual type; of condemnatory report and he was angry because
«
his subordinate challenged the myth of criminality. Perhaps we can noxf
see how reasons and the causal effect of role experience can be used
together when one is trying to explain and justify holding an attitude.
The causal effect of role experience can lead to and strengthen reasons.
Section 3 - Role Interpretations and Variations
After considering what roles do to people it is appropriate to
consider what people can do with roles and how they can interpret them
and express their individuality through them. It is commonly though that
roles leave no room for individuality. They tend to be seen as railway
tracks along which people run like trains. The interpretative arts
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however remind us that even in situations where people follow very
precise instructions these can. in fact be immense scope for individual
interpretation. The pianist and the actor have in one sense simply to
play certain notes or speak certain lines. Yet the scope for their
individual interpretations is in fact more or less infinite. And there
is room for individual interpretation in a large proportion of roles.
It would be a mistake to think that one can express one's individuality
only if one can devote one day a week to discussing the reform of the
PPE syllabus and another to possible solutions of the problem of traffic
on the High. There may be much more scope for individuality in many
working class roles than many middle class people imagine. When one's
train stops apparently for ever at White City one can listen to what
the guards say to each other. Often they talk about their colleagues
role interpretations. Bill we learn is famous for looking up and down
the platform an inordinate number of times before he lets his train
continue on its journey and so on. Possibly any sign of life and humanity
is likely to stand out more prominently at White City than it would
elsewhere. Yet even there we can leam of scope for individuality that
we might not have known about. At the same time it is important to
criticise roles that do not give sufficient scope for individuality.
Driving trains from West Ruislip to Epping must be more interesting and
more creative as it were than collecting tickets all day at either of
these two places. In general we can say that each occupant of a role
has what might be called his role style, the manner in which he carries
out his duties. Most people prefer cheerful bank clerks to sullen bank
clerks and officiousness is regarded as a sin. One's role style is
generally a reflection of one's psychological characteristics. Certain
roles give their occupants a lot of scope for initiative and in certain
cases we can talk meaningfully of what x has done with his job or made
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of his post. Roles place limits on the behaviour of their occupants
but within these limits there is scope for individuality and some roles
as those of President of the USA or Secretary General of the United
Nations give their occupants a great deal of scope while other such as
bank clerks or factory workers give very little scope, but all role
occupants are liable to cause themselves trouble if they try to adopt
individual attitudes to the limits of their roles. A President of the
USA who acts unconstitutionally will find himself in serious difficulties
or at least he may do and a bus conductor who refuses to wear the
appropriate uniform will almost certainly lose his job. In certain cases
however individuals can change the nature of their roles. Erving Goffman
calls this role enterprise in The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life
p .15 and defines it as 'a process in a particular social establishment
whereby a particular member attempts not so much to move into a higher
social position already established as to create a new position for
himself, a position involving duties which suitably express attitudes
that are congenial to him. Role enterprise need not go so far as the
creation of entirely new roles. Sometimes particular individuals perform
so brilliantly more or less within the established limits of a role that
they are examples of the role at its very best and so we talk admiringly
of Daniel, Jowett and Florence Nightingale and only slightly less admiringly
of Daniel, a Jowett or a Florence Nightingale.' In other words if x is
an outstanding occupant of a role the expression 'an x' may come to be
used as a recognition of high ability in the role. People like Jowett
and Florence Nightingale realise the unrealised potentialities of a role
and in doing so they in effect change it slightly. Not all roles are
assumed voluntarily but many are and individuality should be sought as
much in a person's choice of roles as in his performance within any role.
One learns a great deal about the individuality of a bank clerk when one
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knows that he is the secretary of a horticultural society and a member
of a swimming club.
In this chapter we are trying to understand the complexity of roles.
Some of that complexity arises from their possible combinations and their
synchronic and diachronic variations. Consider the case of an ambassador
who goes to a reception at an embassy other than his own in the country
where he is stationed. During the reception he simultaneously occupies
the roles of ambassador of country x to country y and guest at a reception
in the embassy of country z in country y. The relations between x and y
and x and z and z and y will have an important bearing on his behaviour
at the reception. Normally in such a situation the role of guest might
take slight precedence over the role of ambassador but an urgent message
from his own embassy might very well reverse the situation. The role of
doctor provides a good example of synchronic and. diachronic variations
despite the fact that throughout all these variations the primary task
of the role viz attempting to heal disease and relieve suffering remains
unaltered. Prom the synchronic point of view we can sae for example the
differences between private enterprise and state organised medicine and
between a male dominated and non male dominated profession. These
differences become clear if one looks at medicine in the USA, UK and USSR
at the present time. Prom the diachronic point of view one can see an
improvement in social status and an increase in the use of technology
and equipment and in specialisation* The doctor who entered his patient's
house by the back door did not use much if any equipment he could not
carry his bag and he did not refer his patient to a specialist, And
so we can see that talk of the role of the doctor is unlikely to do justice
to the role's diversity. One does not find oneself simply in a role but
rather in one particular variation or version of a role at a particular
place and at a particular time. The role of company secretary for
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example is likely to vary in many ways from company to company.
Section 4 - Biological Roles
There is one type of role which, is extremely important from several
points of view. The roles in question are biological roles which are
very widespread in the sense that everyone occupies not only one but in
fact several of them. In addition the existence of that type of role
raises important questions about different types of explanation of human
behaviour and action. By a biological role one means a vertical ascribed
role which is ascribed primarily on the basis of the possession of certain
biological characteristics. Vertical roles are those which cut through
social classes which can be regarded as horizontal strata of society which
give rise to horizontal class roles. In other words vertical roles can
be and are occupied by people from all social classes. It can be said
that biological roles involve a combination of biological and social
explanations of human action and behaviour. Perhaps it would be helpful
therefore to glance briefly at the various possible types of explanation
of behaviour and action.
The main types of explanation of action and behaviour are social,
biologicab psychological, theological, moral and metaphysical. Social
explanations make use of concepts such as role, class, social mobility
and social conflict. Biological explanations use concepts such as
instincts and drive and may regard human beings as simply complicated
animals and human societies as simply complicated versions of animal
societies. Psychological explanations use such concepts as learning,
memory, needs, personality, intelligence, and use the concept of
intention in the way that G ¥ Allport uses that concept. Theological
explanations use such concepts as sin, grace and salvation. Moral
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explanations make use of such concepts as free will, choice, decision,
duty and obligation. Metaphysical explanations use concepts such as
mind and mental processes and may use such concepts as soul and volition.
It may be claimed that catalogues of concepts are of little value and
that in any event the catalogue above is particularly useless since it
is incomplete from the philosophical point of view. In chapter six we shall
be concerned with philosophical explanations of action that give a central
place to the concepts of limb and muscle movements. At the same time it
can be claimed that although a satisfactory account of each type of
explanation would really have to be quite extensive we have nevertheless
indicated in at least a very rough and ready sort of way what the main
types of explanation of action behaviour are.
It is of philosophical interest to note that each type of explanation
can take either an inclusive or an exclusive form and all of the types
except the biological can take either a determist or a free will form.
The last point can be explained first by saying that each type of
explanation except the biological is compatible with either determinism
or libertarianism. The first point means that each of the types of
explanation can be taken either to exclude all the others or to include
some or all of the others. Only the exclusive form of the biological
type is incompatible with free will. Presumably however the exponent
of the exclusive biological type of explanation believes that his views
result from a rational consideration of the relevant evidence and are
not simply the product of his own instincts, drive and hormones. In
other words if one argues for the exclusive biological type of explanation
one ipso facto does not believe in it or support it. The exclusive forms
of the types of explanation are heroic but uninteresting. Anyone who
argues for a totally social explanation of human action and behaviour
is simply ignoring the biological facts of life and vice versa. Worse
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still anyone who argues for either an exclusive theological or
exclusive metaphysical explanation is not merely ignoring social,
biological and psychological phenomena but is also basing his explanation
on existential claims that can be regarded as extremely weak. The
interesting and important forms of the types of explanations are inclusive.
A study of biological roles enables us to see something of the complexity
and value of the inclusive forms of the types of explanation. The main
biological roles are chronological, sexual and racial and we shall look
at each of those varieties of biological roles in turn.
Chronological roles are perhaps the simplest of biological roles.
The extreme physical weakness of infants and the senile means that their
social position must be one of considerable dependence if they are to
survive. It might be argued that dependence is the only factor in common
between the social position of an infant and of a senile person. But
there may be other factors in common as well. Dependent people tend to
take their social status from those on whom they are dependent. The infant
child of x has the social status of x and an inmate of a home for the aged
may to a very considerable extent have the social status of the home.
Certainly a ninety year old widow living in an institution has a social
status that contains elements derived from the social status of her late
husband and her children. Her social status would in some ways be quite
different if she lived with her children because her physical proximity
to them would emphasise her status as their mother. If however her
children are rarely able to visit her in her home for the aged then her
social status may derive as little from them as it does from her late
husband. The example we are considering enables us to see roles and status
and the biological and social factors involved in them quite clearly. The
status of a role can vary a great deal and occupants of the same role do
not necessarily have the same status or social standing. It might be
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argued that the role of very young or very old dependent persons
explains primarily the behaviour and actions of those on whom the person
is dependent rather than of the dependent person himself. In as much as
the behaviour of a dependent person follovrs on from the behaviour of the
people on whom he is dependent this view is correct. A senile person
can eat only when someone else provides a meal. Equally however those
who look after the old may say that they supply meals only when their
charges need them. It is more important to note that infants and the
\
senile may not be regarded as being capable of action and: so the only
\\
actions in their situation may be those of the people who look after them.
\Since infants cannot speak and so cannot supply anything that %mld be
regarded as reasons for pr justifications or explanations of whab^they
do it is reasonable to regard them as being incapable of action, fthe
case of the senile is somewhat more complicated since we are likely to
want to say that although they may often be very confused and incapable
of action yet from time to time their former abilities may return and
may be completely aware of what they are doing. Possibly it is reasonable
|
to say that the roles of infant and senile person are passive ascribed"
roles which can be occupied by those who are totally incapable of aotibn.
ii
Between infancy and senility chronological biological factors take
second place to social factors. Puberty is a biological arid psychological
•I
landmark in the history of the individual but in our society it is not If
I
an event of particular social importance. The stage at which people arp
jf
allowed to assume full adult rights and responsibilities in our society
J
is a matter of conventions that are not directly linked to puberty. It
may perhaps at times be somewhat vaguely assumed that certain adult rights
are responsibilities that cannot he exercised until after puberty but the
matter is not normally discussed. Marriage before puberty may be
undesirable but it is not necessarily clear why people should not vote
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■before puberty.. Adolesence greatly complicates matters and makes
confusion worse confounded. Puberty may mark the beginning of
adolescence but it is not entirely clear what mart's its end. The
problem cannot be solved by saying that adolescence comes to an end with
the adoption of a completely adult form of life because, bdth 'adolescent'
and 'adult' are highly evaluative terms. Things which are called
adolescent are generally regarded as inferior to things which are called
adult. It is important to emphasise however that, what is adult to one
person may be adolescent to another and vice versa. The problem is not
solved but only restated by saying that adults are mature and adolescents
are not entirely mature because 'mature * is a very highly evaluative word
when it is applied to human beings. The topic of maturity will be
discussed in greater detail in chapter five. Mercifully it is sufficient
for our present purposes to note that the end of adolescence is not marked
by any biological event or events. Reproduction does not by itself mark
the end of adolescence and incidentally we might as well note that neither
does parenthood although parenthood is primarily social rather than
biological. Whatever marks the end of adoloscence must be to a large
extent if not entirely social even if we cannot state what precisely it is.
A powerful example of the priority of social over biological factors is
provided by Dr Margaret Mead in her book Culture and Commitment in which
she writes
"The distinctions I am making among three different kinds of
culture-postfigurative, in which children learn primarily from
their forebears, configurative, in which both children and adults
learn from their peers, and prefiguarative, in which adults
learn also from their children - are a reflection of the period
in which we live. Primitive societies and small religious and
ideological enclaves are primarily postfigurative, deriving
authority from the past. Great civilisations, which necessarily
have developed techniques for incorporting change, character- \
istically make use of some form of configurative learning from ; '
peers, playmates, fellow students and fellow apprentices. We
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are now entering a period, nex< in history, in which the young
are taking on new authority in their prefigurative apprehension
of the still unknown future".
The biological aspects of childhood are basically the same in the three
types of society and so differences amongst them rhat relate to child¬
hood are caused by social and technological factors. And precisely the
same point can be made about adulthood. As far as chronological roles
are concerned therefore we can say that only at the extremes of infancy
and senility are biological factors dominant over social faotors. "ven
that statement may have to be modified in favour of social factors
because in some societies old people including the senile are revered,
while in others they are neglected and shunned. Biological factors
cannot explain the differences between these types of society.
Sexual roles seem at first sight to be a matter of social boundaries
following biological boundaries. People are either male or female from
the biological point of view and also from the social point of view.
Acccunt s given by anthropologists of societies in which what we regard
as normal sex role behaviour seem to be reversed do not in any sense
complicate matters. A society in which women are mox-e aggressive than
men is likely to have just as strong and important sex roles as one in
which men are more aggressive than women. Homosexuality is perhaps the
biggest complicating factor as far as the simple picture of 3ex roles
is concerned if heterosexuality is one of the assumptions on which that
picture is based. To a greater or lesser extent the psychological and
social life of a homosexual may be said to run counter to his or her
physical sex if heterosexuality is regarded as the norm. A society
which is rigidly divided on a heterosexual basis is unlikely to have
any room outside prisons and mental hospitals for people who are openly
homosexual. If a society allows people to be openly homosexual without
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suffering any penalty or stigma then almost inevitably the sex role
situation in that society will be somewhat fluid. The simple picture
of the 3ex rolo situation suffers serious damage ,-hen we begin to
look at some of the complexities of the biological factors involved.
Disputes about the sex of some Olympic athletes are quite well known
and remind us of the distinction between genetic and somatic sex. Only
those whose genetic sex corresponds to their somatic sex are fertile
in the biological sense of the term. It might be said that as far
as the vast majority of people are concerned this point is purely
academic and simply does not affect the general picture. Those who
say that might readily agree that women on average seem to live longer
than men. Comparative^ lengthy widowhood does seem to be part of the
sex role situation. But in an important and interesting article
published in the journal 'The Listener' on the 17th August 1972 and
entitled simply Men and Women Dr. ¥ M S Russell shows us that matters
are considerably more complicated. He writes
Aristole had two concubines and a daughter and he went on
record with the statement that men have more teeth than women:
generalisations about the two sexes are apt to be made rather
lightly. But when modern textbooks tell us that, on average
woaent live longer than men, they a re basing the conclusion
on copious and reliable evidence obtained in a number of countries.
The trouble is that these countries are all of a certain kind.
The countries of the world can be divided into two groups. In
the first group, people can generally expect to live son®thing
like three score years and ten, and here women live longer than
men. In the second group, both sexes can on the whole expect
much shorter lives, and her men live longer than women. The
first group includes European countries such as Hungary and
Sweden, but also others such as Canada and Japan, so the
difference between the two groups is not one of region or race.
The longer-lived countries are-roughly speaking, the industrialised
ones, where modern medical services are most highly developed.
Later one he talks about the reasons for this situation and writes :~
Since women live longer than men in industrial societies why do
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they die younger in pre-industrial ones? Part of the answer
is provided by the hazards ofchildbirth* In a modern
industrial society, we have advanced obstetrical methods,
considerable control over infection, anaesthetic techniques
to reduce pain and shock, medical services during pregnancy,
abortion for cases of heart, lung or kidney disease,
contraception to delay the first pregnancy and reduce the
total number of pregnancies. All these factors must make
childbearing §afer for women, not only reducing the number of
outright deaths, hut also reducing the strain on health produced
by repeated pregnancies*
low he begins to complicate the picture he has drawn by saying
There remains another question. Since men live longer than
women in pre-industrial societies why do they die younger in
industrial ones? Before the facts about pre-industrial
societies were kno\<ra, when it was believed that men always
died younger on average, it was generally assumed tliat women
were inherently fitter, and therefore longer-lived than men*
Tills could still be true* Relieved from the special stresses
we have considered, in societies where everyone lives longer,
women may at last he able to benefit from a difference of this
kind. The chromosome mechanism of sex determination is more
complex than we had formerly thought, but it is so designed
that it could confer genetic advantage on the female. Women
have a lower basal metabolic rate and steadier blood pressure
than men: obvious evolutionary adaptations for the protracted
energy drain of pregnancy and labour.
Towards the end of his article Russell complicates matters still
further saying
It is natural now to wonder whether modern industrial men would
die so much younger than women if they were not subjected to
some special stresses - just as women are in pre-industrial
societies. In industrial societies, substantially more men
than women go out to work and are thus subjected to more
competitive pressures and burdensome responsibilities as
well as industrial health hazards and the fatigue and strain
of long-distance commuting. Men in these societies, compared
with women present greater rates of accidents, stress diseases
of the circulation, alcoholism and suicide.
It should now be clear that our original idea that sexual roles are
simply a matter of social boundaries following biological boundaries
completely untenable since social factors influence human biology.
Once we move away from the purely biological field into areas
26
that are psychological and social it is simply not clear what produces
difference between the sexes. In her book Intelligence and Personality
Dr Alice Heirn has a chapter which has the title 'The Mediocrity of Women
And that chapter has the brave and cheerful subtitle 'Vive La Difference*.
At the beginning of that chapter Dr Heim writes
Five points are worthwhile making on the congnitive differences
between males and females. First, there is a tendency for men
to be'more so* than females, whatever is being tested. Thus
on intelligence tests, for instance, xifhen groups of comparable
young men and women take tests, they tend to gain mean scores
which are similar, but the highest and the lowest scorers are
liable to be male. This finding is not confined to intelligence
tests or even to psychological tests in general. It applies
also to academic examinations. There is a tendency for women
students to gain proportionately more second class degrees - and,
thus fewer firsts and thirds - in many examination subjects. This
applies even to Oxbridge where, owing to the sex ratio in the
university, the competition for Oxbridge places among girls
leaving school is stiffer than it is among boys. It might therefore
have been supposed that these young women, being still more highly
selected would obtain a higher proportion of first class degrees.
This is not the case, however, and in ay opinion, the reason is
not simply prejudice on the part of the (predominately male)
examiners.
In the 'real world' situation, the same tendency holds: men
rather than women are found at the extremes. There are more
male geniuses, more male criminals, more male mental defectives,
suicides and stutterers, more colour blind males, than females.
The list is a long one, with relatively few exceptions. Whether
this is due primarily to the biological functions of women may
become clarified within the next half-century. In any case,
the fact that there are far more eminent men than women, past
and present, is not wholly explicable on sociological grounds -
i.e. that higher education for women is less than a hundred
years old, that until recently it was not considered quite
nice for a woman to have a career; and that even now a
professional career for a woman is thought by many to be
incompatible with, and inferior to, wifehood and motherhood.
Perhaps we can now say that the boundaries between the sexes are as
much social as biological. Only the mechanisms of reproduction are
purely biological. Social factors are to be found in every other area
including techniques of intercourse. The phrase 'the missionary
position' if it means anything, reminds us of that fact.
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Racial roles have even weaker biological foundations than sexual
roles. Possibly at the present time many people think of race primarily
in terms of skin colour and secondarily in terms of various facial
features such as the size and shape of the lips and the nose. General
body build and type of hair are also probably involved in the same
concept of race. There is absolutely no reason why these features of
a persons's appearance should be regarded as being of greater social
significance than colour of hair or eyes or height or girth, A
society in which fat people and people with fair hair are given low
social status is certainly a logically possible society and it would be
just as rational a society as ore in which people with black skins are
given low social status. The fact that skin colour is an extremely
obvious feature of a person's appearance may be relevant to the
importance that is sometimes attached to it but it is certainly not a
justification for that importance. Squally the fact that in many
societies white skin ranks socially higher than black skin is without
justification but may perhaps be partially explained by the historical
accident that at one time some white people owned black slaves rather
than vice versa.
As far as our purposes are concerned there is probably not very
much more that needs to be said about race but we might as well glance
briefly at definitions of the term 'race' given by Dr P L van den Berghe
in his book 'Race and Racism' where he writes :«*
The term "race" has been quite confusing because of its four
principal connotations.
1 Physical anthropologists have called races the various subspecies
of homo sapiens characterized by certain phenotypical and geno-
typical trait3 (e.g. the "Mongoloid race" or the "Negroid race").
They have not agreed among themselves, and biological classifi¬
cations of the human species include three to more than a score
of such races (14). Belatedly, many physical anthropologists
28
are abandoning racial taxonomies altogether.
2 Laymen have profusely used the word race to describe a human
group that shared certain cultural characteristics such as
language or religion (e.g. the "French race" or the "Jewish
race").
3 Race has been loosely used as a synonym for species
(e.g. the "Human race").
4 Many social scientists have meant by race a human group
that defines itself and/or is defined by other groups as
different from other groups by virtue of innate and immutable
physical characteristics. These physical characteristics are
in turn believed to be intrinsically related to moral,
intellectual, and other non-physical attributes or abilities.
It is perhaps possible to raise certain doubts about the second of
van den Ber-ghe's points. Racial disputes and problems tend to concern
'laymen1 rather than physical anthropolgists or social scientists and
physical attributes have been at the heart of all disputes and problems
arising from racial discrimination. The racial aspects of German fascism
were as much based on physical characteristics as are the racial aspects
of Boer fascism. Cultural characteristics tend to be regarded as of
secondary importance to physical characteristics. Clearly if one is
trying to run a racially segregated society as the German facists did
and as the Boer fascists are doing one wants to be able to segregate
people easily and quickly. Physical characteristics rather than religious
belief are likely to determine the right of entering into the appropriate
public lavatories in such a society. Our original point about the weak
biological foundations of social roles is confirmed by van den Berghe
when he writes (p 11). - "It is not the presence of objective physical
differences between groups that creates races, but the social recognition
of such differences as socially significant or relevant".
Before we leave the topic of biological roles there are two main
points that should be noted. The first is that the three types of
biological role interact with each other. We can say that there are
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chronological aspects of sexual roles or alternatively we can say
that there are sexual aspects of chronological roles. The psychosexual
development'that is much talked about in psychiatric and social work
circles can be described in either of these ways. And there can be
chronological and sexual aspects of racial roles. In British society
at the present time for instance it appears to be the case that West
Indian women and girls find it very much easier to get jobs than West
Indian men especially perhaps young men. The second point about
biological roles is that they are not especially concerned with the basic
biological needs such as food and air which are essential for human survival.
It might certainly be claimed that sexual satisfaction is a fairly basic
human need and that reproduction is essential for the survival of the
human race. At the same time it is true that the need for food and air
is more basic than the need for sexual satisfaction and that it is
necessary to distinguish betifeen the survival of individual people and
the survival of the human species. All roles including but not
especially biological roles require the satisfactory functioning of the
biological mechanism of the body and the absence of major disease.
Perhaps it is necessary to modify that statement so that it is clear
that it is concerned with all roles except the roles of patient and
invalid which require the presence or alleged presence of disease.
Finally it should be said that although biological roles are ascribed
roles they do give us areas of choice despite the fact that one does not
choose one's sex or one's age or one's race. Sexual<racial and
chronological features can all either be accentuated or disguised.
One can either accept one's race and its relationship with other races
or can rebel against these aspects of one's life. It is possible to
talk about a person's attitudes to his age, his race and his sex and
his interpretation of his biological roles will display these attitudes.
Sex change operations despite all their complications do offer people
many if not all of the social, psychological and even physical
satisfaction of the opposite sex for the sacrifice of fertility. Since
in addition to the loss of fertility, sex change operations cannot alter
a person's basic skeletal structure, they produce in a sense simply an
extreme form of biological disguise or rather perhaps, genetic sexual
neutrality, but at the same time we must say that they provide the most
extreme form of choice available in the field of biological roles.
Despite the fact that they are often background roles biological roles
cannot often be ignored when one is trying to understand someone's
actions and behaviour.
Section 5 - Miscellaneous Points
It may be appropriate to end this chapter with a consideration of
four miscellaneous points, two of which arise in the book 'Role' edited
by Prof. J A Jackson. One of the papers in the book is entitled 'The
Man and the Mask; A Discussion of Role Theory'. A footnote to the
title explains inter alia that the 'article is an edited version of a
discussion held between Bryan Heading (sociology), Martin Hollis
(philosophy) and Malcolm Bradbury (literary criticism) at the University
of East Anglia, Norwich, England'. At one stage in the discussion
(p 59) Mr Hollis replies to a point made by Mr Heading by saying
"But you have already agreed (or at least did not dispute it)
that role-analysis explains only what a man is required by his
roles to do. If you agree also that some chess moves are
neither required nor forbidden by the role of chess master
(and you can hardly deny it), then role-analysis does not
explain why he plays them. Yet rational moves have rational
explanations.. The master explains by analysing the position
why he played that particular move; the role theorist explains
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by analysing the role why the master was in general playing
to win. The sociological explanation is of the 'general-law'
variety and does not explain the particular move; the rational
explanation is not of the general variety and does explain the
move. (That is why I prefer rational innovation. Irrational
behaviour may well fit your model.)"
It should be obvious that rol© analysis explains more than what a
man is required by his roles to do. What a man is allowed by his roles
to do is also explained by role analysis and so is what ho is encouraged
to do and discouraged from doing by his roles. Precisely how a
particular man responds to particular role pressures at a particular
time cannot b® explained by role theory but equally what that man does
cannot be explained without reference to these pressures. It nay be
that it is not very sensible to talk about role pressures which encourage
or discourage chess players to do or from doing certain things but chess
playing does not enable us to see the complexities of role theory.
Hoilis sentence which begins 'If you agree also that ......... ' is
hardly Justified since Heading has just said (Jackson p 159) 'Because
the roles of chess only permit certain types of move'. At
the end of the comments by Hollis quoted above we came across mistaken
ideas that role theory is more or less irrelevant to the explanation
of particular actions in the sense of e.g. moves in a chess game and is
relevant only to the explanation of the general trends in action such as
e.g. the general strategy of a game of chess. Once again the chess playing
example is of limited value if one wants to see the complexities of role
theory. But in general we can say that although role theory cam never
provide a total explanation of a particular action, however a particular
action is defined, it can always provide a vital and important part of
the explanation. What a man does in a particular situation can be under¬
stood only if we take into account his perceptions of his role situation.
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Probably chess playing does not show the point at its clearest because
the roles involved are simple and very precisely defined. A consideration
of the actions of any president of the USA might very well make matters
a lot clearer than a consideration of the moves made by chess players.
Another paper in Jackson's book is entitled 'Role: A Redundant
Concept in Sociology?' In that paper Dr Coulson argues that
The concept of role, with its reliance on a view of man as
role conformer and of society as integrated role system
is a distortion. It is time that these inadequacies were
recognized and that the concept of role was abandoned by
sociologists. Without it we are able to examine the
relationships between the expectations which members of
different groups hold of the incumbents of a particular
social position in a more flexible and dynamic way, one
in which the structure of relationships existing and
developing between the different groups in turn structures
the expectations, and their consequences for the behaviour
of the position holder are understood as part of an
interaction with the individual's own learned expectations.
The process is thus a dialectical one and presupposes
neither unified sets of expectations about people in
different positions, nor a passive individual adaptation
to such sets of expectations.
It is perhaps somewhat strange to find a sociologist holding these
views. The man in the street or in the Aristotelian Society might
be forgiven for holding them if he had not paid much attention to
role theory as many people in these places unfortunately have not
paid much attention to it. But the position of sociologists is in
theory at any rate different from that of these people. The main
point to be made against Coulson is that role theory does not
involve or rely on 'a view of man as role conformer and of society,
as integrated role system'. Rebels, innovators and social change
are all recognised and taken account of in role theory. Roles are
not changeless and. everlasting. They appear, change and disappear.
One of the aims of the French revolutionaries was the abolition of the
role of king of France and even if they did not achieve any of their
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other aims at least they achieved that one. And so philosophers have
been able to deal with the puzzles involved in the proposition 'The
present King of France is baLd* since the revolution. Similarly
the Russian revolutionaries achieved the abolition of the role of tsar
of Russia even if they achieved nothing else. Roles are seldom as obvious
as when they are being rebelled against. Once I heard a prisoner being
asked to address a prison official as 'sir* to which he replied 'I have
•never called anyone 'sir* since I came to prison and, I don't intend to
start now*. His very defiance seemed to emphasise the strength of the
conventions of his unfortunate role. One might guess that at the end of
his long sentence that prisoner will be calling prison officials 'sir'
and that in due course prisoners will not be expected to call prison
officials 'sir'. Some roles are not easily changed but there are few
roles that do not change in the course of time.
Role theory is neutral between functionalist and conflict views of
society. And instead of providing uswith a refutation of role theory
Coulson has given us, quite unwittingly, a good account of some of its
more important features. In the passage quoted above it is necessary
to delete the first two sentences for the reasons which have been given.
If the first two words of the third sentence are then replaced by the
phrase 'with the help of role theory' and the word 'more' is deleted
we have an excellent and worthwhile little contribution to role theory
which runs as follows
'With the help of role theory we are able to examine the
relationships between the expectations which members of
different groups hold of the incumbents of a particular
social position In a flexible and dynamic way, one in which
the structure of relationships existing and developing
between the different groups in turn structures the
expectations, and their consequences for the behaviour of the
position holder are understood as part of an interaction with
the individual's own learned expectations. The process is
34
thus a dialectical one and presupposes neither unified sets
of expectations about people in different positions, nor a
passive individual adaptation to such sets of expectations.
There is an objection to role theory and to roles which is, I
suppose,marxist and can, I suppose, be found in the relevant literature.
But since I do not seem to have read that literature I am extremely
grateful to Mr John Barker for bringing it to my attention especially
since the conditions in which he found himself at the time may not have
seemed to him to have been conducive to academic discussion. The
objection dismisses roles as simply an unfortunate result of the
division of labour which some people may regard as a totally bad
thing. The objection is however completely misconceived. Let us
imagine a simple agrarian community in which the division of Ifebpur
is completely unknown. In that community no one is required to engage
in any type of activity as opposed to any other type and no one is
forbidden to engage in any type of activity. Everyone is free to
perform surgical operations on everyone else and no one is told that
he must not write epic poetry or engage in reproduction. Such a
society would exhibit role behaviour as much as any other type of
society because in it one would inevitably find a distinction between
people and types of activity. The same activity or tasks would be
carried out by different people just as the same thing would be said by
different people. Even if everyone engaged in the same type of activity
at the same time there would still be a distinction drawn between people
engaged in one type of activity and people engaged in another type of
activity. The language of the society would mark these distinctions.
In other words the society would be a society in which roles would be
found despite the absence of any division of labour. Biological roles
might be particularly obvious in such a society. The very young and
very old would be likely to engage in different types of activity and
there might even be certain differences between the activities of the
sexes. In such a society one would distinguish between John acting as
a surgeon and John acting as an epic poet and between John as a young
child behaving in the way that young children behave and John as an old
man behaving in the way that old men behave.
A common but simply silly type of criticism of role theory is given
by Mr Douglas Hol^ in his book 'Society Schools and Humanity* where
he writes (p 56)
'Role theory persists in seeing the individual as a bundle
of people's perceptions - your role is determined by the
way other people see you. Society has a pretty firm lock-
hold on the individual in the positivist perspective. Yet
if one remembers that individuals vary in psychological
constitution over an almost infinite range of dimensions
and that a person's psyche, like the society which helps to
form it, is in a continuous state of change, it comes as no
surprise to find that actual people (as opposed to 'role-
incumbents') are constantly initiating, assisting or
resisting change. Change is at least as much a part of
the human potential as is inertia, though it is inertia
which positivist social science stresses with, constructs
like 'social role' and 'personality type'.
A person's role performance is a function of his role style and
personal characteristics as well as of the relevant role pressures
exerted on him by other people in his own and adjacent roles. Almost
all roles are in a continuous state of change. In the second sentence
of the next paragraph Holly neatly contradicts himself by writing
'No one can initiate change unless his social position allows him
to do so'. Social position is largely if not entirely a matter of
roles. Extreme contradictions of extreme positions do not however
clarify matters and instead of Holly's remark about social change it
would he more reasonable to say that the amount of change anyone can
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initiate is -enerally a function of his social position.
We have tried in this chapter to see something of the complexity
of roles and to challenge the common view that roles are narrow,
restricting and rather tedious aspects of life which are at most of
marginal importance when one is trying to explain human action. A great
deal remains to he said especially in the next chapter and in chapter
six but we have at least tried to carry out some of the preliminary work




Section 1 ~ Rights and Duties
Roles are central to morality and the study of roles is central
to the study of morality. These points are not perhaps very well
appreciated at the present time and so in this chapter we must try to
argue the case for them. But before we embark on our main task we must
return to the business of defining the concept of a role which concerned
us in the first section of the last chapter. It is appropriate to continue
with that matter in this chapter because moral notions have an important
part to play in the. definition of the concept of a role. And so we can
say that a role can be defined by stating the rights and duties of those
who fill it because they are as it were the rules of the game. The role
of postman for example can be explained by saying that postmen are
required to collect and distribute mail. There are rights as well as
duties involved here since it is illegal for people other than postmen
to handle mail in transit and to collect the contents of letter boxes
etc. The rights and duties aspect of roles certainly cannot by itself
explain role behaviour but it forms a background to such behaviour xtfhich
cannot be properly understood without it. Terms of employment, role
description and role specification usually give the rights and duties
aspect of roles and that aspect is the official and legal or quasi legal
view of roles although if we wish to understand actual role behaviour
we must take into account conventions which may differ sometimes radically,
from the official view. But an appreciation of why and in what ways
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rols conventions differ from the appropriate role descriptions will
tell us a lot about roles. Sometimes official descriptions of a role
simply lag behind events and if they are not revised frequently they
simply give an out-of-date picture of the relevant role. At other
times an official description of a role may be an attempt to hide or
to distort what actually goes on. A university registrar once told me
that officially, according to the terms of his appointment, his job was
to give legal and financial advice to the university council. In fact
he very rarely if ever did that. What he actually did could be described
in various ways such as 'he is responsible to the council for the efficient
control of the administrative affairs of the university'. Alternatively
it could be said and indeed was said that he ran the university or
imagined he ran the university or tried to run the university. And
these things were said sometimes as expressions of envy or pity or simply
of impotent academic rage and at other times as comparatively straight¬
forward descriptions of what was in fact happening. Often official
statements of role rights and duties are simply ignored to the
considerable satisfaction of all concerned but in time of dispute or
difficulty they can assume considerable importance. In a certain rather
sad Scottish case a headmaster who had by all accounts run his school
in a manner which met with the complete approval of masters, boys,
parents and old boys clashed with his board of governors on largely non
educational matters and they dismissed him from his post. When he tried
to take legal action against them he lost his case and the judge pointed
out that legally he was simply the servant of the board of governors.
Doixbtless headmasters seldom act like servants and they are not normally
expected to but that is what they legally are and they forget it at
their peril in times of dispute or difficulty.
A general consideration of what rights and duties are might be
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useful at this point. One can perhaps see what they are if one
considers the simple statements 'I have a right to do x' and 'I have a
duty or an obligation to do x'. Saying that I have a right to do x
means that I am justified in doing x and that I can claim support for
doing x and for defeating attempts to prevent me doing x, Generally
such support will come from some legal or quasi legal authority and
from those who uphold it. If I am asked what my justification for my
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rights ir or how I know that I have a right I can usually point to some
legal or similar code which gives me the right. Sometimes rights are
not explicitly stated in any code but are implied by social convention.
Thus an orchestral conductor has a right to be fairly insulting about
his players performance and to impose his interpretations upon them
although the right may not be stated in the official definition of his
job which might very well refer only to drawing up programmes and
rehearsing and conducting the orchestra. But rights which are based
only on conventions are much more easily challenged and much less
easily defended than those which are explicity formulated. A member
of the orchestra could ask the conductor to criticise politely and in
turn he might be told that conductors are not normally polite and that
it would he impossible to reach the desired standard of performance with-
out frankness and even rudeness on the conductor's part. It is difficult
to be precise about a conductor's right to be rude during rehearsal.
A policeman's right to enter and search private property however is a
very different matter since it is comparatively well formulated. Saying
that I have a duty or obligation to do x means not only that I am justified
in doing x and that I can claim support for doing x and for defeating
attempts to prevent me doing x hut also that I must do x whether I
want to or not. I may choose not to exercise my rights but I cannot
avoid my duties because others are justified in asking me to perform
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them and. in invoking sanctions if I refuse. Indeed one can say that
every right implies a duty and every duty implies a right. Every
right implies the duty of others to respect that right and every duty
implies the right of some others to demand the performance of that duty.
It follows from this that there is likely to he a greater amount of
pleasure or satisfaction associated with the exercise of rights than with
the performance of duties. If one finds the exercise of a right
distasteful one may avoid it but one has to perform distasteful duties.
There is no need to elaborate this point in an extreme nineteenth
century way which might involve talking about the stern voice of duty.
Some duties may be unpleasant but others such as some social duties may
be extremely pleasant and enjoyable. One should note that the relation¬
ship between rights and duties is not symmetrical although every right
imples a duty and every duty implies a right it is also the case that
every duty iraples another duty but it is not the case that every right
imples another right. Every duty imples the duty of others to respect
that duty. There are two possible ways in which others are entitled
to be interested in my duties. They are entitled to demand thej.r
performance and they are also required to see that I am not frustrated
in my attempts to carry them out. The duties of policemen illustrate
that point well since some people frequently ask the police to carry
out their duties and others frequently try to prevent them doing the
same thing. The police are entitled to ask the public not to prevent
them carrying out their duties and indeed, even to help them to carry
them out and they are also under obligation to perform them on demand.
Various philsophers have considered that the psychological aspect
of rights and duties is important so it is perhaps a good idea to give
it some consideration. Professor Hart remarks in his article on
Leval and Moral Obligations that 'The statement that a thief has a legal
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obligation not to - is not a psychological statement about him. He
may have no fear at all of the threatened evil and yet his obligation
remains*. That view is obviously correct. Obligations are distinct
from feelings in a number of ways. One may qtdte easily feel emotionally
detached from one's obligations and be neither enthusiastic nor
unenthusiastic about them. Squally one may be either ecstatic about
them or nauseated by them but either way their status as obligations
remains unchanged. The fact that it is easier to fulfill these obligations
one likes than those one dislikes is quite irrelevant. That point is
often made but it is perhaps not quite so common to suggest that the
emotions cannot be commanded and so we cannot have an obligation to have
any particular emotion in any particular situation or to feel in any
particular way about anything. One can be asked to control one's
feelings or at least to control the expression of them but that is quite
different from being asked to have certain emotions in a certain context.
If the well known injunctions to love one's neighbour as oneself and to
love one's enemies mean that one ought to have feelings of love towards
neighbours and enemies as well as behaving in certain ways towa. is them
then the injunctions are absurd because they are impossible to fulfill.
Feelings cannot be produced at will. If one altered the injunctions
to read 'Treat your enemiqs as if you loved them' the situation would
be bad enough for it might be claimed that even that style of injunction
and obligation was impossible to fulfill. In this field the most
emotional injunction and obligation possible is the Kantian one to
respect persons. It is possible to respect someone even if one dislikes
him though perhaps one should really say that it is just possible.
Respect is an attitude rather than a feeling or an emotion. In
addition it is perhaps worth mentioning the distinctions between the
subjective ought and the objective ought which is noted by Frankena
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in his paper on 'Obligation and Motivation in Recent Moral Philosophy'
and also by many others. One has a subjective obligation if one feels
one ought to do something and an objective obligation if in fact one
ought to something. Similarly there can be subjective and objective
rights. 'The first point to notice here is that feeling one ought to
do something is a matter of belief and not of emotion. Such a feeling
is not a feeling in the sense of an emotion such as anger. An accurate
paraphase of 'he feels he ought to do something* is 'he things he
ought to do something* and this shows that we are dealing with credal
and not an emotional matter. Subjective obligations may or may not
correspond to objective obligations. A man may thing that he ought
to do x when in fact he ought or when in fact either he ought not or
need not. If he ought to do so then his belief that he ought is true
but if he either ought not or need not do so then his belief is false
and he is suffering from a delusion. And a similar account can be
given of subjective and objective rights.
Now we must return from a consideration of general philosophical
points to roles and notice that as we said at the beginning of this
section conventions are normally more Important than the legal or quasi
legal codes which may govern roles from the official point of view and
that consequently it can in fact be extremely difficult to separate
subjective rights and duties from objective rights and duties. The
roles of headmaster and orchestral conductor have already been mentioned
and they are both useful at present. There is a sense in which official
descriptions of roles give the objective rights and duties and conventions
give what are not much better than subjective rights and duties. let
it is often both impossible and undesirable to give more importance to
official descriptions than to conventions. Take the case of the
conductor. If he does not take advantage of the convention of making
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very frank critisisms of his players to the point of rudeness then he
is unlikely to achieve a satisfactory standard of performance and inter¬
pretation although he may strictly speaking have absolutely no official
backing for his frankness. Similarly headmasters cannot run their
establishments in the manner in which they are expected to run them if
they normally think of themselves as servants. Indeed they,would
displease their governing bodies whose servants they officially are if
they behaved in a servile or extremely cautious manner. Yet the
Scottish case mentioned above remains as a warning to them of the danger
of totally forgetting the official position. In any event neither rights
and duties nor conventions can give a complete guide to every role
situation partly because each role occupant is likely to encounter
many unique and novel situations and also because any role is likely
to require a judicious breaking of conventions and ignoring of official
rights and duties from time to time. Such action may be very risky
because it leaves the role performer open to severe criticism if it
fails but very often only a very mundane and uninspired role performance
can he achieved without it and the role performer may be reasonably
criticised for being conventional and unimaginative if he does not take
risks.
Section 2 - Roles and Moral Agents
Roles are essential to morality because they give us specific
obligations to specific people and they also give us veiy specific
and often very agonising moral problems. General moral principles
leave us, as it were, in mid air with moral obligations to the whole
human race. The moral life is only possible if we come down to earth
and have a reasonable number of obligations to a reasonable number of
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people and if we give priority to these obligations over our general
obligations to the whole human race. Let us suppose that lire start
forming our moral principles with what is so appealing in our salad
days, namely utilitarianism. Soon increasing philosophical knowledge
and sophistication makes us give priority to negative over positive
utilitarianism and makes us limit even negative utilitarianism by
first of all respect for persons and secondly a prima facie obligation
to honour promises and contracts of all kinds. Someone who was only
a moral agent would almost certainly be aware of much more suffering
and distress then he could possibly relieve and that would still be
true even if he limited his attention to distress he knew of by
acquaintance rather than by description. Such a limitation of
attention would in any event be hard to justify on moral grounds.
Roles solve this problem. My duties to my own children are
greater than my duties to anyone else's children, although if I
am a teacher or a paediatrician or a social worker specialising
in work with children, I may have very considerable duties to other
peoples children. Certainly, although individuals are never in
fact simply moral agents, they are always moral agents as well as parents,
prostitutes, executioners and landscape gardeners. And in situations
of great emergency one has a duty as a moral agent to try to save human
life even if the individual whose life is in danger does not enter into
any of one's other role relationships. The chances of the life actually
being saved will probably be increased if as well as being a moral agent
one is a doctor. Sometimes the relevant situations can be horribly complic-
cated. If one's children are playing with strangers in the jungle in
Vietnam when a passing American bomber sends an incendiary bomb down amongst
them and one runs out of one's hut to save life, is one a moral agent
amongst charred moral agents, or is one a father amongst one's children
and some strangers? One is in fact both and because of that one
endures agony both when the incident actually takes place and whenever
one rembers it. A doctor to whom all the injured were strangers would
probably give priority either to those who were most seriously injured
or to the most seriously injured of those who had a reasonable chance
of survival after treatment. And a non medical person would act in very
much the same way, although at most he could offer first aid and although
his ability to judge chances of survival would probably not be very great.
The father of one or more of the injured could quite justifiably give
priority to his child over someone who was less seriously injured or
over someone who was as seriously injured as his child. If his child
were the most seriously injured and had even in the eyes of the medically
completely untrained, no chance of survival, then the father would not
be justified in giving this child more than brief comfort. Only if his
child were as seriously injured as another child and had a reasonable
chance of survival would the father be justified in discriminating in
favour of his child just because he was his child.
The example that has just been discussed runs counter to a certain
extent to the main point that roles are vital for morality. But it does
that simply because it is concerned with exceptional circumstances.
Possibly only during war is it at all common to be faced with large
numbers of seriously injured people remote from adequate medical
resources. Death comes swifly in such circumstances and so that
type of situation is quite different from the Indian situation in
which millions starve to death comparatively slowly, remote from the
food surplus of USA and western Surope. Normally one is comparatively
ignorant of people outside one's role relationships and one is
comparatively unable to help them. Donations to charity are often
an attempt to relieve the feelings of slight moral discomfort that
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this inevitable situation tends to produce. Within the field of
role relationships there are tremendous variations in knowledge and
ability to help. Parents know a great deal about, and can do a great
deal for their sons and daughters during their childhood, but not
during their adulthood. One cannot do very much to help matters if one's
secretary is almost always pregnant unless one is the direct cause of
the situation. And the prime minister of India cannot do very much
about the millions of staxving Indian subjects. But generally speaking,
one can do more for one's own secretary than for someone else's and the
prime minister of India can do more for starving Indians than for
starving Britons. A remark of Hume's is strangely analogous to what' we want
to say here. In the Treatise of Human Nature Book 111, Part 111,
Section 1, he says "We sympathise more with persons contiguous to us
than with persons remote from us,, with our acquaintance than with
strangers - but notwithstanding this variation, of our sympathy, we
give the same approbation to the same moral qualities in China as in
England." Using that remark as the basis of a very loose analogy, we
may say that our primary duties and. obligations are concerned with
people with whom we are socially involved through our role relationships.
And at the same time, we are often uncomfortably aware of a vast field
of potential secondary duties concerning all those with whom we are in
no way socially .involved. Sometimes we make gestures such as donations
to Oxfam towards that field of secondary duties.
At the beginning of this section, we mentioned the very specific
and often very agonising moral problems xfhich roles give us. It is
now time to see what precisely these problems are. They arise from
intra and inter-role conflict. The subject of inter role conflict
draws our attention to the extremely important fact that individuals
occupy many roles and indeed many roles at the same time. Beside one
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in the agony of the rush, hour tube is someone who is not only a
passenger attempting to defraud London Transport but who is also a
loving father, an unfaithful husband, a Fabian, a member of the
Patients' Association and an expert in industrial espionage employed
by an organisation concerned with what is somewhat euphemistically
called industrial security, And at any moment his' various roles may
start interacting in a very complicated way. If the sudden appearance
of a ticket inspector leads to his conviction and his taking up residence
in Wormwood Scrubs his wife, children, employers, as well as the
Assistant Governor in charge of security and the Principal Medical
Officer may all find their lives strangely and suddengly changed.
Another example will help to illustrate the problem. One afternoon on
an English red brick campus a lecturer in English burst into tears
while she was talcing a seminar. Before the seminar she had been to
visit her seriously ill professor husband, in the teaching hospital
beside the university. A well meaning ward sister had said to her
"your father is slightly better today Mrs X". The role of tutor which
would normally be Mrs X's foreground, role during a seminar was suddenly
pushed into the background by the role of wife. If someone does not
occupy many roles, but is trapped in one as a prisoner of a chronic
patient, he is likely to suffer in a variety of ways by becoming, as
it were, a personification of that role. A reasonable number of different
roles is essential for a human existence. But now we must return to
intra and inter role conflict. Professor R Darendorf in his essay
'Homo Sociologicus1 mentions conflict within roles and writes "One
thinks of the university profeseop torn between the demands of research,
teaching and administration". There are different ways of solving such
a conflict. One can either give priority to one activity and neglect
the others or one can struggle endlessly to give adequate attention
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to all of them. The agonising nature of a conflict of that type
arises from the fact that it is impossible to give adequate attention
to all the activities and giving priority to one of them leads
inevitably to a neglect of duty in relation to the other activities
of which one is likely to be made aware. Sometimes of course, one
may manage to sacrifice some of one's activities with impunity. Once
I studied under a professor whose lack of interest in his subject and
his students was quite exceptional, but when I became a university
administrator, I heard him praised on all sides for his■administrative
ability. Despite such examples Darendorf's point is a sound one. In
the field of politics ore can think of the conflict between gaining and
retaining power on the one hand and using it to achieve desirable ends
on the other. For many politicians ends and means become hopelessly
confused and gaining and retaining power become ends in themselves.
Even an honest and unconfused politician may find that many really
important matters have to be avoided for quite sone time before an
election.
Mothers-in-law and step fathers show us the problems of inter-
role conflict. A paragon of virtue would find it difficult if he or
she tried to be either a mother-in-law or a step father. Certain types
of personality may very well exacerbate these difficulties, but they
cannot cause them because the difficulties are inherent in the role
situation, A girl's mother and her husband are likely to find it
difficult to share her. Employers and employees are unlikely ever to
live in perfect peace because employers aspire to a situation in which
labour costs nothing and employees aspire to a situation in which they
are paid vast sums for doing nothing, or at least, nothing they
dislike. These examples are concerned with one type of inter role
conflict, via inevitable conflict between related roles which leads to
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conflict between individuals in these roles whatever their personal
characteristics may be. The other type of inter role conflict concerns
the conflict an individxxal experiences between the demands made on him
by two or more roles which he occupies simultaneously. The casualty
surgeon who finds that the desperate case in front of him is his wife
or his son experiences a dramatic form of role conflict. As a husband
or a father his response to the situation is a very emotional and
involved one, but as a casualty surgeon his response is very technical
and uninvolved one. Normally in such situations another casualty
surgeon is available to deal with the case but if no one else is
available the father or husband and surgeon is likely to experience
really unbearable conflict between the demands of his roles. Sometimes
it is quite easy to avoid role conflict by appropriate action and so
medical students are warned not to make friends of their patients or
patients of their friends. And they are also warned not to question
the advice of doctors who treat them when they are themselves patients.
Similarly, judges avoid cases in which they have an interest. In a paper
entitled 'Beliefs and Roles' delivered to the Aristotlian Society in 1966,
Mr Gerald A Cohen gives an example of inter role conflict when he
*
mentions the case of an American professor who said to his son on the
subject of cheating in a particular examination "As your father I must
consider your welfare, and I think you ought to cheat, but as a member
of the Committee of Discipline, I think you should respect the rules".
Mr Cohen wants to defend the view that the professor should have
committed himself not as a father or as a professor, but as a man.
Presumably in this context committing oneself as a man is the same as
committing oneself as a moral agent. But neither the professor or his
son can be simply a moral agent and if one tries to speak to the
other as a moral agent addressing another moral agent, what is said
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will have little "bearing on the situation in which one person who
is a moral agent, a professor, a father and a member of the Committee
on Discipline addresses another who is a student and his son. Mr Cohen
does not do justice to the complexity of his own example. We hear what
the father says and what the member of the committee says, but not what
the professor says. Even in America, it is not unreasonable to expect
that a professor might wish to encourage a genuine as opposed to a
bogus academic performance and that he might have some concern for the
standards of academic competition and of degrees. Certainly only a
distinctly odd professor or a distinctly odd father would advise his
son to cheat in an examination, and inox*e peculiar still, base his
advice on a consideration of the boy's welfare. If the person concerned
is both a father and a professor, the advice is really totally unbelieve-
able. The moral agent could reasonably expect to receive as much support
from the father and the professor as from the member of the Committee
on Discipline.
Moral appraisal cannot avoid roles. If one is evaluating an
action we must take account of the role situation and roles themselves
require moral evaluation. Probably most of us assume that roles can
easily be defied. It is difficult to be certain about this since the
matter is not much discussed. At the Nuremburg trials for instance
one was probably meant to believe that the eloquent prosecutors would
have been moral heroes and martyrs if they had been in the positions
in the Nazi regime that the defendants had occupied. Scepticism about
this seems to me to be entirely justified. Very few of us are capable
of being heroes and martyrs. Many roles can defeat all but a very few
exceptional and exceptionally well placed individuals. In bureaucracies
almost everyone is to a greater or lesser extent servile and sycophantic
towards superiors and at times nasty towards subordinates. The nursing
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sister who reduces student nurses to tears will grovel to consultants.
And she is simply an extreme example of a very common phenomenon. Only
those who will not suffer to any great extent from resignation or
dismissal or who for some special reason cannot be dismissed can
afford to he outspoken with their superiors in a bureaucracy. A middle
aged man who supports a wife and family and who has virtually no
employment prospects outside his organisation will inevitably do almost
anything he is told to do by his superiors. In barbaric situations,
those who disobey are simply killed. Pure moral agents would doubtless
think that the words from one of Plato's dialogues "it is better to suffer
wrong than to do it" are the final answer to the whole question and they
would calmly endure dismissal, poverty or even death. But pure moral
agents do not support wives and families and are not deeply affected
by social stigma and disgrace. Secrates was an exceptional man.
It is often more reasonable to condem certain roles and certain
individuals for taking on certain roles than tocondemn certain
actions in certain role situations. Let us take the case of the
role of executioner. One of the more sordid aspects of its presence
in Britain was evidently the steady and totally excessive stream of
uninvited applicants for the post that it attracted. Its abolition
was from the moral point of view totally commendable. In a society
of saints it would doubtless be impossible to fill that role, but
Britain is not such a society. One might argue that sadistic
individuals will always find ways of being sadistic despite the absence
of officially approved sadistic roles, but there is a vast difference
between encouraging certain types of behaviour and accepting the
unfortunate fact that they cannot be prevented. The case of the
executioner is extreme and dramatic. In less extreme and dramatic cases
it is desirable to work for role reform rather than abolition. Judges
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in Britain are no longer required to pass death sentences and so
an undesirable duty has been removed from their role. Those who wish
to stop corporal punishment in schools are trying to improve the
teacher's role. It has been suggested that the practice of tattooing
would be made completely safe if a register of adequately qualified
tattooists were established. Middle class prejudice against this
colourful piece of working class culture .is said to stand in the way
of this desirable role reform-. When one turns to the question of an
individual's responsibility for occupying his roles one has to distinguish
between achieved and ascribed roles. One does not choose to be a son,
but one does choose to be a father. In the first case one is dealing
with an ascribed role and in the second with an achieved role. Generally
speaking one is responsible for occupying one's achieved roles. At
times of choosing roles one's freedom of choice may be very limited
and one may make mistakes * If one is seeking employment, clearly
one can apply with any hope of success for only a small percentage
of the types of employment that are actually open to applicants. One
is bound to be too old for some jobs, and too young for others, and
too poorly qualified for some and too well qualified for others and
so on. Another complication with roles is that one cannot really
know what they are like until one has occupied them. A lot of
information about roles is not easily available to people other than
their occupants. And even if one has very extensive information about
a role and knows many people in it, there is still an important sense
in which it is true to say that one does not know what it is like to
occupy a role unless one has actually done so. Single people do not
know what it is like to he married and married people do not know what
it is like to remain single beyond the point at which they got married.
Those who have never been clergymen do not know what it is like to be
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clergymen and so on. If one does decide that one lias made a mistake
' in entering a certain role one's freedom to leave it may he very
limited. Some people remain married to each other for the sake of
their children. And leaving a certain role may not be a matter of
returning to the state one was in before, one entered it. King Edward Vlll
could not become the Prince of Wales again when he abdicated. A divorced
person is very different from someone who has never married. In the
light of what we have said in this paragraph it should be clear that we
should hesitate for a long time and consider carefully before one blames
someone for occupying a certain role, but blame may sometimes be
appropriate.
Ascribed roles present special problems. Conscripts, prisoners
and those who are required by law to attend school may have certain
grievances. Forcing someone to occupy a certain role can be a very
serious s'tep. In the case of compulsory education, it is done for
the good of the individuals concerned and in the case of imprisonment
and of compulsory military service, it is said to be done for the good
of the community, at the expense of those who are imprisoned or enlisted.
Making provision for conscientious objection to compulsory military
service is a sign of moral doubts on the part of those who decide in
favour of imposing a role on many people. In the case of compulsory
education, there is not normally any provision for total conscientious
objection even on the part of the parent, let alone on the part of the
pupils themselves. The frequent raising of the school leaving age
increases the moral problems in this area. It is not sufficient to
allow parents to withdraw their children from religious instructions
or sex instructions or both. The possibility of education must be
made available to all irrespective of parental views on the matter,
but the possibility of rejecting education must also be available,
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at least to the adolescent. Even if society tries to exclude that
possibility, it will in fact be taken by many people. Perhaps c -j
has to meet a young adult illiterate- who says he has not the slightest
interest in learning to read and write before one can fully appreciate
the immorality of forcing education on people. Most young adult
illiterates are in fact very keen to become literate, but the exception
who opened my eyes was puzzled by the suggestion that he might want to
learn to read and write and he explained that he was Just like his
illiterate parents who coped with life perfectly adequately. At that
point a rather silly attempt to point out the advantages of literacy
over illiteracy was given up. Just as conscientious objectors are
required to engage in one of a list of approved activities, it might
•
be appropriate to require those who wish to opt out of compulsory
education to engage in suitable ncn educational activities in order to
discourage excessive laziness,, It is difficult to see what one can
do with the role of prisoner "other than abolish it or at least make it
a part time role eg. a weekend role but one might suggest that prisoners
should be allowed to form a trade union. Such an organisation would be
able to engage in interesting, if not exactly fruitful negotiations with
similar organisations such as the Prison Officers' Association. And
participation in trade union activity in custody would be a useful
preparation for similar activity after release.
Roles show up possible weaknesses in absolute moral imperatives
and categorical imperatives such as the rule that deliberate killing
of human beings by other human beings is always wrong. Yet the common
roles of combatant, executioner, armed policeman, armed prison guard
and armed counter espionage agent do challenge that rule. Absolutists
can and do object to these roles, i.e., they refuse to allow that
killing ceases to be immoral just because it is done by a combatant
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or an executioner in the course of his duty. They call soldiers
murderers and refer to executioners as legalised murderers. Whether
or not they are right in doing this is a matter of moral judgment. But
it is important to note that, if an act which is normally regarded as
highly immoral, e.g., killing, is regarded as either amoral or moral
whan it is carried out by the occupants of certain roles in the course
of their duty, it is at least possible to say that there is not
necessarily any tendency for the influence of these roles to cause the
act to be regarded as either moral or amoral when it is carried out
outside the limits of these roles. Even during a war which involves
endless carnage, murder may still be severely condemmed and a soldier
home on leave from extremely fierce fighting could not expect any
special sympathy if he committed murder. And people who as soldiers
come to regard death as a commonplace on the battlefield may regard
murder with horror. One might say that this example illustrates the
strength of roles and their ability to contain actions within certain
limits.
It is commonly said that roles depersonalize people and turn
them into automata which treat other people as automata. One
frequently hears for instance, complaints about the inhuman and
insensitive behaviour of bureaucrats. There are however, considerable
advantages in the impersonal aspects of certain roles and these have
been well expressed by Professor Charles Davis in his book 'A Question
of Conscience' where he makes the following remarks .(page 201-2) "The
limited scope of every organisation with the impersonal character this
gives it, should be seen as the liberation of the individual from
imposed and preformed relationships. Many prefer to get medical
attention without extending the relationship with the doctor to
friendship, unless they deliberately choose to do so
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it is a restriction upon one's liberty and privacy to be unable to
buy ^oods without entering into a discussion with the shopkeeper about
the details of one's personal life. The anonynmity of the city and the
general possibility of limited the numberous necessary relationships of
social existence to their particular purpose leave men free to shape
their own lives and commit themselves as persons by a truly free
decision
A surgeon or lawyer or administrator who limits his relationship
to his clients to what professionally concerns him is respecting and
not decrying their integrity as persons. Only if he forgets that his
relationship with them is limited, and does not embrace their total
reality as persons will he be guilty of treating them as mere objects
for his professional skill". Davis deserves great credit for drawing
our attention to the benefits of certain often unpopular features of
roles. But at the same tine it is necessary to emphasize that the
most personal aspects of our lives are to be found within the framework
of roles. And so Dahendorf is quite mistaken and confused when at the
end of his excellent essay 'Homo Sociologus' he writes "However we turn
and twist homo sociolo.gus he will never be the particular person who
is our friend, colleague, father or brother. Homo sociologus can
neither love nor hate, laugh nor cry". Certainly a particular
individual's interpretation of a role contains elements that are not
covered by a general description of the role. But when one talks of
friends, colleagues, fathers and brothers one is talking of roles and
role relationships. And however intimate or eccentric one's own
versions of these relationships may become they will still be influenced
by at least pane of the general features of the relevant roles. The
remark about loving, hating, laughing and crying is very strange.
When a senior prison governor told assistant governors in training
57
that at times their work would reduce them to tears he did not
imagine that he was dealing with a particularly lachrymose set of
individuals. Roles can most certainly make us love, hate, laugh and
cry.
Section 3 - The role of moral agent
The philosophical literature on roles is somewhat limited but one
of the better papers on the subject is Prof. B Mayo's essay on The Moral
Agent in which he writes (Royal Insitute of Philosophy Lectures Vol. 1
p 62) "There is no reason why someone who says 'Speaking not as a
father, or a government employee, but from the moral point of view....'
should not be assuming a role, though certainly a very special and
important one.* Indeed there is no reason and we can illumine matters
by asking if the role is ascribed or achieved and by comparing the
chronological aspects with the chronological aspects of sexual roles.
The comparison may be strange but it may also ,be illuminating. Very
interestingly the role of moral agent is both achieved and ascribed.
After a certain age people are not allowed to escape their moral
responsibilities and they are if necessary very strongly reminded that
they are moral agents whether they like it or not. At the same time
most people want sooner or later to be moral agents and to take moral
decisions. It is perhaps difficult to think of another role which is
both ascribed to almost everyone and achieved by almost everyone in
exactly the same sort of way as the role of moral agent. But sex roles
provide a useful comparison to a certain extent. After a certain stage
boys are likely to find that people treat them like men and expect them
to behave like men or in other words that the role of adult male is
ascribed to them. Equally however most boys want to become men or in
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other words to achieve the role of adult male. When conscription is
in operation someone who wants to join the army or in other words to
achieve the role of soldier will find that it is ascribed to him by
the mechanisms of conscription. Such a person may decide to make it
clear that he is not an unwilling conscript by volunteering before his
conscription date or by signing on for a period which is longer than
the period of conscription. The sexual and military examples are not
exactly the same as the case of the moral agent. Pacificism, homosexu¬
ality and transexuality all provide ways of avoiding to a greater or
lesser extent the roles of soldier and heterosexual adult. There are
no similar ways of avoiding the role of moral agent. We do not say
that Hitler was not a moral agent hut rather that he was highly immoral
or in other words a very poor moral agent. Possibly we say that those
who are extremely mentally deficient or are psychotic are not capable
of being moral agents. These cases are however cases concerned with
the refusal to ascribe the role of moral agent to people and so are
unlike pacificism, homosexuality and transexuality which are concerned
with a refusal or inability to achieve the role of soldier or of
heterosexual adult very often in circumstances in which at times
extremely strong efforts are made to ascribe these roles to the people
concerned. As far as the role of mpral agent is concerned then we do
not allow people to refuse to achieve it although at times we may
refuse to ascribe it.
The chronological aspects of the role of moral agent are very like
the chronological aspects of sexual roles. Just as they very young
and the very old may be regarded as asexual so they may also be
regarded as amoral. There may be some doubt about the case of old
people whose sexual interests and abilities vary greatly and indeed
whose moral capabilities may also vary greatly but there can be
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comparatively little doubt about the case of young people. Just as
children are not capable of adult sexual activity so they are not
capable of acting as moral agents in the complete sense of the terra.
Moral agency like adult sexuality develops slowly. Since there is no
moral equivalent of puberty it is never possible to be very precise
about the age at which someone becomes a full moral agent and indeed
one must always allow for moral development throughout a person's life.
Legal and political matters have a moral element in them and so both the
age of criminal responsibility and the age of political franchise
inevitably influence peoples ideas about the'age at which people become
moral agents. We have already noted that the moral and sexual state
of old people is complicated but as far as the completely senile are
concerned it is reasonable to regard them as both asexual and amoral.
We can say therefore that these are important parallels between the
chronological aspects of sexual roles and the chronological aspects
of the role of moral agent',.
The soundness of Prof Mayo's point has been shown by the fact that
the role of moral agent can be discussed and analysed in the same way
as any other role. At the same time it is important to note the position
of the role of moral agent as perhaps the only universal role which is
potentially ascribed to everyone and achieved by everyone. One might
say that certain chronological roles such as child and old person are
ascribed to everyone who lives long enough to reach the relevant part
of the human life cycle. Despite a certain amount of asexuality in
the early and. late stages of life one car say that the roles of child
and old person are not really as universal as the role of moral agent
since it is often most satisfactory to break the role of child into the
roles of boy and girl and the roles of old person into the roles of old
man and old woman. The true significance of the role of moral agent
60
lies in the fact that although it may not he the only universal role it
is almost certainly the only universal adult role which is potentially
ascribed to everyone and achieved by everyone. As soon as one has
said that however it is necessary to emphasise that some of the
greatest problems of the moral life arise out of the fact that the
role of moral agent is inevitably involved with countless other roles.
That point has already been discussed in section two.
Section 4 - Freedom and Equality
Freedom and equality are vast topics \irhich do not directly concern
us in this work. The only point that concerns us here is that roles are
central to any discussion of these topics. Since it is usual to find
that published discussions of freedom and equality make absolutely no
reference to roles our point may be well worth making.
One's freedom is limited by one's roles amongst other things. Every
role involves things that cannot be done and cannot be said by its
occupants. It might seem at first sight that although in normal
circumstances most people would probably rather not break the conventions
of their roles yet any sensible person could easily and sensibly break
these conventions. If we think that social conventions are just slight
restraints on freedom we may think of situations such as that in which
it is said an elderly Oxford professor held a party in his house one
evening. Fairly late in the evening he went up to his wife and said^
•darling, I think it is time we went*. His startled wife had to remind
him that he was the host and not a guest and that he was proposing to
do something that in terms of social and role conventions a host cannot
do. Clearly a certain amount of confusion would have been caused if the
professor had carried out his plan but stranger things have happened at
61
Oxford parties and the poor man may after all have found his guests
totally boring. When we think of role restraints as slight matters
we laugh at the tale of the Victorian porters who could not run into
the street after a thief because they did not have their hats on. Our
laughter may give way to surprise when we hear that recently in London
a marl was unable to pursue a thief in his own house because he did not
have his trousers on. But we are doubtless all convinced that in real
emergencies we could all throw social and role conventions to the winds
and eg run into public lavatories normally reserved for the opposite
sex.
The hatless Victorian porters and the trouserless man in London
may actually suggest that people can at times find it surprisingly
difficult to break apparently trival social conventions. The strength
of role restrictions on freedom however comes out much more clearly
in different examples such as incest and colleagues in distress. In
our society the incest taboo is very strong and it means primarily
that the role of parent excludes sexual relationships with one's
offspring and the role of offspring excludes sexual relationships with
one's parents. It has been suggested and indeed seems to be obvious
that the incest taboo performs a very useful social function in directing
young peoples sexual interests away from their parents and indeed away
from their siblings and towards people outside their own family. What¬
ever its function or functions may be however our concern is with its
strength in relation to the relevant roles. As far as is known, the
incest taboo is not widely broken in our society and when it is broken
strong feelings tend to be i-oused in many people. The strength of some
of these feelings might raise suspicions that at times the desire to
break the taboo may be quite widespread but at best that is a fairly
wild guess. In any event the case of incest shows us very strong
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limitations in one direction at any rate on the freedom of action of
parents offsprings and sildings. These limitations may he totally
desirable but they are certainly there and they are certainly very strong
and almost inevitably more people must want to break them than actually
do break them. Although it is a digression perhaps even in an academic
discussion of role theory such as this we should note the futility of
sending men to prison for incest. Very frequently such men tell very
convincing tales of strong sexual approaches from their daughters. A
girl's complicated emotional relationship with her father is unlikely
to be helped by sending her father to prison. One's relationship with
colleagues in distress shows the strength of role boundaries and
limitations on one's freedom. Naturally unless one has a totally bizarre
job one does not normally meet one's colleagues in a state of distress
but it can happen from time to time. Role boundaries in this situation
are clearest where at least part of one's job is concerned with welfare
work. In such a job dealing with clients in distress is a comparatively
routine matter which does not present any special problems. But dealing
with colleagues in distress almost rightly and inevitably reduces one
to a state of impotence because although on the one hand one knows
that treating a distressed colleague as if he were a client will probably
reduce his distress on the other hand one also knows that treating a
colleague as a client is insulting to his status as a colleague and
may create grave difficulties when he has recovered from his distress.
One is likely to end up sharing one's sense of impotence with colleagues
who are not in a state of distress by saying eg. in a university 'if
he were a student it would be obvious what should be done but since
he is a colleague one can do nothing' and similarly in a prison one
is likely to say 'if he were a prisoner it would be obvious etc'.
There does not seem to be any justification for ignoring roles in
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discussions of freedom but they normally are ignored. And so if one
comes across a philosophical book with the title Essays on Freedom of
Action one could reasonably expect that it would, because of the very
meaning of the title, have to contain at least one essay on roles and
the limits they impose on freedom of action. But in fact a recent book
of that title edited by Dr Honderich does not contain any such essay
and the whole topic appears to be entirely ignored in the book.
Honderich's very brief introduction to the volume should be read very
carefully because it reveals that in a very important and fundamental
as opposed to a superficial and obvious sense Honderich like most
other philosophers writing in English has simply never heard of sociology
or of role theory. One cannot write and edit in the way that Honderich
has written and edited in that book unless one is totally unaware that
sociology and role theory are basic to an understanding of individual
people and their actions and that they are at least as relevant to the
understudy of individual people as neurophysiology and psychology which
are mentioned in the book. One can certainly argue about the degree if
relevance of sociology to the understanding of individuals. But only
if one holds the simple minded and naive assumption that sociology is
concerned with something called society and not with individual people
can one ignore the matter in discussions of f- ^edom and freedom of action.
This point will concern us again both in Chapter VI and in the General
Conclusion.
Roles are as important to the study of equality as they are to
the study of freedom. As long as roles are unequal people are unequal.
The inequality of roles is connected with the unequal distribution of
wealth, power, land and property in most societies and with the class
structure of most soc?Leties. Mercifully we do not have to go into such
vast and complicated matters here because ancillary roles provide us
with a short cut. Some roles are ancillary to others and so in the
relevant role situations those who occupy the ancillary roles are to a
greater or lesser extent inferior to those who occupy the dominant roles.
Nurses are for example inferior to doctors and secretaries are inferior
to their bosses. Roles also create certain types of competition which
lead to inequalities. There is competition within roles and also
competition to get into some roles. Some nurses become matrons and some
doctors become consultants. Since there is only one president of the
USA at a time there is much competition amongst many people to become
president. Those nurses who do not become matrons and those Americans
who do not become president may be regarded as inferior to those who do.
It is sometimes asserted that all men are born equal. A study
of roles shows us that in a very obvious sense in many societies the
assertion is simply false. The role of 'offspring of x' has the social
status of x. In other words from their earliest days children have
the social status of their parents. The picture is complicated to a
certain extent by children of unknown origin and parentage and by test
tube babies who are likely to be with us sooner or1 later. The complic¬
ation is fairly slight because whatever happens to such children they
simply acquire the social status appropriate to their social situation.
If they are adopted they acquire the social status of those who adopt
them and if they are brought up in some kind of institution they
acquire the social status of inmates of the institution. Utopians
have often wanted to remove children from their parents at birth in
order to achieve social equality. Mere removal from parents would not
of course be enough. Children would have to be deprived of all knowledge
of their parents in order to prevent them taking their status into
Utopian insitutions for the young. Such Utopian ideas involve cruelty
to parents by depriving them of the joys and satisfactions of parenthood.
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And in addition they might produce hordes of adolescents trying to
resolve their identity crises by roaming through the countryside
looking for their parents. One young man I know who was an abandoned
baby in Berlin after Hitler's war has been known to tell the couple
who adopted him and brought him up that he sometimes thinks of
going to Berlin to look for his mother whom he has not seen or heard
from since early infancy. Members of staff of Utopian institutions for
the young would often hear of plans to track down parents even if it
was thought that they lived in Ruislip or some similarly philistine
place.
It is likely to be said that anyone who discusses the idea that
we are born equal in the way that I have done is either a fool or a
knave or indeed quite probably both. Social status at birth, it might
be argued, does not really come into the matter since as one formula
puts it men are born equal in dignity and rights. Another inter¬
pretation of the idea is that men are born equal as moral agents. But
dignity and rights simply cannot be separated from social position and
status* Those who are born into abject poverty, can have very little
dignity and their struggle for survival may not allow exercising
whatever rights they may have. Also paying attention to rights
in the strict legal sense of the term can at times simply obscure
important social realities and inequalities. It is easy enough to say
smugly that all British citizens have equal legal rights but the ability
to pay for a good lawyer gives at least some advantage to the rich
when they are involved with the courts. An infant who is well looked
after by a nanny and other staff in a large and well equipped nursery
as well as by his mother is treated with more dignity from birth than
an infant who is bora in a cold and wet shack in refugee camp. The
idea that people are born equal as moral agents does not completely
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stand up to the examination as our analysis of the role of moral agent
has in effect shown. Strictly speaking people are not born moral
agents at all, they become moral agents gradually over a period of
time. And at the end of the day they are not equal as moral agents.
There is no moral equality between, those who approve of slavery and
those who disapprove of it or between those .who approve of South African
apartheid and those who disapprove of it. One aspect of the role of
moral agent is being entitled to be treated with respect and men are
equal as far as that aspect of the role is concerned. In addition if
we want infants and children to become moral agents we must treat them
with respect because that aspect of the role can come into operation
before the others for which it can serve as a foundation. In particular
being treated with respect is a foundation and preparation for treating
others with respect because those who have not been treated with respect
may find it extremely difficult to treat others with respect. We can
say then that throughout their lives from birth to death men are
equally entitled to be treated with respect. Even murderers are entitled
to be treated with respect because in spite of their terrible moral
failure they usually behave in a morally satisfactory fashion in most
if not indeed all other areas of their lives. Treating them with
respect may also play some part in preventing them from repeating their
moral failure. Whether or not people actually do receive the respect
to which they are entitled depends to a large extent on social circum¬
stances. But the important point is that we have discovered a sense in
which it is true to say that men are born equal.
One possible interpretation of the slogan 'all men are born equal'
is that it means not that all 'men are equal but that they should be
equal in very respect and at all times. In other words the slogan
can be regarded as prescriptive rather than descriptive. Total equality
at all times would however require the abolition of all ancillary and
all competitive tasks and activities. That price can simply be regarded
as too high to pay.
It is reasonable to conclude our study of roles and equality by
taking note of the fact that a consideration of roles should prevent
us from thinking that equality is a monolithic concept. Normally
when we compare cars and indeed objects in general we say that they are
equal or unequal in this respect or in that respect. We do not, I think,
often say without qualification that they are simply equal or unequal.
In the case of cars for example we say that two or more of them are
equally hideous, equally dangerous, equally destructive of civilised
values and so on. When we are talking about people however we seem to
he inclined to say that they are simply equal or unequal. As we have
to a large extent already seen it is very difficult to make such sense
of such assertions. In particular the problem is not solved by saying
that people are equal or unequal from the moral point of view or as
moral agents. The study of roles should remind us that two people may
be roughly equal in one role and totally unequal in another. Brown and
Bloggs may be equally poor drivers and politicians hut totally unequal
as husbands and squash players. In addition people are not in any
simple or monolithic sense equal or unequal from biological or psychological
points of view. There are many biological and psychological scales and
dimensions along which people can be arranged and with which they can
he measured. The complexity of human equality and inequality does not
stop there because no aspect of a person can be considered in isolation
from all the other aspects. A person's marriage, job, and verbal skills
all affect each other. As we shall see in chapter 7 our understandings
of people must be idiographic. Perhaps we should end our discussion
of human equality by saying that the statement 'all men are equal', and
'ail men are born equal* are prima facie false because of the wide
variety and complexity of social roles and of the characteristics both
biological and psychological of individuals. As we have seen there is
only one extremely limited but also extremely important sense in which
all men are equal and are born equal. All men are equally worthy of
respect. Any attempt to make men totally equal would involve sacrificing
and trying to eliminate valuable social and individual inequalities and
their often equally valuable interactions and combinations.
Section 5 - Sartre's Waiter
The barren desert of the philosophical discussion of roles is
dominated by one huge figure, the figure of a waiter. Unfortunately
Sartre's waiter has become a scarecrow because his presence in the
literature of the subject has led to the common belief that the claim
of roles to be taken seriously in philosophical discussion has been
dismissed for all time by the two words 'mauvais foi*. In this
work our task is to start cultivating the desert in the hope that one
day it may blossom if not exactly like the rose then at least like a
topic such as the freedom of the will. It is necessary therefore to
deal with the waiter. Good accounts of the problem are to be found in
the writings of Professor R Downie and Professor Dorothy Emmet.
In her book Rules. Roles and Relations Prof. Emmet writes
expounding Sartre (p 152)
To accept a role is to evade the responsibility of seeing that
one is free not so to act, and of freely deciding what one wants
to be. It is to evade freedom by sheltering behind one's social
function* This freedom Sartre calls 'contingency': the terrifying
realization that there is no need to play this role, or indeed
any other in particular, unless one so chooses.
Despite what Sartre thinks one cannot escape from roles if one wishes
to act any more than one can escape from language if one wishes
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to speak or make a statement. That point will be discussed in chapter
VI. Accepting a role normally involve# an awareness of alternative
roles and is usually a matter of deciding what one wants to be. And
so it is most certainly not a matter of evading freedom by sheltering
behind one's social function whatever that may mean.
When one is dealing directly with the waiter it is useful to turn
to Downie who writes in his book Roles and Values (pp 132 - 133)
The importance of maintaining a concept of personality
irreducible to roles is .emphasized, as we have seen, by
Existentialist thinking. We have already pointed out that
Sartre, for example, condemns the idea that a man is nothing
but a waiter, soldier, etc, It is true up to a point that for a
waiter to be morally good is for him to act as a waiter, and so
on for any trade or profession. But the waiter in Sartre's
example is being a waiter to the extent that he has forgotten
that he is also a person who is a waiter. Again, to see a waiter
as nothing but a waiter and a shopkeeper as nothing but a shop¬
keeper is to fail to respect them as persons. Moral agents are
always people acting; sometimes they are simply as persons, and
sometimes as persons in certain roles or capacities. But how¬
ever much the rights and. duties of the role affect a given
action the morality of the action is never wholly reducible
to the rights and duties of the role; there is always an
irreducibly personal element in any moral action, and a person
cannot completely transfer the moral responsibility for what
he does to his role.
There are two aspects in which a person's responsibility
cannot be analysed in terms of the rights and duties of his
role. To begin with, it is as a person that he accepts the
rights and duties of a given role in the first place. The
morality of role-acceptance is therefore necessarily not
reducible to that of the role which is accepted. It is as
persons plain and simple that we are responsible for the
role we accept or reject. Secondly, a person brings to his
actions in his chosen role qualities which are not analysable
in terras of the role. For example, we may praise a shopkeeper
for his courteous and cheerful service, but 'courteous' and
'cheerful' are terms of praise for the person's enactment
of his chosen role; they cannot therefore be reduced to the
concepts of the role itself.
It is perhaps not entirely clear whether Downie is using the worft
'personality' in its philosophical or its psychological sense. As
far as the psychological sense of the term is concerned personality
is to a large extent formed by role experience. From the philosophical
point of view personality arises from the combination of individuals
which are purely biological and roles which turn them into persons.
That point: will be expanded in the General Conclusion. Certainly
roles doe not give us a total explanation of personality in either
sense of the term hut at the same time they make an essential contribution
to it.
\
Seeing a waiter as nothing but a. waiter is a matter of forgetting
that he has other roles besides that of waiter.. In the case of someone
who is trapped in one role and has become a personification of it one
perceives accurately if one perceives him as only a prisoner or a
chronic patient or a regular soldier or whatever. One would he showing
respect for such a person if one made it possible for him to escape
from his imprisoning role into other roles which he might know for
the first time or which he might have known in the past. It is not
entirely clear if Downie equates the terms 'person' and 'moral agent'.
In any event as we have seen acting as a moral agent means acting in
the role of moral agent. It is not at all clear what acting simply
as a person means. Imagining that one can act without using roles
is like imagining that one can speak without using a language. That
point will he further discussed in chapter VI. A person can transfer
the moral responsibility for what he does to the role of moral agent
or at least to his interpretation of it. But he cannot completely
transfer moral responsibility to that role because his other roles are
also involved in producing some of the aspects of any moral problem.
In the Introduction we saw that Downie talks as if all roles
were achieved and none were ascribed. It is not as persons plain
and simple, whatever they may be, that we are responsible for the
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role we accept or reject. As a husband, and a father I may decide
that it would ba advisable to change my job. A person brings to his
actions in a chosen role qualities that are not analysahle in terms
of that role because they come either from other roles or from his
biological constitution. A shopkeeper may be cheerful because of the
state of his hormones or his metabolism or whatever and he may be
courteous because many years ago as a pupil in some dreadul school
he was taught to be courteous.
It is to be hoped that we havo a least done something to question
and cast doubt on the existentialist dismissal,of role theory from
the philosophical scene, Now we must leave the topic of roles and
morality and turn in the next chapter to the frequently neglected
topics of the physical and linguistic aspects of roles.
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Chapter III
THE PHYSICAL AND LINGUISTIC ASPECTS OP ROLES
Section 1 - Settings, Equipment and Dress
In this chapter we are concerned with matters which are simple and
to a large extent fairly obvious but which are also important. They
are important both %-rithin the context of role theory and within a wider
philosophical context part of which is considered in this work. It
might seem at first sight that all the simple and obvious points about
things and language which are the main topics of this chapter have
already been made in philosophical discussion. The philosophical
literature on physical objects is vast and so is the philosophical
literature on language. The problem is however that epistemology and
ethics are flourishing subjects but social philosophy, as we noted in
the Preface, scarcely exists. And so although there has been much
talk in philosophy about the existence of physical objects there has
been remarkably little talk about their social importance and significance.
Similarly language has been studied in great detail by both epistemologists
and moral philosophers but a lot remains to be said about its social
significance despite the fact that Wittgenstein started the social
philosophy of language many years ago. Most of our discussion of
things takes place in this chapter but in the next chapter we shall
pay some attention to one kind of thing, namely machines, both from an
epistemological and a social point of view. In chapter VT we shall
once again be concerned with the relationship between language and
roles when we consider roles as the language of action.
As far as a study of roles is concerned it is important to
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emphasise that they are not totally abstract entities which cannot
be seen or heard. In actual fact roles have important physical and
linguistic aspects which surround us all the time. In a sense roles
can be both seen and heard and we see and hear them all the time. Yet
just as a man born and bred beside a waterfall may never hear it and
may never be aware of it so although we have all seen and heard roles
or at least their physical and linguistic aspects since birth we may
nevertheless be unaware of the fact and so it may he necessary to
point out what is or should be more or less obvious. Let us start
with things and the physical aspect of roles.
It is common to regard things as remote from persons. Things are
more inanimate objects and so are far removed from conscious beings
and moral agents. There is however an obvious physical rather than
metaphysical sense in which things are very close to, let us say,
people rather than persons. Ie are surrounded by things. When
philosophers start discussions about perception by referring to the
tables and chairs which surround them they are inadvertantly drawing
attention to the academic's use of a study or library and they also
illustrate the common tendency to regard one's clothes as part of
oneself. Underwear manufacturers rightly point out from time to time
that their products come next to oneself. Ties and shirts are as
reasonable starting points for a discussion of perception as tables and
chairs. If a certain amount of solidity is required, shoes might be
found useful. In everyday life things are important in the way in
which things are important on the stage and in team games. ¥e must
return to the analogies we used at the beginning of the work. In
the theatre we get a certain amount of information about a new play
from the programme. Scene one, we are told, takes place in Lavinia's
bedroom after midnight and scene two in the middle of Christ Church
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Meadow two hours later. When the curtain rises the set, relevant
stage properties and lighting also give us some information about
what is going to happen because they create a setting for activity.
We may however be totally surprised. Someone may decide that Lavinia's
bedroom is the only possible place for announcing the end of the world
and. anything can happen on Christ Church Meadow despite the elaborate
rules which undergraduates find so hilarious. But a set arouses at
least vague expectations and if they are completely flouted then
there will be a greater or lesser sense of comedy and absurdity or
sometimes impressiveness and dignity. Philosophising and giving birth
are not unusual activities but if one does the first in a tub and
the second in a stable one may attract a certain amount of attention.
Nudity and intercourse are commonplace in bedrooms and obligatory on
stage at the present time, hut they are not common in Christ Church
Meadow during the hours of daylight. Coronations in either place
i
at any time are unusual and so noteworthy.
When an actor comes on to the stage his costume if any tells us
a fair amount about this part before he begins to speak. Hamlet's
mourning dress makes it clear that he disassociates himself from his
mother and his uncle and the rest of the court. Stage costume can
indicate the period of the play and that is possibly the only aspect
of stage costume which has no exact parallel in everyday life. We
understand that Lady Macbeth is sleep walking not only from lighting
effects, bodily movements and facial expression, but also from her
dress. In actual life getting up in the middle of the night and leaving
one's bedroom fully dressed is very different from getting up and
leaving one's bedroom in pyjamas or whatever. What happens next is
.likely to he very different in each case. The different types of dress
show different types of intentions and are part of different situations.
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Except for cases of emergency action such as chasing a burglar or
fleeing from a burning building, if one is in one's pyjamas, one does
not perhaps expect to go very far or to meet anyone one does not know
well. If one is completely dressed one is reasonably prepared to go
almost anywhere and meet almost anyone. Sleepwalkers such as Lady
Madbeth are not aware of what they are doing so they might appear in
nightwear in the most unlikely places. - At an athletics meeting or a
rugby match, what is happening is indicated by the setting, dress and
equipment in exactly the same way as on the stage. The setting is very
precisely divided into areas set aside for specific purposes. The
markings on a rugby pitch or a running track may be regarded as playing
a part in governing the activities for which these places were designed.
The dress worn by and the equipment used by the participants in rugby
matches and athletic meetings are carefully prescribed. Biological
factors play some part in determining the form of all dress and
especially athletic and sporting dress, but the history of such dress
should make it clear that social factors are dominant. In the past
participants in athletic events have worn clothing which would now be
regarded as totally excessive and unsuitable from the biological point
of view. Changing social conventions concerned with modesty and decency
have been the governing factors in this matter. But apart from social
conventions and biological considerations athletic dress indicates roles.
Opposing rugby teams wear different colours and the referee must wear
colours different from those of either team. Athletes wear numbers and
colours both in order to make individual identification easy and to
indicate club membership. Starters and judges are distinguished from
each other by different types of dress.
It is now time to apply the theatrical and athletic analogy to
non-theatrical and non-athletic activities. Most human activities take
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place in a setting and involve the use of appropriate equipment and the
wearing of appropriate dress. Since settings, equipment and dress are
all the products of technology, their importance for the understanding
of human action is a function of technological advance. Many roles are
defined in terms of things and we cannot e.g. understand what a typist
or an airline pilot does without understanding something about typewriters
or aeroplanes* That point will be taken further in a later section. In
a technologically primitive society settings may be limited to caves,
clearings and primitive huts; equipment to crudely shaped pieces of stone
and wood and clothing to animal skins. But in present day Western society
the complexity of settings, clothing and equipment is very considerable
and it is not always an easy matter to understand them. A room is
possibly the most common setting for many human activities but it is
usually best to consider the building in which the room is situated as
the relevant setting. Sometimes one may have to take into account the
street, the area^ of the town, the town, the region and country in which
the building is situated. The three main types of human activity in an
industrial society, family life, work and recreation, tend to take place
in different types of building. There are obvious exceptions to this
general rule such as a place of entertainment which is also a place of
work for its staff and houses which may be centres of both work and
family life for wives. Normally when one goes into a building one knows
roughly what type of activity one expects to find in it and what one's
own part in that activity will be. And that general knowledge helps one
to understand the behaviour of people one meets in the building. One
can of course be surprised. One may enter a bank and find that the
manager is having his teeth extracted in the strong room and that featlet
dancers have taken over the rest of the building for rehearsal purposes.
But life would become chaotic and impossible if one could have no
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expectations about the types of behaviour to be found in different
types of buildings or if such expectations were not frequently fulfilled.
Normally the activities taking place in any one building are complicated
and as well as being aware of the general activity for which the building
is used one must also understand the particular sections or aspects of
that activity which are carried on in particular parts of the building.
Kitchens, bathrooms, managers' offices, store-rooms, operating theatres,
waiting rooms, committee rooms and typing pools are highly specialised
types of rooms which have an identity which is partially independent of
the larger settings of which they normally form a part. The independence
is distinctly partial however because the difference between a kitchen
in a private house and one in an hotel and between an operating theatre
in a maternity hospital and one in a dental hospital is determined by
the settings in which these sub settings are situated. Equipment and
dress relate to settings in the way that stage properties and. costumes
relate to stage sets. They tend to be appropriate to the relevant
activity and they play an important part in the activity. It is very-
confusing if a head waiter wears the same dress as the other waiters.
A Jcottish judge who used to have to impose the death penalty of which
he personally disapproved once said that wearing full judicial dress
including, as was the Scottish custom on such occasions, a black
eighteenth century tricorn hat, helped him to speak in accordance with
the requirements of his role despite his private beliefs. A naked society
would be socially confusing and impoverished. Hospitals have been faced
with the equivalent of staff nudity in the form of almost universal staff
white coats. Labels indicating roles such as anaethetist and. dietician
have had to be used to solve the problem. Apart from uniforms, quasi
uniforms and role labels, different types of dress serve the purpose of
indicating formality or informality, age, life styles, beliefs and
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attitudes. One aspect of social activity is the differences in
atmosphere amongst different social events. There are probably four
important parameters of social atmosphere. One is a formality—informality
parameter, another a hostility co-operation parameter the third a mourning-
rejoicing parameter and the fourth a public-private parameter. For
present purposes let us simplify matters and use only two of these
parameters, the formality-informality one and the mourning-rejoicing one.
From these parameters we get a rectangular field of atmosphere in which
each corner represents an extreme type of atmosphere. Social events
for the corners of the field might be a British state funeral (formal
mourning) a British Coronation (formal rejoicing) tearful embracing











Right in the middle of the field we might want to place strolling in
a public park as a type of activity which is equidistant from the
extreme of formality, mouring, informality and rejoicing. Clothing
plays its part in atmosphere and the relevant role performances. A
consideration of the types of clothing, if any worn during the activities
and situations outlined above should make this clear. The atmosphere of
a social event or activity is to a large extent a function of the
relationship between the roles of the participants. At the same time
it has to be said that the nature of the event or the activity controls
the roles to the extent that if events and activities follow their
normal course only certain aspects of the relevant roles are usually
involved in them. An English king and the archbishop who crowns him
may very well get drunk together but not normally during the course of
a coronation ceremony. Role style and interpretation as well as background
roles may also influence the atmosphere of social events and activities.
If a prison official invites an ex prisoner to a party at his house the
prison official prisoner relationship is likely to influence even if
only in slight and amusing ways the dominant and foreground guestM host
relationship.
Equipment, which should, be taken to include furniture and furnishings,
does not require much consideration at this stage. Its more important
aspects will be considered in the following section on technology.
Here it is sufficient to say that equipment makes settings precise.
Most unfurnished rooms could be used for a great many purposes but once
they are furnished and equipped,the range of possibilities is greatly
narrowed down. When a room has boen fully equipped for post mortem
examinations people are unlikely to want to hold a party in it unless
it is some kind of sick joke party. But before it was furnished and
equipped the same room might have seemed to have considerable potential
as a setting for a party.
It is possible to say very briefly what the social significance of
settings, dress and equipment is. They are the physical aspects of roles
and constantly remind people of their own and other people's roles. One
might even go so far as to say that they have a tendency to control human
activities in as much as they are the visible aspects of the roles which
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form the framework of these activities.
Section 2 - Technology
Human beings alter, control and increasingly create their physical
environment. But their ability to do so depends to a large extent on
a,
things. The amount of force which ahuraan being can exert on his
environment without the aid of things is extremely limited and the
number of ways in which that force can be exerted is also very limited.
Not much can be done apart from a certain amount of pushing, pulling,
lifting, throwing and snapping. Such a simple operation as cutting or
digging cannot be carried out without an instrument. The things which
are used to modify and control the environment are variously known as
tools, instruments and machines. It is doubtful if one can draw clear-
cut distinctions between these three types of things. One should perhaps
note that they are all used to extend bodily powers and that important
groups of them are used for travel and communication and for scientific
purposes. Scientific instruments are concerned with understanding the
world rather than controlling it and many of them such as microscopes
and telescopes are concerned with observation and many such as theremo-
meters and micrometer screw guages are concerned with measurement. The
acquisition of empirical knowledge is to a large extent dependent on
things because man's powers of observation are extremely limited if only
the unaided senses are used, and also because objective measurement is
virtually impossible without things such as measuring rods and weighing
machines.
If one is studying roles tools, instruments and machines are important
because aany roles are defined in terms of their use. The invention of
typexrriters, aeroplanes and computers has produced the roles of typist,
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airline pilot and computer programmer, The importance of the machines
for these roles is quite different from the importance of a stethoscope
for a doctor. There were doctors before there were stethescopes and it
is possible to listen to heart sounds without a stethoscope. But by
definition there were no airline pilots before there were aeroplanes..
The importance of equipment in the medical field is of course very
considerable and there were no radiologists or radiographers before there
were X-ray machines, no anaesthetists before there were anaesthetics and
anaesthetic machines. The main point however is that it is meaningful
to talk of machine dependent roles and to distinguish them from machine
using roles. Probably most roles are machine using at the present time.
In technologically primitive societies, if there are any machine dependent
roles they are probably regarded as relatively unimportant. In the early
stage of industrialisation the most common machine dependent role is
probably that of factory worker or machine minder. Such a person
performs very simple tasks, but the person who controls an anaesthetic
machine or an airliner performs extremely complicated tasks and has
human life in his hands. In a variety of ways machines have as it were
moved closer to human beings and that point will be investigated further
in the next chapter on animals and machines.
Musical instruments give rise to a special class of machine dependent
roles which should be mentioned briefly. Some people would doubtless
object to calling musical instruments machines and their objection draws
attention to the evaluative and emotive meanings which not only the word
'machine' but also the related words 'tool' and 'instrument' have. We
are using the word 'machine' in this context in a neutral and extended
sense which covers instruments and tools. The role of musical instrument¬
alist is generally regarded as an artistic and creative one but it is
also totally machine dependent. The quality of musical instruments is
important for satisfactory performance. The most skilled instrumentalist
cannot triumph as it were over a poor instrument. And' a new type of
instrument means a new type of music. One cannot understand the
difference between harpischord music and piano music without understanding
the difference between the harpsichord and the piano. The admittedly
rather special case of the role of musical instrumentalist may prevent
us from adopting the common supercilious attitude to machine dependent
roles. Airline pilots and computer programmers also occupy machine
dependent roles which require skills and abilities of a high order.
One's attitudes to machine dependent roles in general must take account
of their increasing range and complexity* The roles of grave-digger and
stoker can no longer be regarded as paradigm cases of machine dependent
roles.
Section 3 - Property and Territory
Prom the social point of view property and territory are fundamental
to the understanding of things. If one is to survive in society one
must learn at an early age to distinguish between public and private
property and one's own private property and other peoples private property.
The concept of ownership is a complicated one but we shall not investigate
it here. It is sufficient for our purposes that we can use and understand
such sentences as 'He owns that car' and 'That park belongs to the local
authority'. Territory and property are very often linked. One's
property is usually on one's own territory, e.g. one's plastic gnomes
tend to be in one's own garden rather than in one's neighbour's although
one's aesthetically discerning children may throw them over the wall and
one's contraceptives are more likely to be in one's own bedroom than in
one's son's although one's son may very well remove them to his own room.
83
In order to understand many role performances one must understand the
ideas of quasi property and quasi territory. Frequently in bureaucratic
organisations employees are assigned territory, property and equipment
for their role performance. One is given an office and/or a desk and
one may also be given a secretary. As far as the legal notion of property
is concerned these things belong to the organisation and not to the employee
but as far as the day to day work of the organisation is concerned, they
are regarded as having been handed over to the employee for as long as
he holds the relevant post. Accordingly they may be regarded as quasi
territory and property as distinct from real territory and property such
as a house which one owns filled with one's own furniture. Someone who
lives in rented furnished accommodation lives and probably works in quasi
territory although from the legal point of view, that kind of quasi
territory is very different from the kind used by employees during working
hours. Clearly, there are degrees of ownership and quasi ownership. At
the one extreme we have what we legally own and at the other what we
have borrowed or stolen. If one wished to pursue this topic for its
own sake one might want to consider the ownership and quasi ownership
of books in university towns where bookshops and libraries normally have
very heavy losses. At Oxford one was often astonished to hear people say
that they got all their books from Blackwells but never paid for them.
As far as our present purposes are concerned, there is no need to
consider the matter further..
Role performances that take place on the performer's own territory
or quasi territory may be different in subtle ways from those that.take
place on someone else's territory. One is dominant in one's own
territory. The undertaker is dominant amongst the horrors of his
funeral parlour but he is a gaeat and hence subordinate when he comes
to Aunt Agatha's house to measure the cook's corpse. And one is not as
84
dominant in one's subordinate's territory as one is in one's own.
A secretary is dominant in her own office and so if one wishes to feel
really superior to her it is best to summon her to one's own. Even a
prisoner in his cell has a slight dominance over the oddities who rush
in and out to see him. Again it is best to summon him to one's own
office if one wishes to be more patronisingly superior than usual.
Perhaps we should notice here that people make their territory their own
by the use of personal objects many of which relate to roles of the
occupant other than that performed in the territory in question. In
the office one finds a photograph of wife and family and in the sitting
room at home the house journal of the organisation which does not allow
its employees to see their wives and families very often. Pieces of
personal property are especially important in quasi territory where for
the occupant at any rate they stand out amonvst the pieces of quasi
property. One's ancestral swords may play an important part in decorating
one's office and when one removes them in preparation for one's departure
one may feel like a stranger in a strange place because of their absence.
The lower orders are not of course allowed to have offices but even
night watchmen's huts are sometimes made personal by the use of a
limited range of painted slogans or even four letter words. And long
distance lorry drivers may: hang personal items in their cabs. Prisoners
often counteract the effect of drab uniforms by carrying the carefully
and elaborately ornamented tobacco tins which seem to make life more
bearable for them. And in their cells these tobacco tins along with
photographs of wives and children, pet birds, drawings and paintings
in some very small measure help to counteract the effects of chamber pots.
Territory is an aspect of the physical aspect of roles because it
is in the most general sense a setting for some of the roles of those
whose territory it is. At the same time it can be the setting for
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some of the roles of other people. But as we have seen the roles of
these others are likely to be subordinate to the roles of the owners
or quasi otpers of the territory. When one goes to one's solicitor in
order to draw up one's will, one is as it were upstaged up him on his
own territory even if one's will is much more interesting and impressive
than his own and even if one is a barrister or a judge. One's breakfast
room is primarily a setting for the breakdown of one's own marriage and
so one may never notice the servant who faithfully helps matters along
by serving cold coffee and burnt toast. And one's adolescent sone may
find one's xihole house totally a setting for one's own life so that
he frequently wants to flee from it. There are exceptions to the point
we have just made and they can be unpleasant. A policeman who searches
a private house turns someone else's territory into his own for the
duration of the search and that dramatic change in the usual state of
affairs can be traumatic for the owners of the house. Similarly in the
world of quasi territory cell searches may upset prisoners. And one
can learn a lot about roles in relation to territory and quasi territory
from the fact that prison officers who specialise in cell searches are
referred to by their colleagues as 'burglars' as in the expression
'we'll get the burglars in for Brown's cell'.
It is advisable to pause at this stage before we go on to
consider the linguistic aspects of roles. At present we are wandering
around in a vastarea in which there are very few if any satisfactory
philosophical landmarks or guide posts. Our friends the existentialists
have however said one or two things about the topics we have been
discussing. A useful account of existentialism is given by Professor
John Macquarrie in his book Existentialism which is to be found in a
series devoted to the improbable subject of 'theological resources'.
Perhaps it is possible to regard Macquarrie not only as a theologian
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but also as the only British existentialist philosopher of whom one
has heard. In hia book Macquarrie writes (p 61) •Instruments are
interlocking. They imply one another, in systems and subsystems, A
pen implies paper; the paper implies a postal system; the postal system
implies methods of transportation, and so on. Today, as we often hear,
we live in the context of a world of immense complexity where everything
seems to affect everything else. What articulates this world and gives
significance to each single item xcithin it is human concern. The everyday
world is correlated with the range of human concern. That is what gives
unity and system to the multifarious items embraced within the world'
Our talk about the physical aspects of roles has I think been more
satisfactory than Macquarrie's talk about 'human concern'. There are a
great many types of human concern and a great many types of things
people can be concerned about. One type of concern about things is a
desire to destroy them. People can be concerned about logical problems.
Instead of saying that the everyday world is correlated with the range
of human concern it would be much more precise to sqy that the everyday
world in Macquarrie's sense of the term, consists of the physical
aspects of roles. And instead of saying what Macquarrie said in the
last sentence of his that we quoted above it would be much better to
say that the physical world becomes part of the social world and acquires
social significances through roles and because of the physical aspects
of roles.
In the same chapter of his book Macquarrie talks about (p 62)
'the idea of the world as an instrumental system that derives its unity
and meaning from the organizing concern of man' And he goes on to say
that 'At the beginning of the century Bergson was pointing out that tools
are simply extensions of man's body, and similar ideas have been taken
up more recently by Marshall McLuhan. But the total instrumental system
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within which these tools have their place and significance, namely
the world, is also an extension of man'. Once again it would be
much more precise to talk about the physical aspects of roles instead
of the idea of world as an instrumental system', and 'the organising
concern of man'. People do not normally set out to organise the
physical world just for the sake of doing so, rather th§y produce
and adapt the physical world in accordance with the requirements of
roles and the social purposes and activities of which they are a part.
The idea of the world as an extension of man is also best clarified
by an account of the physical aspects of roles which show us how
the world is related to human action. Not for the first time we
see that existentialists make the great mistake of paying too
little attention to roles. Now we can forget their unfortunate
lapse and turn to the linguistic aspects of roles.
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Section 4 - Roles and Linguistic Behaviour
Although quite a few things may happen before the actors start to
speak it is only when they do that the play really gets under way. What
the characters in the play say to each other will to a large extent be
governed by their roles. Similarly off stage what people say to each
other is also governed by their roles.
Language is perhaps the principal means of interpersonal contact
i
and the roles of the contacting parties will to a large extent determine
the linguistic expressions used. Interpersonal contact usually starts
with one party attracting the attention of the other party or parties.
Normally this is done linguistically though the linguistic behaviour may
be combined with non-1inguistic behaviour such as smiling and hand waving,
and if linguistic behaviour is risky^non-linguistic behaviour only such
as nudging, winking, prodding and coughing may be used. The appropriate
linguistic behaviour may be directed at people in general or it may be
more specific. Expressions such as 'help' and 'here is an' announcement'
are used for people in general and forms of address are used for someone
or some people in particular. Role relationships are shown in forms of
address. One can usually tell whether someone is speaking to a peer, a
surrogate or a subordinate by paying attention to the form of address alone.
And the roles of the relevant parties determine the relationships in
the relevant situation. The forms of address set the scene as it were
and all that follows takes place within the limits of that scene. It
is as well to note that even in very tactual forms of interpersonal
contact such as boxing, wrestling and sex language plays an important
part. The words spoken by umpires and judges control boxing and
wrestling and the publication of that indispensable guide to modem
travel 'How to Make Love in Five Languages' reminds us that in the
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most tactual of situations language has a part to play.
Not all roles are equally verbal. Many working class roles such as
those of coalminer and engine driver are largely non-verbal. Most middle
class roles are verbal and some such as barrister and teacher are highly
verbal. At times the verbal element is prescribed and ritualistic but
normally there are loose conventions about the type of thing which it is
proper for occupants of various roles to say when they are speaking in
an official capacity. Judges passing sentence are likely tn many legal
systems to use a prescribed form of words. Bank clerks do not make use
of ritualistic words but they are bound by certain conventions. Speaking
as bank clerks they cannot ask people about the state of their teeth but
they can make mild comments about peoples spending habits and bank
managers can make considerably stronger comments on the same subject.
Assuming a role means assuming certain linguistic habits while one is
acting in the role.
At times what people want to say to others, or feel needs to be
said to others clashes strongly with the relevant role situations.
Most people discover sooner or later that if they go too far beyond
the linguistic boundaries of their rales they are likely to encounter
very considerable hostility or anger. Seniors can say things to their
juniors that juniors cannot say to their seniors. Politicians can say
things in public that civil servants cannot say in public and so on.
'He was not in a position to say that* is possibly the most usual
criticism of someone who gets on the wrong side of linguistic role
boundaries. In an angrier tone of voice someone may sharpen the
criticism by saying 'he seems to forget that he is an X and not a Y' or
'he seems to forget that he is only an X and not a Y' where X and Y are
roles. Most people learn sooner or later how to deal with these difficulties.
One can get others to say what one cannot say oneself because of their
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role position and one's own. Possibly the most obvious example of that
move is the situation where a committee secretary whispers in the
chairman's ear and the chairman then says "the secretary has just
reminded me that ..." In such a situation the secretary considers it
inadvisable to say something himself but he gets the chairman to say it
for him. The matter in question is regarded as being more appropriately
said by the chairman than by the secretary. In more elaborate cases
there are several links in the chain. Someone drops a hint to someone
else who does the same and so on until eventually the person whom the
first person had in mind is told whatever the first person wanted to
tell him by someone quite far removed from the first person. The information
or opinion in question has to be passed up or along until it reaches someone
who is in a position to pass it on to the person for whom it was intended.
Once a school mistress told me that she found it very helpful having
her daughter,in the same school as a pupil because through her she heard
the other girls' comments on her clothes. "Oh mummy you can't wear that
skirt again because the other girls say it's awful" was evidently the kind
of comment that the school mistress found useful. School girls cannot
normally tell their mistresses how dreadful their clothes are but one
girl can speak to another and a girl can pass the vital news on to her
mother. When I was a university administrator I was sometimes given
information that I was clearly meant to pass on. When lecturers in a
certain department told me that one of their professors undertook virtually
no, teaching duties whatsoever, clearly they imagined that someone could
do something about the matter. It was fairly obvious to me that no one
could, but I felt duty bound to pass the information on so I told the
dean of the faculty who could simply say in a sad sort of way that he
had long suspected that Professor X was incredibly lazy even by academic
standards. Sometimes one finds that intermediaries are not necessary and
that occupants of apparently remote roles can speak very freely to each
other. Queen Victoria was by all accounts able to speak very freely
indeed to a certain Mr John Brown who was her gamekeeper. Doubtless
Mr Brown could tell her things that Mr Gladstone could not but presumably
Mr Brown did not address her as if she were a public meeting as Mr Gladstone
is supposed to have done. Brown and Victoria cases are noticed because
they are exceptional. Possibly sore usual are cases liljEthe one I came
across in rural Scotland where a woman's chauffeur was urged to give her
quite a lot of rather personal advice but he refused on the ground that
he simply did not want to place his job at risk and it was not Ms place
to give her such advice. Even in less feudal societies there are limits
to what for example secretaries can say to their bosses.
Individuals may have to watch carefully at times what role they are
occupying when they say certain things. Mrs Brown can say that
Mr Snodgrass is a horrible bastard when she is at home talking to her
husband but things may be more difficult when she is working in the
office as Mr Snodgrass's secretary. Certainly she can say such things
in the office but she has to be careful to whom she says them. There
is however a widely used convention which allows people to say what
they in one sense cannot say. It is generally accepted that people may
speak unofficially and off the record provided they make it clear that
that is what they are doing. Possibly the Pope comes top in this matter
because he uses the device of speaking ex cathedra and non ex cathedra.
The rest of us write some things on official paper and other things on
non official paper. Once I was a candidate in an examination about which
there was some confusion. In the middle of the confusion one of the
examiners wrote to me from his private address and on private note paper.
Clearly he wished to indicate that by not using the headed note paper
of his university department his remarks were unofficial and off the
record. But this case shows us clearly that in saying things off the
record one does not move from one role to another but stays within one
role. What the lecturer said in his letter could only have been said by
an examiner in the relevant examination. The letter was a letter from
an examiner to a candidate. At an earlier stage of my life I used to be
somewhat amused by letters sent to my mother by my solicitor uncle. They
were typed by his secretary on his office note paper but he scored out
the heading at the top of the paper. By that procedure he made it
clear that although he was writing in the Lincoln's Inn Fields setting
of his solicitor role he was in fact writing as a brother-in-law to a
sister-in-law. It would be wrong to imagine that the points we have been
discussing apply only to work roles and that in family roles for example
people can say absolutely anything to each other and that there cannot
be even equivalents of speaking on and off the record and officially
and unofficially. If we think that a husband shoiild not live off his
wife's earnings as a prostitute then presumably we think that he should
not suggest to her that he should. Similarly if we think that a father
should not have sexual intercourse with his daughter or bugger his son
then presumably we think that he should not suggest such things to his
daughter or his son. Family roles do not give their occupants complete
freedom of expression. Saying certain things may be incompatible with
such roles and if occupants of these roles do say the forbidden things
and say them seriously then they are likely to experience some form of
crisis in which their occupancy of the relevant role is likely to be
called in question. At times fathers and sons may speak to each other
as if they were contemporaries. They may for example go out drinking
together on that basis. What they say on that basis is as it were off
the record and unofficial.
Communication in the limited sense of passing information from one
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individual to another is a role bound activity. What one tells tie
milkman, gas fitter or rat catcher who calls at one's house depends
very little on his personal characteristics and a great deal on the
relevant role situation. One may of course become very friendly with
the rat catcher or even a gas fitter and move from role bound interaction
to interaction based largely on individual characteristics. But because
of the role bound nature of communication it is not dependent on
individual characteristics. It is possible to enter into communication
with shop keepers, doctors and bus conductors who are complete strangers.
One understands their roles and they understand one's own whatever it
may be. Just as in a wider sense one can understand what someone is
saying if one knows his language so one can in more precise sense
communicate with someone if one knows his role* Indeed although a full
discussion of the language of action will not he undertaken until
Chapter 71 we can perhaps at this stage just begin to see what is
involved in that concept* Language games are part of action games and
action games are to be understood in terms of roles. One of the most
important elements involved in learning a role is learning the language
of the role in the sense of learning the terms and expressions peculiar
to the role. Normally the actions and the language of a role go together.
Shop assistants for example learn the language and the actions of selling
at the same time and most important of all they learn to relate them to
each other. Only if a shop assistant starts off the selling game by
displaying great interests in what the customer wants and indeed tries
to find it will he end up being able to sell him what the shop wants to
sell because it is expensive and selling badly. Some roles are almost
entirely linguistic and involve very little in the way of non linguistic
action but they are probably somewhat exceptional!, and may not be very
important. Consider the role of philosopher for example. One becomes
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a philosopher by learning philosophy until one reaches the stage of
being able to display a high degree of philosophical competence and if
possible of originality. Learning philosophy and displaying philosophical
competence and originality are linguistic activities. Those philosophers
who are academics are supposed to have and in some cases undoubtedly do
have teaching and examining skills. These skills are also linguistic.
There are virtually no non-linguistic skills required by philosophers.
Some philosophers are skilled in producing pregnant silences but that skill
may not be found to any great extent outside Cambridge. In my day at
Oxford a post graduate philosopher from Cambridge stirveyed the Oxford
philosophical scene and came to the undoubtedly true conclusion that
•Oxford philosophers say too much'. Unlike philosophers dentists have
considerable non verbal skills. Restorative dentistry, orthodontics,
minor oral surgery and dental prosthetics are all activities that involve
manual skills as well as language games. But all branches of dentistry
rest on the assumption that there are people who understand and are
willing to occupy the role of dental patient. Dentist and patient
communicate with each other by accepting each others roles. That
acceptance is the basis of their interaction or communication. Now
let us return to our discussion of communication in the sense of passing
information from one individual to another.
Secrets are very important for an understanding of communication.
Although for the epistemologist all knowledge is public in the sense
that it is expressed in a public language or quasi language such as
mathematical symbolism and can he publicly checked and verified from the
social point of view a lot of knowledge is to a greater or lesser extent
private or secret. Universities illustrate this matter very clearly.
The knowledge in the library is socially public but the .knowledge in the
administratorb' files is socially private. In one particular case at a
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certain university when it was announced that a certain man had been
promoted to a chair the administrators and some others knew that all
his referees had advised against the appointment. The announcement of
the appointment and of the professor's inaugural lecture and the lecture
itself were all extremely public but the referees' advice was one of the
administration's better kept secrets* At times even libraries ?aay be i
involved in a certain amount of secrecy. The library at the Ministry of
Defence may be an extreme case but even in university libraries one may
encounter both formal and informal restrictions on access to books and
other material. Generally these restrictions are concerned with the
protection of rare and delicate books and manuscripts and so are not
relevant to our purposes but even in a general academic library one may
find that an unpublished PhD thesis for example is concerned with a
socially sensitive area. Once I was given permission to read such a thesis
about a legal organisation. The librarian who gave the permission was
under the mistaken impression that I was a lawyer and when he discovered
that he was mistaken he was slightly worried. There seemed to be some
kind of tacit understanding between the library staff and the members of
the organisation that if possible only lawyers would be allowed to read
the thesis. It is possible to argue that a great deal of the secrecy
r
in many societies is totally ludicrous and unnecessary. Evidently in
some Scandinavian countries there is a great deal less official govern¬
ment secrecy than in countries such as Britain. But equally, it is very
difficult if not impossible to imagine a society without any secrets at
all. Even if it were desirable to publish all government papers it might
not be desirable to publish all medical, legal and financial matters
relating to individuals. Secrecy is also involved in allowing people
to enjoy the rewards of industry and originality by means of patents
and copyright. It can also be argued that in family life there is a
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place for secrets between spouses, and between siblings and between
parents and children. The interesting point about secrets as far as
communication and roles are concerned is that they are role bound. One
tells one's medical secrets to any doctor and one's financial secrets to
any hank manager who is handling one's account. To say that information
is secret is to say that it is restricted to people in certain roles.
In bureaucratic organisations such as the civil service and the armed
forces, it is usual to indicate the level or rank below which certain
information cannot be passed. Such grading of information often takes
no account of the handling of information by typists and photocopiers
but the number of leaks of information through such people appears to be
surprisingly few. Against the view that I have outlined it might be
claimed that people often tell secrets to particular individuals because
of their individual characteristics. In our society most married people
hsye only one spouse and because of that situation belief in giving
secrets to a particular individual as opposed to someone in a particular
role may he widespread. But a man who has three wives one after the other
rather than only one will probably be prepared to tell his third wife
everything he told his first wife although when he was married to his
first wife he probably thought that he was telling her secrets that he
was not prepared to tell anyone else. In such a case we can say that a
man is prepared to say certain things to his spouse.whoever his spouse
may be. Yet by its very nature in our society the relationship between
a pair of spouses is regarded as totally exclusive and it is only when
one member of the pair is replaced that the true nature of the situation
is revealed.- It would be absurd to deny that individuals can enter
into special relationships whatever the role situation may be. The case
of Queen Victoria and Mr John Brown illustrates that point admirably.
In general however communication, including the communication of secrets,
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is a role bound activity.
Perhaps it is now clear that roles have important physical and
linguistic aspects. As we have tried to show in this chapter roles are
not abstract entities which are discussed in sociology text books and
which can be ignored by those who do not happen to be interested in
sociology. In a very physical and obvious sense they surround us all
the time and we see and hear them all day and every day. Somewhat
paradoxically although the physical and linguistic aspects of roles are
extremely obvious they are often ignored and many people do not seem to
be aware of them. Many discussions of role theory do not even mention
them. And so although what has been said in this chapter has been to
a certain extent tedious and obvious it has at the same time been important.
Indeed the matters we have looked at in this chapter are as important as
the matters we discussed in chapter II despite the fact that in that
chapter we were concerned with matters that are comparatively often
discussed and have as it were a higher intellectual and academic status
than the physical and linguistic aspect of roles.
The next two chapters give us some blessed relief from roles. But
before we enjoy that relief it is necessary to say that we are not claiming
to have mentioned every aspect of role theory. All we have tried to do
in this section of the work (Chapters I - III) is to hint at the importance
and complexity of roles in relation to understanding human action and




Section 1 - In General
Now it is time to turn to the individuals who occupy roles. This
chapter and chapter V are together concerned with human individuals hut
the title 'human individuals' is restricted to chapter V. Here in this
chapter we are concered with animals and machines because a consideration
of them helps to clarify our understanding of human beings. If on wishes
to understand one type of entity it is often helpful to consider other
types which may be regarded as similar or related to the type under
consideration or as reasonably near neighbours of it. Those who are
concerned with one form of transport may find it very helpful to consider
other forms and those who study bacteria may also want to have some
knowledge of viruses and so rm Precisely how great are the differences
betxreen animals and machines on the one hand and humans on the other will
to a certain extent at any rate we hope emerge later in the chapter.
At this stage it may be necessary to try to provide some sort of
justification of our choice of animals and machines as the most important
objects of comparison with humans. It may be that on some distant planet
there are beings xfhich are much more like human beings than either
animals or machines. Unfortunately this work was written before they
were discovered by humans. As things stand at present animals and machines
are the entities of all those knoxn to man that are most like man himself.
Religious people of various types are likely to regard that point of view
as false and mistaken. For them some kinds of god or gods are the entities
most like humans. And indeed some of them would go so far as to say that
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one cannot understand man without understanding these in some sense
metaphysical or supernatural beings. Those who regard man as some kind
of creature are apt to say that he can be understood only by reference
to his creator. Some religious people may wish to say that man has an
immortal and metaphysical soul which is the most important part of him
and that therefore if we wish to understand man we must study the general
field of metaphysical entities.
Since this work is written from a general empiricist point of view
these religious points of view are not accepted. It is beyond the scope
of this work to give a general defence of empiricism and a general
refutation of the claims of traditional metaphysics. We may however
digress very briefly into the philosophy of religion in order to deal
with a point of view trhich claims to support the idea of the existence
of a creator god without recourse to arguments for the existence of such
a being. Almost certainly the best explanations of that point of view
are to be found in the writings of the theologian Karl Barth. In his
paper 'The Rationality of Discipleship' Barth writes (Fragments Grave and
Sav by Karl Barth p 43).
Any god postulated or dreamt up by man, even the loftiest and most
impressive, is alien to the Christain faith and can only be
repudiated by it as a non-god.
The God professed by the Christain faith differs from all other
gods in that, without assuming any ability or willingness on
man's part, but as a free act of grace, he announced himself,
to man's deep wonderment, as his Lord, Creator, Redeemer and
Father, calling him only to responsibility. And thus the
Christain faith, aloof from all spirit of metaphysical enterprise,
is merely this responsibility, this free acknowledgment of the
self-announcement of God's being and existence, his act and word;
free thanks to the liberation that aan experiences as a result
of the self-announcement of the free God. This and this alone
orders, fills and forms ever anew human propositions and ideas
about the Christain profession of faith.
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In order to deal with this point let us imagine two groups of people.
The members of the first group believe that they can pnve the existence
of god and the members of the second group believe that god has announced
or revealed himself to them. The sceptics approached to each group is
bound to be the same. In each case he will want to know what reasons
there are to substantiate the claim in question. He will expect the
members of the first group to produce their reasons for thinking that
they have proved the existence of god and he will expect the members of
the second group to produce their reasons for thinking that god has
announced or revealed himself to them. If the members of the second
group try to avoid the issue by saying that human reason cannot be trusted
because it is fallen then the sceptic will ask them for their reasons for
saying that human reason is fallen or imperfect or unreliable. And
indeed the sceptic may tell the man who says that human reason is fallen
that he is trapped by the liar paradox. Just as we do not know whether
or not to believe the Cretan who says that all Cretans are liars so we
do not know whether or not to take seriously the claim that human reason,
is fallen since that claim is as it were advanced by human reason and is
presumably intended by those who advance it to be rational. It is in
other words impossible to escape from the difficulties of reason and
argument to a safe and secure world of revelation. Any attempt to say
that revelation can only be experienced and not argued for is itself an
argument. In the case of what is called Christain revelation the dis¬
belief of the Jews is at least as important and one might almost say
as damning as the disbelief of atheists and sceptics.
One digression levels to another and so it should be said that the
paper by Prof Max Bense to which Barth's paper is a reply deserves to
be studied as a fascinating curiosity of continental philosophy despite
the presence of what are almost certainly serious errors of translation
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one of which does not appear to be
'Thus the vital good in theoretical explanation seems to me to be
the spiritual purity of atheism, and this requires the use of a
philosophical language, since in the last analysis only that can
do justice to that spiritual purity'
Even the strangeness of that sentence however cannot compete with the
incredible information supplied by the editor of the book at the beginning
of the article where we read (Barth op cit p 32).
•In 1963 Professor Max Bense was finally appointed to a chair
of philosophy at Stuttgart after the Ministry of Cultural Affairs
of Baden-Wurttenberg had refused the appointment in 1961 on the
ground that a declared atheist could not be appointed to a chair
of philosophy at a German university*.
Now we must return at once to our subject and say that at this stage
our reasons for selecting animals and machines as the most appropriate
entities with which to compare human beings are negative in the sense
that 110 better candidates in whose existence there are satisfactory
grounds for belief have yet appeared on the scene. As one says that one
must be aware that to-morrow one may wake up and find standing at the
bottom of one's bed an entity from another planet that has at least as
good a claim to be compared with human beings as animals and machines have.
The positive reasons for the selection in the sense of the existence of
important similarities amongst animals, machines and human beings will
it is hoped emerge during the rest of the chapter.
If we ask what animals and machines are it is possible to answer
the question very simply by saying that they are entities which are
inferior to human beings. This is an extremely anthropocentric view.
It might be that visitors from another planet would regard animals and
machines as being generally superior to humans but it is equally probable
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that they might come to agree with the anthropocentric view. There are
reasons for the anthropocentric view and they are worth examination. Both
animals and machines are generally regarded as intellectually inferior to
people. The problem solving behaviour of animals can be regarded as
inferior to that of people. Human beings are able to solve more complicated
problems than animals can. The intellectual capacities of certain types
of machine have improved and are improving greatly at the present time
and more will be said about them in the next section, but there is still
possibly a sense in which machines are intellectually inferior to people.
The intellectual powers of people are to a large extent a function of
their ability to use language and similar systems such as mathematical
symbolism and musical notation. There are not yet machines which can
use these systems to the extent and with the sophistication that the
most able people can. It has long been acknowledged however that animals
and machines are very often physically superior to people. Probably all
human physical capacities are inferior to the corresponding capacities
of some machines and some animals. There are machines and animals which
can move faster and carry greater loads and so on than human beings. But
humans have a unique combination of abilities. One can see this if one
considers the abilities required for such distinctively human activities,
as drawing, painting, ballet dancing eye and brain surgery, singing and
playing musical instruments. These activities require a very high degree
of muscular co-ordination and control used in conjunction with and
controlled by appropriate perceptual, intellectual, artistic and emotional
skills. Even such activities as writing, dental surgery, speaking and
chiropody also require similar skills although not at the same level.
In this context we are talking about writing and speaking as purely
physical activities. They can be seen in this light in situations
such as the copying of a manuscript written in a language which the
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copyist does not understand and the reading aloud of a phonetic
transcription of a passage in a language which the speaker does not
understand. If we turn to the field of sensory discrimination we find
a similar type of situation. There are animals which can hear sounds which
are inaudible to humans and there are animals which can see in the dark.
Also the insect eye gives a type of all round vision which humans might
find useful. But humans have powers of visual and auditory discrimination
which cannot be found in the animal world. As far as we know there is no
animal which has perfect pitch. It is important to note however that
just as the most sophisticated human muscular skills are closely linked
with other skills so the most sophisticated human perceptual skills are
linked with artistic skills and. aesthetic judgment.
The considerable physical powers of animals and machines are used
by human beings to supplement or replace their own lesser physical
abilities. And that is just one instance of the general use made of
animals and machines by humans. Part of the inferority of animals and.
machines is in the fact that they are used by humans and in the case of
machines produced by them. Vast numbers of animals are not in any sense
used by people but all animals are potentially available for human use.
It is also true that in a sense animals can be produced by humans who
either provide suitable conditions for their breeding or actively promote
it by artifical insemination. There is truth in the view that humans are
masters of both animals and machines. But there is another side to the
picture. In certain situations people can be destroyed by either animals
or machines. And situations in which people control animals or machines
can often turn into situations in which people are dependent on thera.
Failure in machines which convey people can have serious consequences
and people are also dependent on machines of biological significance
such as iron lungs, artifical kidneys and cardiac stimulators and pace
makers which are placed, inside the thorax. Certainly people are ultimately
in control of all machines which are incapable of the most complex forms
of learning since they designed and produced them but even that point
cannot stand without qualification since even the most careful design
and production cannot remove the need for the testing of prototypes ox-
trial runs or test flights. The behaviour even of machines incapable
of learning does not seem to be totally predictable from a knowledge of
their design and production.
So far we have classed animals and machine s more or less together
but it is time to start paying attention to their differences. The most
obvious difference is that animals are biological and machines are non-
biological. That means that they differ both as regards chemical structure
and mode of operation. Animals like all biological organisms are cellular
in structure and their mode of functioning is basically an elaboration of
the functioning of a unicellular or acellular organism like Ameoba. Machines
on the other hand are organised on mechanical or electronic principles
and do not have such biological features as cells, enzymes and the ability
to respond to many types of visual, auditory, olfactory and tactile stimuli
from their environment. In addition they have powers of learning and
remembering and they can. indulge in problem solving activities. Machines
are possibly not yet as homeostatic or as responsive to such a wide range
of stimuli as mammals. And they cannot as yet reproduce. But there is
no reason in principle why they should not be developed in such a way -
that will have these properties in due course. Another difference between
animals and machines is that all animals produce their owrj energy and so
they can be highly mobile if they have appropriate locomotive structures.
In general machines other than locomotive machines such as aeroplanes
tend to be relatively static and tend to draw energy from a distant source
which also supplies other machines as well. But in this respect as in
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others there is no reason why animal-like machines should not be developed.
The flexibility and highly adaptive nature of animal behaviour stands out
in sharp contrast to the very specialised behaviour of machines, A
beaver can cut through tree trunks but an electric saw can do it much more
efficiently. Similarly the other abilities of beavers can be surpassed
by other machines. Multipurpose machines may not be in great demand,
One of the most noticeable features of animals is what biologists call
their life cycle i.e. progression from birth to death through stages of
growth, development and aging. Tvidently there are two theories of
aging, the biological aiad the pathological. According to the biological
^ * # .
theory dying is the last stage of development and according to the
pathological theory it is a disease which could in theory be prevented
or cured. At present is is not clear which theory is true. If the
pathological theory turns out to be true and there is no theoretical reason
why aging should not be stopped then in one respect animals and machines
will become more like each other. Certainly machines wear out and they
also collapse because of metal fatigue. Only an expert in both biology
and engineering could say to what extent the disintegration of machines
and the aging of biological organisms do or do not resemble each other.
At present almost all parts of all machines cap be replaced as they become
worn out and transplant surgery is just beginning to make this process
a possibility for biological organisms. If the pathological theory is
true presumably one day we shall be able to arrange things so that not
even the parts of organisms will age and so as far as longevity is concerned
organisms may at some stage be superior to machines. If the bioLogical
theory is true an important difference between animals and machines remains
unless we can indulge in some very complicated genetic engineering because
according to it the progression from birth to death is a continous process
*




to produce some kind of metal or other material which would never
disintegrate or at least would not be liable to suffer from metal fatigue
as we know it.
Section II - The Intellectual Capabilities of Animals and Machines
Recently there has been a dramatic change in the intellectual
capacity of machines. Computers and similar machines now have powers of
memory and calculation which greatly surpass those of human beings.
But machines remain intellectually inferior to humans because they cannot
yet make use of languages and similar systems which are as complex as
those used by humans. There are machine languages in use at the present
time and it might seem reasonable to suppose that in due course machines
will be devised which will be capable 6f coping with human languages. One
well known person who has argued against this view is Professor N Chomsky.
Before giving some attention to his writings we can say at present that
Chomsky argues that the whole attempt to teach machines human language
is misconceived because the ability to learn language is peculiarly
human and is at least partly genetic and inherited. Evidently Chomsky
claims that human languages are not as dissimilar and diverse as they
first appear because there are certain basic and deep as opposed to
surface structures which are common to all human languages. These basic
features are held to relate to important features of the human nervous
system or, in the view of the metaphysically inclined, of the human mind.
For those who are not metaphysically inclined there is no particular
problem here. If the structure of language learning machines has to be
modelled on that of the human nervous system no doubt in time it will be
possible to produce such machines.
A brief statement of Chomsky's views can be found in his paper
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Recent Contributions to the Theory of Innate Ideas which is printed in
-The Ecology of Human Intelligence edited by Professor L Hudson. It is
useful to consider this paper before one goes on to discuss the arguments
presented in Chomsky's book Language and Wind. Prom the philosophical
point of view there are two main points in the paper. The first of these
(Hudson p 81) is that 'Compared with the number of sentences that a child
can produce or interpret with ease, the number of seconds in a lifetime
is ridiculously small. Hence the data available as input is only a minute
sample of the linguistic material that has been thoroughly mastered, as
indicated by actual performance.* And a few lines further on in the paper
Chomsky writes 'The sentences used in everyday discourse are not 'familar
sentences' or generalisations of familar sentences in terms of any known
process of generalisation. In fact even to speak of familar sentences
is an absurdity'. All that Chomsky gives us at this point is assertion
and what he asserts is somewhat implausible and would require a vast
amount of empirical investigation and evidence to support it. One would
imagine that the number of types of sentence used in everyday discourse
must be minute in comparison, with the number of sentences used. Only a
vast amount of empirical evidence could reasonably persuade one otherwise.
Many conversational exchanges at the small talk level are very limited
and are almost ritualistic. It is not particularly difficult to master
the types of sentences used in such exchanges. Chomsky thinks that he
strengthens his case when he says between the two passages already quoted
from his paper that 'We observe further that the tremendous intellectual
accomplishment of language acquisition is carried out at a period of life
when the child is capable of little else and that this task is entirely
beyond the capacities of an otherwise intelligent ape'. There are three
main objections to that statement. A person's mastery of his native
language can go on improving until his dying day. This is particularly
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true of people who devote themselves to vaguely academic or intellectual
pursuits such as law, politics or journalism or to very definitely
academic and intellectual pursuits such as philosophy and sociology.
For such, people higher education can lead to a considerable increase in
linguistic competence. The undergraduate in philosophy for example
usually learns the various meanings of the common word 'is' either
through reading certain of Plato's dialogues or through studying logic
or both. Very probably he has not understood the meanings of the word
at an earlier stage although he has most certainly used in on innumerable
occasions* It might be objected that I am exaggerating my case but ray
exaggeration is no worse than Chomsky's* Presumably in the passage
under discussion Chomsky is really talking about Miat is colloquially
called 'learning to speak' which is really very different from 'language
acquisition'. But the so called 'learning to speak' is really only a
matter of beginning to learn to speak. Language acquisition does or
should include reading and writing which are activities that the child
nomally begins to master at a stage when he is capable of doing quite
a few other things. When children, as we say, learn to speak they
possibly cannot do very much else because of lack of muscular strength
and co-ordination but it really does not particularly matter. Clearly
a lot depends on what one means by language acquisition and knowledge
of a language* An anonymous friend of a philosopher I know put forward
the view in a private communication that 'learning to read and write
are forms of language activity but are hardly necessary in language
acquisition, as illiteracy is quite compatible with knowledge of a
language'. There are no good reasons for accepting that point of viexir.
If a language has a written form the£i those who cannot read and write
the language in question have only a partial knowledge of it if they
can speak it. In the case of dead languages the possibility of speaking
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the language does not arise but they are languages and those who can
read and write them are rightly said to know them. Equally there are
languages which do not yet have a written form and so knowing them is
simply a matter of being able to speak them. Those who wish to claim to
know living languages which have a written form must be able to cope with
both the written and spoken forms of the languages
The point about apes has now been shown to be simply false. Apes
cannot speak and they cannot write but there is a very limited amount
of experimental evidence to show that they can use and understand language
if it is presented in the form of visual symbols for words. Evidently
if they are presented with questions in such symbol languages they can
compose correct replies to the questions. The situation has been well
described by Prs Claire and IIS Russell in their paper Language and
animal signals where they write in Linguistics at Large edited by
N Minnis p 183-185.
The real test is whether chimpanzees can be taught to use human words
themselves, and to combine them in appropriate ways. A very
intensive attempt to teach a chimpanzee to talk was made some
years ago by a married couple, both scientists, K J and Cathy Hayes.
They adopted a baby chimp called Tiki, and brought her up in their
house exactly as if she were a human child, but using in addition
the most sophisticated methods of teaching available. The result
was disappointing. After six years of great effort and ingenuity,
Tiki had learned to utter only four sounds resembling English
xtfords. Prom this and other studies, it looked as if chimpanzees
cannot be taught a human language,.
So matters stood until June 1966, when another scientist couple,
R A and Beatrice T Gardner, began work at the University of Nevada
with a female chimpanzee between eight and fourteen months old,
whom they named Washoe after the county where the University is
situated. Benefiting from the Hayes' experience, the Gardners had
had an imaginative new idea. We have seen that most monkeys rely
more on visual than on vocal signals. Even the actual vocal
apparatus of chimpanzees is very different from man's. So instead
of trying to teach spoken English, the Gardners decided to teach
Washoe American Sign Language, as used by the deaf in North America,
in which English words or concepts are represented by signs made
with the hands; some of these symbols are representational, others
arbitrary, and all can be combined according to principles of
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English grammar and syntax. The Gardners and their colleagues
bought up Washoe in shifts so that she never lacked for
affectionate human company. They played all sorts of games with
her and seem to have given her a very good time. All the time
they were chattering among themselves in Sign Language, for it
is known that simply being exposed to adults talking helps human
children to learn to talk. They encouraged Washoe to imitate
them, prompted her to get a sign right by repeating it themselves
or by placing her hands in the right position, introduced plenty of
toys and other objects to increase her vocabulary, encouraged her
to 'babble' with her hands, as a child does with his voice, and
rewarded her for correct usage by tickling her, which she greatly
enjoyed.
The results of all this were as follows. After twenty-two months
of teaching, Washoe could use thirty-four words correctly in the
appropriate circumstances. (She was only counted as knowing a
word if three observers independently saw her use it correctly
and without prompting.) Whenever Washoe learned a new word, she
very soon and quite spontaneously transferred it from a particular
object, such as the key of a cupboard, to a whole class of objects,
such as all keys. She would spontaneously call the humans'
attention to objects by making the correct signs. She used the
sign for 'dog* when she saw a picture of a dog or even heard a
dog bark without seeing it; evidently, like the dolphins, she had
the capacity, previously supposed to be unique to man, of transposing
patterns from one sense to another.
All this is remarkable, but Washoe did more. Without any prompting
and apparently quite spontaneously, as soon as she had about ten
signs in her repertoire, Washoe began to invent combinations of
signs and use them in a perfectly appropriate way. Among
combinations which she invented are: open food drink, for opening
the refrigerator; go sweet, for being carried to a raspberry bush;
open flower, to be let through the gate into a flower garden,
and listen eat, at the sound of an alarm clock signalling meal-time.
Just before the Gardeners published their first results (in August
1969). Washoe had learned the pronouns I -me and you, 'so that
combinations that resemble short sentences have begun to appear'.
It only remains to add that Washoe's learning was accelerating -
she had learned four signs in the first seven months, nine in
the next, and. twenty-one in the last seven months.
Since Washoe unmistakably combines and recombines signs to describe
objects and situations new to her in perfectly appropriate ways,
this wonderful experiment seems to have established beyond doubt
that a chimpanzee is capable of learning true language. True, at
three years of age, she only has thirty-four words; at the equivalent
age in terms of development, namely five years old, the average
human child has a vocabulary of hundreds of words and makes
sentences averaging 4.6 words in length. Sheer numerical differences
of this kind may be important for the potentialities of human
language. But the Gardners' achievement remains epoch-making. An
animal has been taught to use true language, to communicate with
human teachers.
Naturally it is to be hoped that Washoe will continue with her
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studies of English and it is also to he hoped that many other animals
will follow her example. But the important point is that Washoe has
destroyed Chomsky's position and no amount of talk of deep and surface
structures and types of grammar car; save it. Washoe has shown both that
an animal can learn a language or at least one aspect of it and that there
is nothing fundamental about the spoken as opposed to the written forms
of language becaxise he has acquired a very rudimentary knowledge of a form
of the written or at least visual as opposed to auditory from of the
language without first learning to speak. It should not be necessary to
make this point since i^hat Washoe has done with English is done to a
certain extent by school boys who learn any dead language such as Latin.
The idea that the spoken or additory form or aspect of language is more
fundamental than its written or visual form or aspect may be widespread
simply because children learn to speak before they learn to write.
Possibly this happens simply because their vocal organs develop more
quickly than the strength and co-ordination of the muscles used in
writing. The situation may however change if children are taught the
visual form and aspect of language in the way that Washoe was taught it.
In accordance with what we said above we cannot claim that Washoe
is in the full sense of the term a language user because she does not
appear to be able to use the auditory aspect and form of language.
Presumably her deficiencies are entirely vocal and not at all aural.
It has often been said that no animal has anything like the human vocal
apparatus which is not restricted to the larynx but also includes the
mouth, nose, pharynx and certain sinuses in the skull and may indeed be
regarded as also including the thorax, diaphragm and certain muscles in
the abdomen. In principle however it is possible that animals could cope
with the auditory aspect of language if they could be taught to use an
appropriate machine which could produce the sounds which because of their
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anatomical structure they cannot produce. Only a very complicated machine
could produce the exact equivalent of the vocal capabilities of people
which include inflection and tone as well as simply vowel and consonant
sounds. But if necessary we could settle for something less than 'normal
human vocal capacity as we do in the case of those people who suffer from
either surgical or traumatic removal of the larynx and have to be content
with either a mechanical larynx or oesophagal speech.
At the end of the paper (Hudson op cit pp 87-88) Chomsky quotes a
passage from Descartes, part of which runs as follows:
But because we already possess within us the idea of a true
triangle we, therefore, when we see the composite figure,
apprenhend not it itself but rather an authentic triangle.
Chomsky's comment on this passage is 'It seems to me that the conclusions
regarding the nature of language acquisition discussed above, are fully
in accord with the doctrine of innate ideas, so understood, and can be
regarded as providing a kind of substantiation and further development of
this doctrine'. It is probably best to regard the passage from Descartes
as simply false. Many children take quite some time to grasp the
Euclidean idea of a triangle simply because it is so different from the
actual triangles they have met in the physical world. In any event only
the philosophically ignorant can speak as if the traditional controversy
between the rationalists and the empiricists had not been profoundly
altered by Kant. We cannot now say that knowledge comes from either mind
or experience but only from, in the traditional language, the interaction
of mind and experience. If we do wish to revive a traditional empiricist
or rationalist point of view we must first show that Kant's objections
to the traditional positions are unsound. Immediately after quoting the
passage from Descartes he states simply and without qualification 'In
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this sense the idea of triangle is innate', Such confident philosophical
simple mindedness is really quite alarming.
It is tine now to turn to Chomsky's book 'Language and Mind' which
like his paper mentioned above is filled with support for Descartes and
his followers and so on p 7 we read 'I think it is correct to say that
the study of the properties and organisation of mind was prematurely
abandoned'. Neither at that point nor at any other is there any hint
that the concept of mind raises immense problems. The work of Professor
Ryle is not mentioned. One should not however be surprised to find
philosophical confusion in the work of a writer who says later on p 69
'It would be mere dogmatism to maintain without argument or evidence
that the mind is simpler in its innate structure than other biological
systems*. Several of the points in 'Language and Mind' are similar to
those in the paper that we have already discussed but since Chomsky makes
so much of them it may be a good idea to look at them avain. On p 10 he
writes 'much of what we say in the course of normal language use is
entirely new, not a repetition of anything that we have heard before
and not even similar in any useful sense of the term - 'similar' and
'pattern' to sentences or discourse that we have heard in the past'.
This is a truism*. The falsity of this view is really quite surprising.
Most language both written and spoken is filled with endless echoes of
what people other than the writer or speaker in question have written and
said. Any examiner knows that* There is an important sense in which the
works mentioned in the bibliography of a PhD thesis echo and reverberate
throughout the thesis. Bureaucrats soon learn that certain official
documents are supposed to be written in an allegedly appropriate official
style and part of their skill lies in being able to produce that style. Once
as a university administrator I had to consult a certain professor about
the drafting of some regulation or other. As we struggled to produce a
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satisfactory form of words the professor remarked how strange it was that
in such a situation one soon found oneself using the ghastly language of
the university regulations. At the level of literature the critic the
literary historian and the author are all well aware of echoes and
resemblances. And so one can talk of the influence of Ovid on Chaucer
and of the Bible on Milton. T S Eliot's notes on The Waste Land are a
useful study in literary influences. At one point, line 441, he draws
our attention both to Dante's Infernoo XXXI11, 46 and to F H Bradley's
Appearance and Reality p 346. One can also mention the patterns in
language such as 'if' 'p then q' xirhich logicians study. But the most
important objection to Chomsky's view is that without patterns and
resemblances in what different people write and say the idea of a public
language would collapse and-we would be left with a collection of so
called private languages. If Chomsky overstates his case I must be
careful not to overstate mine. There may indeed be an element of novelty
in everyone's use of language and Chomsky's is right to draw our attention
to that aspect of linguistic behaviour. But unless one is a James Joyce
the novelty is almost totally obscured by the conventionality. One may
of course say new things without much if any linguistic novelty. Highly
original works in any field may open up vast new horizons in the most
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conventional of language. We have already noticed that linguistic
behaviour is role bound. Chomsky challenges that idea when he says p 11
'But the normal use of language is not only innovative and potentially
infinite in scope but also free from the control of detectable stimuli
either external or internal'.. A few lines later on he says that
linguistic appropriateness to the situation is 'an entirely different
matter from control by external stimuli'. Unless one defines external
stimuli in a needlessly narrow way that statement is simply false.
Normally linguistic behaviour is a response not in a mechanical but in
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a social sense to the linguistic behaviour of others and the whole
linguistic interation is governed by the appropriate roles..
It is interesting to compare two views of his basic thesis that
Chomsky gives us. The first of these is perfectly reasonable and has
much.to commend it, the second is very different. The first view is
given on p 69 of Language and Mind when he writes 'As participants in a
certain culture, we are naturally aware of the great differences in
ability to use language, in knowledge of vocabulary, and so on that result
from differences in native ability and from differences of acquisition,
we naturally pay much less attention to the similarities and to common
knowledge, which we take for granted. We find that the similarities
that we take for granted are quite marked and that the divergences are
few and marginal. Furthermore we discover a substantial system of
principles that do not vary even among languages that are, as far as
we know entirely unrelated.* Provided there is sufficient empirical
evidence to back up that point of view it is entirely reasonable. Indeed
it would not be at all surprising if it turned out that at some kind of
deep as opposed to surface level all languages are fundamentally the same
because they all carry out the sane fundamental task of being instruments
and vehicles of human communication. In saying that and in agreeing
with Chomsky at this point we are not saying anything about nor agreeing
with Chomsky about the idea that linguistic knowledge or competence is
innate. Although it may well be the case that current learning theory
is unable to give a satisfactory explanation of language acquisition
it does not follow that the whole idea of language learning should be
discarded. It is reasonable to wait a considerable tirreto see if learning
theory can be modified or altered in such a way that it can cope with
what is presumably its greatest and most complicated problem. On p 78
Chomsky turns to his idea of innate linguistic ability and expresses it
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in a clear and extreme from* He writes 'The child cannot know at birth
which language he is to learn, but he must know that its grammar must
be of a predetermined form that excludes many imaginable languages.
Having selected a permissible hypothesis he can use inductive evidence
for corrective action confirming or disconfirming his choice. Once the
hypothesis is sufficiently well confirmed, the child knows the language
defined by this hypothesis; consequently, his knowledge extends enormously
>
beyond, his experience and in fact, leads him to characterize much of the
data of experience as defective and deviant'. The idea of a child knowing
anything at birth raises many problems and requires much more elucidation
which Chomsky does not supply. Most knowledge is dependent on actual
linguistic ability. Even a claim to know how to do x as opposed to knowing
that x is normally expressed in language and then substantiated by action
which may be wholly or partially non linguistic. The child Chomsky talks
about is truly remarkable for not only does he know southing at birth
but he also at an early stage selects an hypothesis and uses inductive
evidence. Very carefully controlled experiments would be required to
establish the idea that children are able to characterise auch of the
data of linguistic experienced as defective and deviant and have a
knowledge of language extending enormously beyond their experience. Many
parents and teachers must wish that Chomsky's ideas were true because
they have to spend quite a lot of time correcting the linguistic habits
which children appear to pick up quite uncritically through their
experience.
Once or twice I have hinted darkly that Chomsky's enthusiasm for
rationalism can be criticised on the grounds that it does not take
adequate account of Kantian philosophy. There are two oblique reference
to Kant on pages 78 and 81 but they are not really very significant.
But on pages 24 and 53 Chomsky raises Kantian questions without apparently
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being aware that they arb Kantian. On p 24 he writes 'The study of universal
grammar is the study of the nature of human intellectual capacities. It
tries to formulate the necessary and sufficient conditions that a system
must meet to qualify as a potential human language, conditions (which)
constitute the innate organization that determines what counts as
linguistic experience and what knowledge of language arises on the basis
of this experience'. The first of these sentences is the more important
of the two. If universal grammar is what Chomsky says it is in that
sentence then it was first expounded by Kant and Chomsky must really
discuss his own ideas in relation to those of Kant. Such a; task would
be quite difficult and involved as well as very illuminating. Matters
are even more Kantian on p 53 where Chomsky writes '..... it seems not
unlikely that continued research will bring to light a highly restrictive
schematism that determines both the content of experience and the nature
of the knowledge that arises from it 'This can be elucidated only
in the content of a Kantian discussion. A 'highly restrictive schematism'
is more likely to determine the form than the content of experience
because it is to he hoped that the obje ctive physical world is at least
partly responsible for determing the content of experience. At this point
Chomsicy has once again touched on vast philosophical problems which really
cannot be avoided*
In passing it is difficult to ignore how strange two of the examples
designed to show the difference between deep and surface structure appear
to be. On p 27 of Language and Mind Chomsky writes 'One major problem
is posed by the fact that the surface structure generally gives very
little indication in itself of the meaning of the sentence. There are,
for example, numerous sentences that are ambiguous in some way that is
not indicated by the surface structure. A few lines later on he writes
•Thus the sentence 'I disapprove of John's cooking' may imply ' fcher that
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I think Ms wife should cook or that I think he uses too much garlic,
for example'. My use of English may be totally eccentrice but it seems
to me that the sentence *1 disapprove of John's cooking1 means that I
don't like what he cooks and the quite different sentence '1 disapprove
of John cooking' means that I don't like the fact that he cooks. As it
happens I checked his matter with handful of university graduates in
different subjects and of different universities and they seemed to
agree with me. One philosopher with whom I discussed the matter said
that although he felt that my point of view was sound as far as colloquial
usage was concerned it was completely false as far as correct and
grammatical English was concerned and that Chomsky was right as far as
correct and grammatical English was concerned* Presumably contemporary
linguists would not want to claim that philosopher as their friend since
they are rightly extremely critical of the traditional ideas about correct
and grammatical English which he supports, On page 28 Chomsky writes
'Other examples can be found where a similar principle seems to be at
work. Thus, consider sentence 10 xfhich is presumabley derived from
either 11 or 12 and is therefore ambiguous,
10 I know a taller man than Bill,
.11 1 know a taller man than Bill does.
12 I know a taller man than Bill is.
It seems clear that the ambiguity of 10 is not represented in the surface
structure; and the deletion of 'does* in 11 leaves exactly the same
structure as the deletion of 'is' in 12'. Here I would want to claim
that the sentence 'I know a taller man thgaBill' means that I knox?
someone who is taller than Bill and has nothing to do with the quite
different sentence 'I knoxir a. man who is taller than anyone Bill knows'.
120
At the very best it seems to me that these examples of Chomsky's are
extremely doubtful and unfortunate. Possibly only the demands of a theory
would make one want to find more ambiguities in everyday language than in
fact there are.
In general we may conclude that Chomsky does not give us any good
reasons for thinking that there could not in theory be a machine capable
of learning and using language. The design of such a machine might
very well owe a great deal to the structure of the human, nervous system
in the sense that the machine might in many ways be a copy or analogue
of that system. It might be as well to consider what particular abilities
a machine capable of using human language would require. All the aspects
of what psychologists call cognition would be required e.g. perception,
learning and remembering. In addition the ability to produce and
understand both written and spoken language would obviously be necessary.
All language users must be able to explore and manipulate their environ¬
ments. Words are related to things and in order to understand certain
words perception of things at a distance is not sufficient. Although
words like 'hard1, 'soft1, 'sticky', 'prickly' and 'slimy' can perhaps
be understood to a certain extent as simply properties of things without
actual physical contact of the human type with things yet they are much
better and more easily understood with such contact. There is no reason
in principle why a cognitive machine capable of speaking, writing and
exploring and manipulating its environment should not be produced. The
idea that a machine could perceive may raise difficulties for many people.
The difficulties are presumably either biological or metaphysical. One
can say that perception is either produced by or associated with either
biological or metaphysical entities or processes. The idea that it could
be produced by or associated with e.g. electronic entities or processes
may seem strange but mere strangeness is really the only point that can
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be held against it. The difficulties, that are raised by the idea are no
doubt immense but so are the difficulties raised by either biological
or metaphysical theories of perception. It would be difficult to show
that the possibility of perception either produced by or associated with
e.g. electronic entities or processes raises greater difficulties than
these theories. In saying that one is not denying the obvious fact that
at present all known pases of perception must be explained on either
biological or metaphysical grounds and not on e.g. electronic grounds.
Before we leave Chomsky's work it might be advisable to make
perfectly clear the nature of our interest in it since Chomsky is
such an important and in some quarters such a revered figure at the
present time. We have discussed Chomsky's work en passant because at
the present time he is the most famous exponent of the view that language
is distinctively human in the sense that he thinks that language losing
machines and animals are impossible. Clearly in the course of our
discussion that view could not be ignored but it must be emphasised
that the view itself is our primary concern and not the fact that Chomsky
holds it and equally not his particular reasons for holding it. We
have referred to his work simply because of the historical accident that
he is the most famous exponent of the view at the present time. But the
view is in fact such an unsound one that it is possible to argue against
it as we have done without reference to anyone's particular reasons for
holding it. Chomsky's reasons are concerned with his ideas about the
deep and surface structure of language and with his ideas about grammar.
There are however man3r other passible reasons for holding the view. Some
people might wish to argue that language is in some way related to a
metaphysical mind or to a metaphysical soul or that it is the opecial
gift of a creator god to his special creature man. Such reasons are
perhaps unlikely to be common at the present time but they are certainly
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possible even if they are totally unsound. Reasons for holding the
view are not our concern and. are much less important than the view itself.
Obviously anyone who is interested in Chomsky's work for its own sake
must pay detailed attention to his linguistic theory in relation to that
view. Chomsky's work is not basically a concern of ours. At the same
time it is very difficult in the context of a philosophical discussion
to avoid commenting on the Cartesian and Kantian aspects of his work
and so we have made a few remarks on these topics. Now we must return
to our main discussion relating to animals and machines.
At this stage it may be advisable to consider the current state of
machine development in the field which is relevant to our discussion.
One 6th June 1973 17'/- Times reported that * —
•A robot called Fred, born and tutored at Edinburgh University,
is this week demonstrating its ability to put together toy ears
and ships on a laboratory table.
What Fred does is to look at a heap of objects, sort them into
pieces it recognizes, and assemble the pieces into the appropriate
object, such as a toy car.
Fred is a sort of prodigy among robots, mainly because of his
versatility. This springs from the cleverness of the computer
programe written by the Edinburgh team.
The group is led by Professor Donald Michie, head of the department
of machine intelligence at the university* He says the overall
objective is to improve the arts of programming to incorporate
into computing systems some of the features of human teachability.
Having proved that Edinburgh has gone some way towards combining
the accuracy of a machine with the teachability of say a three-
year old child.
Clearly machines are advancing in the direction in which we want them
to go as it were if they are capable of genuine learning and are
genuinely capable of being taught. Human beings however can not only
learn, they can also direct their own learning in the sense of acquiring
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and following up interests. They can decide to follow things up and to
pursue lines of enquiry. And only when machine learning also exhibits these
features will it be able to be considered equal to human learning. When
there is a machine which is genuinely capable of learning in the full
human sense of the term its behaviour will be completely beyond the
control and prediction if its designers and makers. In my undergraduate
days discussions about the possibility of machines being beyond the control
and predictions of their designers and makers seemed to be excluisvely
concerned with- the idea that it would be necessary to produce a machine
whose behaviour was totally random in order to achieve that possibility.
If one is concerned with the idea of machines attaining human status the
possibility of genuine learning by machines is very important but the
possibility of producing a machine whose behaviour is totally random is
not.
Here it would be advisable to note with interest and approval the
views of the psychologist Dr D S Broadbent who writes in his book
In Defence of Empirical Psychology (p 192)
If I am going to urge a rather different point of view, perhaps
I should first make clear my attitude to this one. First, I
regard the attempts to describe grammar in these terms as a
great intellectual achievement, and am very conscious that
most people working in this area are more intelligent than I am.
Indeed, it seems to me that only a person of quite outstanding
natural intelligence could possibly sustain the idea that the
structure of the world is already present schematically in our
minds in advance of experience, merely requiring to be realized
and differentiated. Some of us have only too much experience
from day to day of discovering that the world does not conform to
the structure which we thought it to have. The descriptions of
linguistic structure which have been produced following the
example of Chomsky seem to me to be an enormous step forward,
which I do not hesitate to compare with the advances introduced
by Euclid into geometry.
But the analogy is chosen deliberately, because Euclidean geometry
is an abstract system relating a large number of mathematical
truths and deriving from a few axioms. It does not, however, have
any necessary empirical content: if two people set out from the
124
equator on parallel courses towards the north, and rely on the
empirical truth of Euclid, they will get a nasty shock when their
paths cross at the North Pole. Similarly, I regard the transform¬
ationalist account of the structure of a language as quite abstract
and separate from the actual organization of that language as a
natural phonomenon.
And later on in the same book he writes (pp 205 - 206)
A further interesting question is raised by our own superiority
over animals: perhaps the superiority might be in the ability
to form classes of classes recursively to a higher degree than
animals, or perhaps as Morton (l969b) suggests in the ability to
hold in store a relationship conflicting with present experience.
These valuable endowments of procedure and mechanisms of learning
may give us an advantage over animals. But a proper respect for
the complexity even of animal learning suggests that there is no
need to suppose an innate endowment of linguistic structure.
In general, therefore, I cannot support the idea that the amount
of information which a child receives in sentences spoken by its
mother and other adults is too small to allow grammer to be
learned by an empirical process. On the contrary, there is direct
evidence from learning experiments that the ability to construct
sentences can be acquired from methods of training organized on
the assumption that the sequence of classes of utterance is
acquired empirically. I have also given you reasons for thinking
that a transformational account of language is not sufficient in
the other sense of empirically. Of course I hope I have made it
quite clear that I find such a grammer a useful description of the
structure of utterances, provided that it is not taken as an
indication of the way those utterances are produced or understood.
In visual experiments, we should be hard put to study perception
without having geometric descriptions of circles and parallel
lines: even though these descriptions bear little relation to
events within the nervous system. Furthermore, I cannot possibly
claim to have defeated Chomsky's dictum that specific empiricist
theories are refutable, because I find I cannot be specific at a
number of cxucial points.
One must, however, compare the empiricist view with its opponents,
rather than find fault with it in isolation, If we say merely that
the structure of certain behaviour is, in some general way, built
into the brain I find this also lacking as a specific explanation.
I think therefore that I would regard empiricist views of the kind
I have been putting forward as more satisfactory than any alternatives,
until some indication is given at least of the elements of the
universal grammar which axe supposed to be innate, and preferably of
the ways and the stages in which these elements are incorporated^
into the processing of information in the nervous system. I am
not asking for a wiring diagram of the brain, but merely for a
flow chart with the innate portions indicated. In the absence
of such suggestions, the empiricist case seems to me better.made
than the idealist one.
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In general we can say that there are no sound reasons for supporting
the idea that the ability to use language is necessarily confined to
human beings and can never be found in machines and animals. It should
be noted however that as soon as machines and animals have a considerable
number of so called essentially human characteristics such as the ability
to use language they cease to be and to be reasonably called animals
and machines because as we have seen part of the meaning of the term
•animal' and 'machine' is 'sub-human'.
Section 3 - The Social Significance of Animals and Machines
Prom the social point of view animals range from pests and vermin
to pets and sacred animals. Pests and vermin are animals which threaten
human health and survival and so must be destroyed. At the other extreme
pets are animals which are cherished by humans and medical and other skills
are used to ensure their survival and promote their welfare. Sacred
animals are an exceptional but philosophically interesting case. Ve
started the chapter by saying that animals and machines are entities
which are inferior to human beings and we noted that this is an
anthropocentric view. In general these points are sound but sacred
animals are an exception to them. Those people who believe that certain
animals are sacred must believe that these animals are of greater value
and worth than human beings including themselves because for those who
believe in it the, holy or the sacred is the highest possible category
of value. Belief in such a category of value in conjunction with theism
produces such statements as 'Better is thy love than life' which to the
atheist and disbeliever in the holy is almost obscenely immoral. It is
interesting to note that the statement we have just quoted is in many
ways analogous to the right wing political slogan of the cold war era
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•Better dead than red*. Also if one either does not believe in the holy
or the sacred or does believe in that category of value but does not
believe that it can apply to animals then the idea that any animal is of
higher value than any human being is highly immoral." Anyone who wishes to
justify regarding animals or more commonly only certain species of animals
as sacred has first of all got to justify the idea of concept of the holy
or the sacred and then to justify its application to animals in general
and to certain species of animals in particular. Both of these tasks are
immensely difficult. In theory one could hold the view that all animals
are sacred or that certain large categories of animals such as mammals
are sacred but in fact people who regard animals as sacred are very
specific or strictly speaking generic about the matter. It might be-
argued that this limitation of the application of the category follows .
from its very nature. Monotheism is sometimes claimed to be superior to
polytheism on the grounds that the sheer rarity value of one god makes that
god more sacred or more holy than any one of a multitude of gods.
Similarly one might argue that a belief in the holiness of one species'
of animal is superior to a belief in the holiness of all animals or of
a large category of animals such as mammals. The potentially infinite
number of individuals in a biological species which is an open class
creates difficulties here. The Israelites who worshipped a golden calf
had the good sense to make only one of the beasts. The trouble with
sacred cows is that there are too many of them. One is expected to regard any
old cow in India as sacred, This point draws our attention to a striking
difference between moral value and other forms of value. Rarity and
scarcity are prized both in the market place and in the realm of the holy.
But we do not in moral theory regard the potentially infinite number of
individuals in the species Homo sapiens as a reason for lowering the
moral status of people. It should be noted that social status operates
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to a certain extent on the principles of the market place and of holiness
rather than of morality. There may he many princes but by definition
there is only one monarch in a kingdom and so the monarch's superiority
over princes is enhanced. The same is tine of a vice chancellor and
the members of the professoriate in a university. Just as there are
however rare objects which are too hideous or repulsive or dangerous
to be regarded as valuable so there are rare social roles such as that
of executioner which are too repulsive to acquire high social status.
Possibly the clearest examples of the preservation of rarity for its
own sake is to be found in the attempt to prevent the extinction of rare
and dwindling species of plants and animals even although the species
concerned may be neither beautiful nor useful. But even here things
>
are not quite as they seem because people are unlikely to try to preserve
species which are dangerous to man. Only harmless if ugly and useless
species are likely to be preserved and harmless, beautiful and useless
species stand a much better chance of qualifying for preservation.
In between pets and pests there are many species of animal which
are useful to humans in a variety of ways. Machines have in general
replaced animals as sources of power for travel and transport in
technologically advanced societies but animals are still extensively
used for these purposes in technologically primitive societies.
Technological advance has also reduced the demand for animal products
such as wool and leather hut animals are still extensively used in all
societies for food and for laboratory purposes. It seems likely that
the advance of technology may one day provide alternatives if not
replacements for animals as human food. As far as the production of
human food is concerned animals are devices for turning plants into
muscle which is consumed by humans. Plants could presumably be processed
by non biological devices or alternatives to plants could be used
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directly as food. Animals may not however be easily replaceable in
biological, medical and psychological laboratories where they are used
inter alia as simplified models of humans. What is found to be true
of laboratory animals may be true of humans. And some of the non human
qualities of animals such as the high fertility and short life span of
Drosophila, to which the science of genetics owes so much, are often
extremely useful to the biologist or similar scientist.
Pets are worth special consideration since they are from the social
point of view the animals which are nearest to humans. Not all pets
however are of equal social interest. Dogs are more important than
goldfish, frogs or earthworms. It may be suggested that humans are
more likely to develop stronger emotional attachments to dogs than to
goldfish, frogs, earthworms or even peacocks though all these animals
are entirely eligible for pethood. Perhaps those with a biological
training are liable to make pets of such animals as Amoeba, Hydra or,
most glorious of all, Amphioxus. But dogs are more important than any
of these because of their greater biological and hence emotional
resemblance to humans. One may regard emotional relationships with
animals as very undesirable substitutes for emotional relationships
with other humans but undesirable or not they are to be found and some
people in some circumstances may not have any human alternatives to pets
available. Pets enjoy their social position because of their resemblance
to humans. That resemblance may not seem very great and in those cases
where it is especially marked humorists have often suggested that it is
the human who resembles the pet rather than the reverse. Those people
who indulge in physical contact with their pets are unlikely to regard
any non biological entities as suitable substitutes. One may hope that
they would prefer physical contact with humans to physical contact with
pets but physical contact with some type of mammal is generally the only
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type of physical contact indulged in for its own sake by all except the
fetishist. There are of course those who indulge in various types of
sexual contact with animals' either with or without orgasm either human
or animal. Newspaper reports of court hearings resulting from such
incidents seem to suggest that pets are rarely used and that farmyard
animals are frequently emplpyed in these affairs. If such behaviour is
regarded as intentional cruelty to animals by those who indulge in it then
logical reasons pets are unlikely to be used because by definition a pet
is an animal which one cherishes rather than tortures. But although
those who do not indulge in such practices are likely to see them as a
form of cruelty to animals it is probable that those who do indulge in
them see them in a different light. It is just possible that these
people regard their activities as a logical extension of physical contact
with pets and either do or would use pets if they are or were anatomically
suitable. It is outwith the scope of the work to comment on the view
that such practices should be condemned as unnatural because it is not
clear what the view means and also because the view may involve natural
law which is an obscure and difficult concept. It is also outwith the
scope of this work to comment on the alleged activities of certain
powers in providing herds of such animals as yaks for the sexual indulgence
of their armies. At the same time however we should note that the terms
'natural* and 'unnatural* are highly evaluative although they may appear
to be totally descriptive. To a certain extent they are similar in
that respect to the terms 'animal' and 'machine' which we have already
examined and which also appear to be totally descriptive. A closer
analogy can however be drawn between the terms 'natural'and 'unnatural'
and the terms 'mature' and 'immature' as applied to human beings. In
the next chapter we look fairly closely at the concept of maturity and
much of what we say in our discussion of 'mature' and 'immature' applies
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to the terms 'natural' and 'unnatural'.
It is often claimed that animals have a moral as well as a social
status. The basis of this claim generally seems to be the belief that
animals experience pain. Certain animals do display pain behaviour.
Some philosophers take the view that pain is nothing more than pain
behaviour and that the sentences 'I am in pain* and 'I have a pain in
my right eyelid' are not statements but are simply sophisticated versions
of yelps and screams. I have tried to give my reasons for disagreeing
with this view in my unpublished Oxford BLitt thesis "Private Experiences".
It would not be appropriate to qjzote the whole of' the brief chapter
on pain in that work here but two passages may perhaps be selected in
order to try to indicate the main points of the argument. After
talking about the traditional distinction between pain and. pain
behaviour I claimed that 'the traditionalists say that each person
argues inductively from the normal concurrence of pain and pain behaviour
in his case to a similar concurrence in the case of others whose pain
behaviour he observes'. Then I went on to say (op cit p6)
Every first year student of philosophy knows that the inductive
argument is very weak and that its principal result is scepticism.
But it is an argument which should rightly be applied principally
to infants, apes and other animals. If a doctor wants to know
about his patient's pain he does not normally centre his attention
on the patient's grimances and twitches and then start to reason
inductively, rather he questions the patient closely about his
pain. And I would claim that the most subtle and sophisticated
pain language games are played in doctors* consulting rooms.
But they seem to have been ignored by philosophers with, as xcill
be apparent later, serious philosophical results. Philosophers
have talked about pain language games but the usual example which
is quoted concerns someone who limps around clutching his leg and
saying, 'I have hurt my leg' or 'I have a pain in my leg* or
something of the sort. Now that particular language game, if it
can be reasonably called a language game, lends itself to inter¬
pretation along the lines of the avowal theory which will be
considered in due course but perhaps we ought to consider the
kind of things that are said in consulting rooms before we rush
to embrace that theory. The co-operation of the medical profession
might well be required before one could get a genuine example so
the following is inevitably very crude but it may serve as a rather
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poor substitute for the real thing.
Doctor: 'When did your pain start?'
Patient: 'It started a week ago'
D 'Has it been present all the time?'
P 'Ho it usually comes on when I wake up, but
gradually becomes less severe during the
morning and disappears after lunch'.
D 'Where exactly is this pain?'
P. 'It is centred round ray nose but when it is at its
very worst, when I wake up, it is all over the face;
but by lunch time I can't feel it much beyond my
nose.'
D. •What kind of pain would you say it is?'
P 'It is a burning and throbbing kind of pain.'
Now I would claim that such a language game can be understood only
on the assumption that the doctor is asking about arid the patient
is talking about something to which the patient has private access.
The doctor is seeking and the patient is supplying information
about something, or in other words the patient is describing
something to the doctor.
Two objections can immediately be raised against the last paragraph.
The first of these is the general scepticism about other minds
which would rule out any attention being paid to language noises
emanating from anthropoid objects on the grounds that it is highly
doubtful if any thoughts lie behind or accompany such noises. I
would claim that such a view rests on serious mistakes about the
relationships between thinking and saying but as I deal with that
topic to a certain extent at any rate in the chapter on thought
and volition I shall not attempt to answer that objection at this
stage. The other objection, which should be dealt with at this
stage, concerns the alleged impossibility of pain language ever
being learned by anyone, if the traditional view of pain is
correct. .According to a very familiar story we have criteria
for the use of the sentence 'he is in pain' and these criteria
are behavioural. So there is no problem about the consistent and
correct usage of such a sentence. But, so the story goes on,
there is an insoluble problem about the consistent and correct
use of first person pain sentence such as 'I am in pain* if these
are regarded as statements and not avowals. The whole private
language problem is brought in at this stage to confound the
traditionalists. But perhaps the traditionalists' plight is not
as desperate as some would have us believe. When a child is
hurt it is aware primarily of the injured part of its body and only
to a limited extent if at all is it aware of its pain behaviour.
Only when the pain is gone will it dab its eyes and blow its nose
and perhaps feel a little ashamed of the amount of noise people
say it has been making and be concerned at the fact that the cat
was frightened out of its wits by the general commotion. So if
one talks to a child in pain about pain the child will undoubtedly
associate the word 'pain' with a sensation. And children who have
themselves been in pain very often laugh when they first observe
the pain behaviour of others. They have to be taught that the
movements and grimaces of an injured person are not in fact the
clowning that they appear to be but are a sign that the person is
in pain. The lesson is certainly learned at an early age for there
are few things that embarass a mother more than the laughter of
her child at someone else's injury. But it is as well to remember
that without teaching it does not occur to us that the wincing and
grimacing man is to be consoled and comforted rather than laughed
at •
When questioning reveals that people who are exhibiting or who have
exhibited pain behaviour are or have been at the same time aware of
an unpleasant sensation we have good reason as distinct from maternal
authority for taking pain behaviour as a sign of pain. Someone ■
who exhibited pain behaviour but never experienced pain could not
fully understand or take part in the kind of pain language game
mentioned above. Still the private language problem remains
though perhaps if we look at wounds and injuries we can begin to
see how to escape from its clutches. As a matter of fact though
not of logic pains usually accompany wounds and injuries. And
it is by means of wounds and injuries which are in the public
world that we can as far as possible ensure that pain language
is associated with public objects and events. We can refer to our
pains by means of the accompanying injuries, e.g. 'the pain I
felt when I broke my leg'. Also we find that similar sorts of
pains accompany similar sorts of injuries e.g. if I break my
leg in January and then break it again in September of the same
year I am liable to find that both the September injury and
pain resemble and revive memories of the January injury and pain.
Later on in the chapter I tackled the avowal theory and in particular I
objected to the exposition of that theory by Mr M S Lean and so I said
that (op cit p 2l)
One of the clearest and most extieme expressions of the avowal
theory can be found in Lean's article entitled 'Mr Gasking on
Avowals' where we read (Butler pp. 183 - 4)
Avowals are not ungrounded merely in the respect that
the speaker is unaware of, or unable to specify what
the basis of his statement might be. They require
no ground because they make no claim whatsoever.
And there couldn't ever such thing as a ground for
them, because a 'ground' is something in the speaker's
awareness, consciousness, or mind', which leads him
to make a claim about somethingelse, whereas an avowal
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refers or pertains only to what is in the speaker's
mind' itself. Avowals are merely verbalizations, so
to speak, of the describable content of the speaker's
imagery, sensations, feelings, attitudes, inclinations,
and the like - in the sense in which, say, the particular
after-image that one person may be 'seeing', e.g. 'a solid
white patch on a black background', may be said to differ
in' content* from that which another person is experiencing,
e.g. 'a broken red patch on a grey background' (even though
in either case the reference, of course, is to nothing
that exists independently of their respective visual
awarenesses).
The sentence beginning 'And there could'nt ever be such a thing as
a ground for them....' is an arbitrary attempt to rule out the
possibility of statements about private experiences. As there is
no ground reason for accepting it or for using the terra 'ground'
in the way suggested it is perhaps best to reject it outright
though we may note in passing that the ground of a or my statement
about e.g. my car is my car and not anything in my or anyone else's
awareness, 'consciousness' or 'mind'. The following sentence which
begins 'Avowals are merely verbalizations - 'is at best confused
and at worst incomprehensible. It is a good thing that the word
•verbalizations' is printed in italics because it is a word which
requires some attention. Presumably Lean means by 'verbalization'
a turning or a changing into ttfords though it is interesting to note
that the Concise O.D. says that the verb 'to berbalize' means to
•Make (noun etc.) into a verb'. But if we accept the presumed
meaning then we must try to decide precisely what kind of things
can be turned or changed into words. One can turn the statement
•7 + 5 ss 12' into words by writing 'seven plus five equals twelve',
and speaking generally one can say that pieces of various types of
symbolism e.g. chemical symbolism can be turned into words. Sow
anything else can be turned or changed into words is not at all clear.
It should be noticed that a verbal reaction to something is very
different from a verbalization (in Lean's sense of the term) of it.
A verbal reaction to pain for instance may be a four letter word
or a statement or a poem or just simply verse e.g. Robert Burns'
'Address to the Toothache* ('My curse upon your venomed stang'
etc.) But not content with talking about'verbalizations# L&hn
makes' confusion'-wotse "confotmded by talking of the verbalization
of the describable content of something. Although one would
hesitate to call a description of something a verbalization
of the describable content of that thing yet if one is faced with
the odd phrase 'the verbalization of the describable content of x'
one has either to say, with I think considerable justification,
that it is a meaningless phrase or cne has to use one's imagination
and say that it is a strange circumlocution from the simple word
•description'. It does not much matter which of these alternatives
we adopt for neither of them can make much sense of the sentence.
It is as well to note that if by any chance the sentence is
intended to mean thfct avowals are 'verbalisations' of e.g. after
images then it is very serious nonsense indeed for however hard
one tries one cannot turn an after image into words or e.g. pains
into words or indeed into anything else for that matter.
Now we can return to our main argument and say that it is possible
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that animals experience pain but it is not by any means certain.
Perhaps it might be best to say that animals have a prima facie moral
status and that relieving and not causing possible animal pain are prima
facie duties. In general we can say that animals are of prima facie moral
concern to moral agents because of the possibility that they may experience
pain but they are no.t themselves moral agents, they are not capable of
action but only of behaviour. The concepts of responsibility and
intention cannot be clearly and satisfactorily applied to animals. We
can clarify matters further by looking at what might at first sight
appear to be role playing by animals. A prison guard dog may be taken
home by the guard and in the guard's house it may be the family pet.
Inside the prison one may meet the guard and the dog at work together as
guard and guard dog and outside the gate one may see them as a man going
home from work with his pet dog. The change from prison officer's uniform
to boutique unisex leisure wear makes the man's role change vivid and
dramatic and the removal of the guard dog lead helps the dog. Both man
and dog behave differently in the work situation and the home situation.
The essential difference between the man and the dog is that the man
either knows he is filling a role or can at least in theory be made aware
of the fact that he is filling a role while the dog does not know any
such thing. We can talk about the man's interpretation of the role but
in the case of the dog we have to talk about its quasi role filling
behaviour which can he explained as a series of responses to a series
of stimuli. The man's role interpretation cannot be satisfactorily
explained without reference to his understanding of the role and his
intentions in relation to it. Sometimes we may wish to suggest that
people fill roles of which they are not aware and we may wish to call
these latent roles. If we think that religion has a secular function
in society we may think that the role of clergyman can be seen, to a
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large extent at any rate, from a secular point of view. In a simpler
case we may see that a trade instructor at a borstal is filling the role
of father substitute in relation to a certain borstal boy although the
man himself sees his actions purely in terms of teaching the boy bricklaying.
Both the clergyman and the bricklaying instructor in the borstal can in
theory at any rate become aware of their latent roles. Dogs are never
aware of their quasi roles and cannot become aware of them unless they
can first master a language. A dog which had mastered a language would
not be an animal. Precisely what it or he would be is difficult to say.
A language using dog might stand in relation to a non language using and
hence animal dog as an angel is supposed to stand in relation to a man.
Social anthropologists have sometimes said vaguely interesting things
about the social status of animals. And so we find the following passage
in Dr Edward Leach's book Levi - Strauss (p 40)
•It is a fact of empirical observation that human beings everywhere
adopt ritual attitudes towards the animals and plants in their
vicinity. Consider, for example, the separate, and often bizzare
rules which govern the behaviour of Englishmen towards the creatures
which they classify as (i) wild animals (ii) foxes (iii) game
(iv) farm animals (v) pets (vi) vermin. Notice further that if
we take the sequence of words (ia) strangers (iia) enemies
(iiia) friends (iva) neighbours (va) companions (via) criminals,
the two sets of terms are in some degree homologous. By a
metaphorical usage the categories of animals could be (and sometimes
are) used as equivalents for the categories of human beings'.
We may be somewhat surprised to see game regarded as the equivalent of
friends or vice versa but we can perhaps let that pass. A very important
point is the different attitudes we adopt to the suffering or the
production of the suffering of members of the various equivalent categories
of animals and people. From the point of view of moral theory it is
wrong to cause unnecessary suffering to any human or to any animal. In
actual fact however the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
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Animals is unlikely to be interested if one phones to say that one is
distressed because the rat poison one is using appears to be causing acute
ante mortem agony to the many rats which have eaten it. If however one's
pet skunk has a meal of rat poison and then endures ante mortem agony
many people are likely to sympathise with one's distress. Campaigns
against pain causing traps for foxes might appear to contradict the point
we have just made but they are at best ambiguous as far as this matter is
concerned. Pets may be caught in them and the English tend to believe
that foxes should be hunted to death rather than caught in traps. Most
people are probably in favour of the use of humane killers in slaughter
houses but possibly simply because of the type of animals that are normally
killed in such places. If rat skins were greatly prized and had to be
2-emoved from rats before rigor mortis set in rats might be sent to
slaughter houses. In such circumstances people might not object to the
use of inhumane killers. On the human side of the fence criminals are
sometimes regarded as being less than human and are therefore treated in
a sub human fashion by being placed in sub human institutions such as
prisons. Prisoners have been known to assert that they are not animals.
Presumably they make this assertion either because other people assert
that they are animals or because the way they are treated suggests to them
that those who run prisons sometimes think that they are animals. It is
not surprising that Hitler declared that the Jews were vermin before he
sent them to concentration camps. Indeed declaring that Jews were vermin
provided the immoral justification of such camps. If one thinks that
all vermin: should be destroyed and that all Jews are vermin it is difficult
to avoid the conclusion that all Jews should be destroyed.
Finally it should be noted that the type of relationship between
human and animal categories we have been discussing can also be found
between human and plant categories. An interesting if unpleasant example
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of this relationship was given in The Guardian on 30/12/71 where the
chairman of the Esses branch of the fascist organisation called the
Monday Club was quoted as saying that Essex University students were
regarded 'by many Essex ratepayers as an insidious and subversive weed
for which we have yet to find a suitable herbicide*. At the other
extreme we find poets and poetasters comparing their loves to roses.
Noty it is time to consider the social status of machines and to
compare it with.that of animals. Like certain animals certain machines
may be given proper names. And individuals, human or otherwise, which
are given proper names have a higher social status than those which are
not given proper names. Pets are given proper names and so are many
transport machines such as ships and aircraft. It might be objected
that ships.are rarely given true proper names such as 'John' but
rather are referred to by the use of such expressions as 'HMS Orgy'
which contains a clearly descriptive and class membership element viz
'Her Majesty's Ship'. Perhaps one should talk about individualising
expressions or phrases which are analogous in certain respects to proper
names. The important point as far as we are concerned is that the use
of proper names and analogous expressions confers and marks high social
status. The use of identifying numbers as in the army, prisons and
motor registration offices signifies a lower social status than that
signified by the use of proper names and analogous expressions. Lower
social status still is denoted by the use of ostensive descriptive
phrases such as 'the Jersey co>; beside the tree on the horizon* and 'the
exploding art object above the latrine behind the vice chancellor'.
But despite the use of proper names and analogous expressions
machines have a lower social status than animals. This is partly
because animals have a moral status as we noted above and machines do
not. Also however it is a matter of the possibility of emotional
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relationships between animals and humans. The kind of emotional
relationships mentioned above do not exist between humans and machines.
Humans do not embrace machines because they are not made of substances
which it is pleasant to embrace and they do not respond to embraces. In
addition they do not respond to emotional communication of a non tactual
nature at a distance. There is no reason in principle however why machines
should not be devised which could respond to emotional communications.
The idea of machines responding to humans has already been put into
practice not only in chess playing machines but more importantly in
teaching machines which respond to their pupils' mistakes and rate of
progress if any. Before emotional relationships could develop between
machines and humans machines would have to acquire quasi biological
features. A type of incarnation is required with the use of synthetic
flesh. B :hind the synthetic flesh there would have to be a mechanism
for producing human like responses or at least pet like responses to
emotional communications from humans. If in addition these machines
incorporated, in an almost literal sense, computers or computer like
devices which gave them advanced intellectual capacities we would
have machines of very high social status. Indeed it is very possible
that we would not be entirely sure whether they should be called
machines or people. In private conversation a philosopher suggested
that the kind of entity I have been describing could not possibly
be a human being but would be simply a 'machine made of meat'. How
if one tries to argue that a machine made of meat is a human being
one is in the same position as someone who tries to argue that murder
is not wrong or is not always wrong. By definition murder is always
wrong and by definition a machine made of meat cannot be a human being.
Meat comes from animals and so a machine made of meat is as it were
a machine animal or an animal machine. At the beginning of this chapter
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we noted that animals and machines both have sub human status. And
an entity which is given the status of both an animal and a machine is
doubly damned as far as its chances of being recognised as human are
concerned. There is however no need to indulge in this exercise in
damnation which is pretending to be an exercise in description. Calling
the entity we are talking about a machine made of meat is like calling
criminals vermin. The entity we have envisaged would be able to do certain
important things which at present only human beings can do. It would
therefore have a reasonable claim to human status. The fact that it would
also have a certain characteristics in common with both machines and
animals cannot be decisive because human beings also have a lot in common
with both machines and animals, particularly animals.
Section 4 - Market place evaluation of
animals and machines in relation to people
In the quadrangle one is unlikely to meet anyone who values animals
or machines as highly or more highly than people. When one leaves the
quadrangle and goes into the market place however the situation is very
different. A pleasant murderer I know told me that he would rather trust
an animal such as a bull than a person. That young man has a rich tapestry
of belief that includes satanism, black magic and reincarnation. The
idea of human sacrifice seems acceptable to him provided there is in his
words 'some good reason for it' although he did not say what he would
regard as a good reason for such an activity. Except for the sexual
aspects of their relationship he said that he would value an animal such
as a bull as highly as his girl riend. When he told me these things he
appeared to be totally sincere and he did not appear to be playing the
well known prison game of telling bizarre tales to the assistant governor.
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Certainly there are various ways of interpreting that young man's
remarks and one is almost bound to say that his emotional development
has been seriously disturbed. Ill informed people might wish to display
their ignorance by saying that it is not surprising to find, a murderer
holding such views. In actual fact many murderers, especially domestic
murderers, are civilised people who would totally disapprove of the young
man's views. And the murder in question did not seem to be produced by his
beliefs but appeared to be a simple case of panic caused by being
discovered while carrying out a burglary leading as it so often does to
murder. This case of a twenty year old murderer serves merely to point
out the difference in belief about the evaluation of animals, people and
in some cases machines that exist between the quadrangle and the market
place, 't least when I interviewed him the murderer did not attempt
to justify his views or to advance any arguments in favour of them and
it is very doubtful if in fact he would be able to .indulge in such
intellectual activities. But we must now turn to cases where at least
some sort of arguments are advanced in favour of views which are just
as strange as those of the murderer.
An argument that a whole animal species is of greater value than a
single human being has been put forward by Mr John Aspinall who is not a
moral philosopher or indeed any sort of pundit but is actually a gambling
club owner. The details of his views and the circumstances in which they
arose were given in The Times for 8th December 1972 as follows
Mr John Aspinall told Mr Justice Cantley in the High Court
yesterday that he would sacrifice the life of his own
daughter if it meant saving an animal species from extinction.
Mr Aspinall, a Mayfair gambling club owner,said naturally
he loved his daughter very dearly, and the situation was
hypothetical.
He contined: "I think everyone would accept that no one
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human life is worth a whole animal species which has
survived 200 million years of evolution.
Mr Aspinall, who says more than half his 20 best friends are
gorillas and other wild animals was giving evidence in the
action in which he is being sued for damages by Miss Merilyn
Lamb, aged 22, a model. Miss Lamb of Manor Farm, Rodmarton,
Gloucestershire, who recently married, was mauled when she
put her hand into a tiger's cage while she was a guest at
Mr Aspinall's private zoo in Kent.
From the moral point of view an animal species has no particular value
unless it makes some kind of contribution to human welfare either directly
or indirectly. At one time the sudden death of all horses would have
caused considerable problems for human society. And one would perhaps
imagine circumstances in which the sudden removal of a particular species
from the earth might possibly cause a type of biological disaster which
could threaten human life. Only if the removal of an animal species
was certain to threaten human life either directly or indirectly would
it be moral for a person to consider sacrificing his life fpr the sake
of that species in some unlikely set of circumstances in which a personfe
death could save a species from extinction. A person who did decide to
die in these circumstances would of course be dying for other people and
not for an animal species. Requiring a person to die in these circumstances
would be a quite different matter and would be immoral. In actual fact
not only is it difficult to think of circumstances in which a person's
death could save an animals species from extinction, but it is also
very difficult to think of a species whose removal would be a total
disaster for humanity. At the time horses were much used for transport
they were also much used for warfare and so their total removal at
that time would have produced certain advantages for the human race.
There are certain strict vegetarians who would seem to want a world
without cows or hens or at least without the consumption by human beings
of cows milk and hens eggs. The prevalence of obesity in the over
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developed world may very well support their point of view.
Although Aspinall's point of view cannot be supported it does have
some perhaps not every great value from the academic point of view. Prima
facie at any rate it is more reasonable to claim that an animal species
is more valuable than a human being than it is to claim that a single
animal* , even a sacred one, is more valuable than a human being. Secunda
facie however as we have seen it is not. Aspinall also uses the argument
which is quite often heard in the market place that because something is
very old it is either true or valuable. And so some preachers sometimes
try to argue that there must be some truth in Christianity because it
has lasted for a long time. The argument is unsound because there is
no reason why what is false and worthless should not last indefinitely.
Astrology for example is older than either Judaism or Christanity and may
very well continue for an indefinite time.
A less sophisticated version of the view that in certain circumstances
human beings should be sacrificed for animals was given in the Mew Statesman
for 3xd August 1973 where in the delightful and important 'This England'
column it was reported from not very surprisingly the Daily Telegraph
that a Birmingham housewife had offered herself as a poison gas guinea
pig instead of two hundred beagle puppies the American Air Force planned
to use in noxious fumes tests. Doubtless the offer was made in the
certain knowledge that it would be refused but if the housewife had
been serious about the matter and had been able to substitute herself
for the puppies without anyone's knowledge she would have been acting
quite immorally. In many circumstances there is absolutely nothing
immoral about suicide but even running the risk of suicide or serious
injury for the sake of animals is quite immoral unless the survival of
the animals in question contributes directly and vitally to human survival.
The doctrine of respect for persons involves respect for oneself as a
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person.
The English tend to be quite idiotic about animals but one might
fondly imagine that they could not possibly be as idiotic about machines
and things. Unfortunately there is no sound foundation for that belief.
In The Times for 18th May 1973 it was reported that
Squadron Leader Malcom Pugh has been awarded the Air Force
Cross for saving his £1.5m Harrier jump jet aircraft, which
was disabled over the Cairngorms by birds being sucked into
the engine.
Squadron Leader Pugh, aged 40, of RAF Wittering, was about
to eject when his engine re-started and he made a safe
landing. The citation read: Despite the risk to his life
he undoubtedly saved a valuable aircraft.
From the moral point of view Squadron Leader Pugh should have been
reprimanded rather than decorated and those who encouraged immorality
by recommending him for an award should have been dealt with very
severely indeed. It is immoral to risk one's life for a machine however
valuable in economic terms unless that machine contributes directly and
vitally to human survival. One could imagine circumstances in which for
example saving a prototype aircraft could prevent one's country from
being defeated in war and one could at any rate argue that in such
circumstances an action such as Pugh's would be heroic and deserving
of praise. But the circumstances in Britain in May 1973 were not these
we have imagined and were indeed such that Pugh acted immorally in
risking his life for the sake of a machine. Naturally the speed with
which he had to t ake the decision was a strong mitigating factor and
might make one want to say that because of it a reprimand would be
unjustified although against that point of view it could be argued that
a reprimand would be justified pour encourager les autres and to preserve
moral standards. There are however no known mitigating factors in favour
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of those who decided that Pugh should he recommended for an award.
Immoral commendations are very dangerous indeed. Perhaps we can
digress for a moment and consider the case of the policeman who shot
and killed two youths who carried toy pistols into the Indian High
Commission building in London in 1973. Some people actually commended
these policemen for their bravery although there is nothing remotely
brave about shooting unarmed people even if one imagines they are armed.
The youths posed at most only a psychological threat to the armed
policemen. One might want to say that no blame should be attached to
the policemen because the youths appeared to be armed although in fact
they were not. But it could be argued quite strongly that even if the
youths had actually been armed the police action would still have been
cowardly rather than heroic because they fired first. In any event
the choice lies between condemning or not condemning the policemen. The
question of praising them simply does not arise and is totally immoral.
How we must return to our subject and content ourselves with two
more examples of market place evaluations in favour of things as opposed
to people. Sometimes it is suggested that in the engineering construction
industry the loss of human life is considered acceptable provided it does
not go beyond the limit of one death for every million pounds worth of
work completed. Since apart from some suicides no avoidable premature
human deaths are morally acceptable they cannot be made acceptable by
relating them to measures of production in any industry.
In the field of sentencing unfairness and injustice abound but even
by the standards or rather lack of standards of that grim and often
pointless activity I find it difficult to forget the cases of two men
I once Interviewed. One of them received a four year sentence for
manslaughter and the other received a twelve year sentence for aggravated
burglary. It would perhaps be hard to find a clearer example of placing
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a higher value of things than on people. Considering the details of
the cases only makes matters worse. One weekend the burglar had with
others broken into tod stolen money from a bank in which he was employed
when the bank was closed for business and contained no members of staff.
The manslaughterer was a male homosexual prostitute who had a considerable
fear of choking. Oral sex with his customers was in no way repugnant to
him but his victim introduced his penis into the prostitute's mouth, with
such a force that his fear of choking was aroused and caused him to stab
his customer to death with a fruit knife that unfortunately was lying at
the time beside the bed which was the manslaughterer's place of work.
One may perhaps hazard a guess that certain judges may perhaps have extreme
ideas about the value of banks and their contents and may perhaps be
nauseated by or even may be simply ignorant of some of the facts of life
as led by inter alios male homosexual prostitutes but no explanations
of these sentences can justify them from the comparative point of view.
To his great credit the manslaughterer said that he had expected a much
longer sentence and considered his sentence to be undeservedly short.
There may at first sight appear to be something of a contradiction
between this section and the other sections of this chapter. In this
section we have drawn a very firm moral dividing line between people
on the one hand and animals and machines on the other. Yet in the other
sections we have talked about language using animals and possible
electronic people. There is however no contradiction between these
two areas of discussion. If electronic people ever arrive on the scene
only the insulting and the confused will want to call them machines.
They will be most unlike jet fighters and if they start flying around
in such machines they will be well advised to remember the case of
Squadron Leader Pugh. As long as machines remain machines and animals
remain animals a strong moral line divides them from people. But we
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argued in the earlier sections of this chapter that it is within the
limits of possibility that in due course some machines may not remain
machines as it were but may cross the dividing line.
Our discussion of animals and machines has inevitably involved
a certain amount of discussion of people. Wow however we must in the




Section 1 - Individuals and roles
We notice sometimes that the man who delivers our mail and wins
the prize for tossing the caber at the Aboyne Highland Games and breaks
into our house is one and the same. In other words we recognise one
individual in several different roles* What we cannot easily do is
find a roleless individual. A naked man in a totally empty room is
unlikely to be roleless, he is very probably taking part in an experiment
on sensory deprivation* And a solitary woman on a blasted heath is
probably a hermit member of the Womens Liberation Movement. The problem
was noted in Chapter 1 where we were just able to regard sleeping people as
being as roleless as anyone ever can be. Roles and individuals are
like colour and shape, we cannot find one without the other. But just
as we can appreciate the difference between colour and shape by seeing
the same colour in different shapes and the same shape in different
colours so we can appreciate the difference between individuals and
roles by seeing the same individual in different roles and the same role
held by different individuals* It is not only when we observe others
that we see the very close link between roles and individuals. Although
we can stand back from our roles and think about them we can never
escape from them except in sleep* Each individual forms his own sense
of personal identity by being aware that in certain respects he remains
the same whichever role he is holding although it is also true that he
alters and changes with each change in role.
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Bodies do not change with a change in role although physical
appearance and movements may change. What does not change from role to
role is primarily biological. Both medical science and psychology try
to study something that does not change from role to role. Even these
sciences however must take account of roles. The type of physical
existence required by a man's role is likely to influence the types
of diseases he is most likely to suffer from. At one extreme we have
occupational diseases and at the other diseases which are not in any way
related to roles. Both clinical and psychological investigations involve
roles at least as long as the subject remains conscious and even to a
certain extent if he does not. The roles of clinician, patient,
psychologist, psychological tester and subject of either psychological
experiment or testing both explain the behaviour of people in clinical
and psychological situations and may influence what can be discovered
in these situations. And personality which may be regarded as the sum
or total of those aspects of an individual's behaviour which do not change
from role to role or which remain constant from one role to another,
is a product of an individual's biological constitution and the roles he
has held in the past. That definition is not as contradictory as it
may seem because some roles leave their mark on the individual and
influence his behaviour in virtually all subsequent roles. The discussion
of attitudes in chapter 1 attempted to throw some light on the matter.
In general we may say that although people are not animals human
individuals are. Human individuals are members of the species Homo
sapiens. As soon as these individuals occupy roles they become people.
And language and personality are the effect of roles on individuals. In
order to understand language and personality therefore we must take
account of both biological and social factors or in other words both
individual and role factors. Language and personality are biosocial
149
phenomena. People however are not simply biosoeial phenomena because
a complete account of a person must include consciousness, decision,
intention and morality although we have already seen in chapter II
that the role of moral agent lies at the heart of morality.
Section 2 - The Life History of Individuals
A human individual normally starts his life in the Homo sapiens uterus.
Embryology might seem to be the science which can shed most light on an
individual's origins but there is a sense in which embryology cannot tell
us what is in a pregnant woman's uterus. Possibly the three most important
answers to that question are a foetus, the products of conception and an
unborn child. The conflict amongst these terms comes out most clearly
over the question of surgical abortion. Those who are in favour of it
often wish to avoid the suggestion that any kind of killing is involved
and so one finds that some books give instruction in the technique of
removing the products of conception. And that sounds an extremely
innocent operation rather like removing waste products or possibly an
inflamed appendix. Those who are opposed to abortion say it is the murder
of an unborn children. The Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child
sounds an admirable organisation and indeed it may remind us of the
Society for the Protection of the Crippled Child but it is in fact
on the same level as the Society for the Protection of the Head Child.
Both unborn children and dead children are simply not children at all.
They cannot do any of the things that children can do. If one asks
where someone's child is and is told that either he is in his grave or
in his mother's uterus one understands that the assumption on which
one's question was based was mistaken. Eton complicates matters by
accepting bookings from the husbands of pregnant women as well as from
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the husbands of mothers. But that is simply a matter of saying that if
Blogge's pregnant wife produces a male child who is reasonably normal
and who survives until the appropriate age then he will be given a
place in the college. Nothing is gained by calling a foetus either the
products of conception or an unborn child. Surgical abortion is not
homicide or even infanticide, it is foeticide. And foeticide can be
moral or amoral or immoral depending on the relevant circumstances.
Normally it is amoral but in special circumstances it can be either
moral or immoral. If it saves a woman's life it is moral but if it
deprives a woman of her only chance of having a child of her own it may
he immoral.
A foetus is a potential person and some people argue that if it is
wrong to kill a person it must be wrong to kill a potential person. That
is a non sequitur, The death of a person is very different from the
death of a potential person. Perhaps medical students can help us here
because a medical student is like a foetus in the sense that just as a
foetus can be called a potential person so a medical student can be
called a potential doctor. And the wastage of medical students is
different from the wastage of doctors. One must not of course get
carried away by this analogy. People who leave medicine do not necessarily
die, they usually go and do something non-medical such as stockbroking.
But the analogy remains useful, A medical student becomes more and
more like a doctor in every possible way the longer he spends in a
medical college and a foetus becomes more and more like an individual
the longer it spends in the uterus provided that both the medical student
and the foetus progress in the relevant and appropriate normal fashion.
A late departure from either a medical college or a uterus is undesirable
and ill advised. Most people want to see a reasonable supply of both
people and doctors provided for the future. One can easily imagine a
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situation in which it might seem essential to try to ensure that every
foetus survived to birth and became an individual and a person and also
that every medical student survived to medical graduation and became a
doctor. Equally it is possible to imagine a situation in which it might
be desirable to kill a high percentage of foetuses and prevent a high
percentage of medical students from becoming doctors. In such a situation
however it would clearly be more sensible to limit both conception and
entry to medical schools. It is interesting to note that the medical
student analogy can illustrate the problem of saying what is in the
uterus of a pregnant woman. A proud mother might prefer to say that
her medical student son was training to be a doctor instead of saying
that he was a medical student. In his final year at medical school her
enthusiasm might get the better of her and she might say slightly
prematurely that he was a doctor. At the same time a contemporary of
the student who had taken a non medical degree and had therefore completed
his studies earlier than the medical student might say sneeringly of him
'he is still just an overgrown schoolboy'. But just as in medical
schools we find that those who are receiving instruction are normally
medical students and not either doctors or overgrown schoolboys so we
find that what is in the uterus of a pregnant woman is normally a foetus
and not either an unborn child or the products of conception. There is
one important point about the foetus with which the medical student
analogy cannot help us. If a foetus is in the uterus of a woman or
possibly has at any stage been in such a place then it cannot be considered
in isolation from the relevant woman. And allowing a foetus to mature
until at birth it becomes a child means that there is a moral obligation
on someone to make the best possible arrangements for the child's
upbringing. In many societies that means that a woman who gives birth
to a child is under a prima facie obligation to become its mother. If
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the woman is in either her own opinion or the opinion of appropriate
others unable or unwilling to become the child's mother and if satisfactory
alternative arrangements for the child's upbringing cannot be made then
there is a strong prima facie case for killing the foetus. In any case
in which either the foetus or the woman in whose uterus it is situated
must be killed or allowed to die in order that the other may survive
then the choice lies between killing a foetus and killing a person and
foeticide is a lesser evil than homicide.
A court of law has evidently decided that, according to the account
of the matter given in The Guardian, "an unborn baby is a separate being
with full rights". In December 1971 the Victorian State Court in
Australia decided, again according to The Guardian, that "Sylvia Watt,
now aged 3» who was born with brain damage eight months after her mother
had been paralysed in a car accident could sue for damages in the Supreme
Court". It is not entirely clear from the report whether or not the
court used the unsatisfactory talk about an 'unborn baby'. That confusion
may have come from the journalist who wrote the paper's report in
Melbourne on 9th December 1971-. But in the light of the court's decision
one would not be surprised, if amidst the general confusion that particularly
confused phrase was used in the formal decision. It would he more satis¬
factory to allow someone to sue for damages to the foetus from which he
developed in a social as well as in a biological sense than to sue for
damages to himself before he was born. And in addition it would be
reasonable to allow the child's mother to sue for damages to the same
foetus which was part of her. Any claim which ignores the mother's
interest in the foetus or ignores the fact that it was a part, although
a temporary part, of her is unsatisfactory. Indeed the mother's interest
in the foetus might be held to be total and exclusive. It is possible
for a foetus in her uterus to be a threat to a woman's life and in such
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circumstances it is reasonable for her to take steps to ensure that it is
killed and removed from her body.
Conception is the beginning of an individual but birth is the
beginning of a person. Birth is a social as well as a biological event
and it marks the transition from a pregnant woman to a mother and a child.
In a sense Prof. G ¥ Allport draws our attention to the main problem of
birth in his book 'Pattern and Growth in Personality1 where he says on
page 75 'The infant is not greatly different from a fetus. Independent
breathing is Ms principal achievement. Otherwise he is far more like,
a fetus than like the child he will become.' and on page 76 he writes
•Birth is a dramatic event for it marks the first step toward independence
and individuation. If we consider how much a peron's life is devoted to
freeing himself from dependence on mother, home and cultural prescription,
one can say birth starts the process of continually increasing autonomy
and self-reliance.' Strangely enough Allport does not try to reconcile
these two views of birth and he does not really give us any indication
that he is aware of their opposition. Premature birtis highlight the
problem. A premature baby is clearly more foetus like than a non-premature
baby, (it is perhaps a matter of linguistic interest that a non-premature
baby is not a baby child) And indeed someone might try to argue that if
a premature child had not been premature he would have clearly been an
unborn child because he would have been as he is but simply enclosed in
the uterus. The biological differences between a premature child
especially one which can survive outside an incubator and a foetus should
not be ignored but they are not from the philosophical point of view at
any rate vital. An intact umbilical cord connecting the foetus to the
placenta means amongst other things that the foetus' lungs and pulmonary
circulation are not in operation. But a premature child which does not
require an incubator is at least in some degree a social unit and a person.
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A sort of relationship can exist between it and others who are to a much
greater extent persons. A premature child living outside an incubator
can be said to hold the role of infant son of x. If the child had not
been premature it would at that stage have been a highly developed foetus
without any social status and no kind of relationship in any meaningful
sense of the term could have existed between it and any person. The fact
that it's biological state would not have been greatly changed is really
irrelevant and the important fact is that it's social state would have
been vastly different. A premature child which cannot exist outside an
incubator is really an extra-uterine foetus rather than a child.
Childhood is both a biological and social matter. Biologically and
socially children come between infants and adults. The biological
position is indisputable but the social position may not be as inevitable
as it is perhaps assumed to be. From the biological point of view there
is simply no problem# A child is small, weak and sexually immature, or
at least the paradigm case of a child is. Puberty may or may not bring
adult status although it brings the end of biological childhood. The
beginning of childhood is as imprecisely marked as its end. We might want
to say that the acquisition of the ability to walk can be regarded as a
possible end of infancy and the beginning of childhood. It is probably
the most important step towards independence between birth and the
acquisition of the ability to speak. In western society children hold
a subordinate, protected and controlled position. They are subordinate
in as much as they are from the legal point of view at any rate controlled
by adults who ensure that children have both fewer rights and lesser
responsibilities than adults. Even in America, the land where the child
is king, the legal position is quite clear. It is interesting to ask if
the social position of children is merely a matter of convention or is
in any sense biologically or otherwise necessary. A child lacks the
physical strength, the secondary sexual characteristics, the completely
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developed primary sexual characteristics and the emotional states that
arise from the adult psycho-sexual states that adults have. One can
reasonably say therefore that children cannot be expected to understand
or participate in the sexual and emotional aspects of adult life. But
it is very difficult to advance an eqtially good case for excluding
children from other aspects of adult life. Some children have vastly
greater intellectual abilities than some adults and in the field of
musical composition the great composers in some cases produced works in
childhood which are far superior to the mature adult works of a great
many second and third rate composers. It is very difficult to see why
children should not be given the vote. Because of their intellectual
ability some children are capable of a better understanding of political
matters than many adults. Although it can be argued that the vote should
be restricted to those who contribute to society by paying taxes it is
not a very convincing argument. Old age pensioners who have no private
income as well as students in the same position and of course paupers are
all affected by political decisions and so should have the same political
rights as surtax payers. Indeed all the arguments that can be advanced
against the extension of the vote to children were probably at one time
advanced against the extension of the vote to women. And in general the
socially inferior position of children is analagous to the socially
inferior position of women in the past and to a lesser extent at the
present time.
Perhaps one can try to argue that children are c dependent on adults
but adults are not dependent on children. The whole question of a
person's dependence on others is however extremely complex. There is a
clear sense in which infants and the senile are totally dependent on
others because they can do very little to procure their own food, or
dispose of their own excreta, or keep themselves clean or avoid any type
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of approaching danger. But apart from these extremes everyone exhibits
a very complicated mixture of dependence and independence. One can he
dependent on one's children, secretary, wife and friends as well as on
seifage workers, prostitutes and chiropodists. And indeed one can be
dependent on infants and the senile for a variety of things such as
one's job or emotional satisfaction. If one says that A is dependent
on B one is using an incomplete expression. One must make it clear that
A is depdent on B for C. If A and B are people then the range of
possibilities for C is very wide. Jobs, emotional satisfactions, money,
lifts to work and instruction in the disembowlment of cattle are just
some of these possibilities. Despite the complications and complexities
one might want to say that children are more dependent on adults than
adults are on children. Even if this is true it is certainly not by
itself a reason for giving children a social status inferior to that of
adults. It may perhaps just possibly be true that women are more
dependent on men than men are on women although it is clearly a hopelessly
involved issue. But even if that is true it does not justify giving
women a lower social status than men.
Senility highlights the problems of childhood. In. many societies
the senile enjoy all the rights that are denied to children despite the
fact that that they may be less capable of exercising these rights in a
satisfactory manner than many children. Retirement could be given a
much wider significance that it has at present. It could mean relinquishing
full adult rights just as attaining the age of majority means receiving
them. Such a procedure would produce many hard cases just as the present
age of majority procedure does. A more rational system would be one in
which permission to exercise rights would be related to a satisfactory
performance in a test of the competence in the relevant area. Ideally all
people of whatever age who can pass periodic driving tests of an appropriate
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standard should be allowed to drive motor vehicles. And so ninety
year old Aunt Augusta and her nine year old nephew might both be able
to drive the car belonging to fifty year old Uncle Charles who is normally
too alcoholic to pass any test of any type of competence. Driving motor
vehicles is a skill or rather set of skills which lends itself very easily
to comparatively objective testing. The ability to exercise political
rights cannot be so easily tested but possibly one could devise a test
of knowledge of actual information about any political system which would
be acceptable to all sections of political opinion within the system and
which could be used to govern the addition and deletion of names to and
from the electoral roll. Clearly however there can be no test of voting
V
competence analogous to a test of driving competence because, it would be im¬
possible to reach any sort of agreement about what should count as competent
voting although it is comparatively easy to reach agreement about what
constitutes competent driving. It would be wrong to suppose that there
is any necessary connection between voting and literacy. In predominantly
literate societies the needs and interest of illiterate adults tend to be
largely ignored. Indeed in such societies 'illiterate' is normally a term
of condemnation and. often of abuse. Elections have however been held in
predominantly illiterate societies. Political parties in such societies
are identified by non verbal visual symbols. Thus in such societies voters
may support the pig symbol party rather than the fascist party. If
illiterate adults can take part in elections so can illiterate children
and arrangements made for illiterate children would be of benefit to
illiterate adults. The only absolute bar to political activity as well as
to most other forms of social activity is a total lack of linguistic
knowledge and ability. Tests about factual political matters can easily
be administered in an oral rather than a written form. Certainly no
civilised society should tolerate the disenfranchisement of adult illiterates.
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Death is an important topic and much has been written about it.
Possibly the biggest difficulty one encounters in this area is the fact
that the language of death is often either extremely euphemistic or is
based on highly questionable ideas of immortality or resurrection. Even
if one leaves aside the more sentimental ideas of "falling asleep" and
'passing peacefully away' that may be very useful antidotes to the
emotional shock and agony that can follow the death of someone one has
knownwell, there is still the problem that everyday talk of death is active
rather than passive. 'He died yesterday' sounds like 'he fell yesterday'
when 'fell' is used in a non-euphemistic sense. One of the soundest
things written about death is Wittgenstein's well know remark 'death is
the end of life, and not an event in life'. Our everyday life language
tends to give the impression that death is an event in life, not the end
of life. 'He died suddenly' sounds like 'he arrived suddenly' and so on.
Possibly in general talk about suicide tends to be less euphemistic than
talk about other forms of death. In order to understand just how seriously
misleading euphemisms about death can be it is necessary to consider actual
examples. We shall see that both a society photographer and a philosopher
are capable of saying quite peculiar things about death. The remarks by
the society photographer appeared in the colour supplement of a Sunday
newspaper and those by the philosopher in a philosophical journal. The
Sunday newspaper article was entitle Mother and Son. The introductory
paragraph explains the situation and runs as follows 'Yivienne, the
society photographer, took her first professional picture at the age of
51. Her son, Antony Beauchamp, took his when he was 15. Both had
simultaneous and successful careers until his suicide in 1957. Yivienne
talks to Francis Wyndham. The following quotations from the article show
the photographer's view of death. 'You know the story, don't you? It
is really rather interesting. I married my art teacher, Ernest Entwistle.
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He fell in love with roe at first sight Well he agreed of course
so I gave in and we were married in 1913 and we had our Golden Wedding
in 1963 and then he decided to go over the rainbow and that was that.....
Then we had two sons. Tony was always very brilliant as a little boy
He's always been brilliant at everything, isn't it terrible? That's why
I wasn't at all unhappy when he went off for ever in 1957 because I know
that werever he is he'll always be at the very top of his profession."
The philosopher, Mr J D Mabbott, made a remark about death in his article
'Prof Flew on Punishment' which appeared in the journal Philosophy in
1955. In the course of the article Mr Mabbott said 'most punishments
nowadays are not inflictions of suffering, either physical or mental.
They are the deprivation of a good.... Imprisonment and fines are
deprivations of liberty and property. The death sentence is deprivation
of life; and in this extreme case every attempt is made to exclude
suffering...... We have taken the ........ important step of substituting
the removal of something desired for the infliction of positive suffering.'
Comment on the remarks of the society photographer is both slightly
unnecessary and slightly unfair. But perhaps we should just notice when
she says that her husband 'decided to go over the rainbow* she goes so
far in using active rather than passive language in talking about death
that one can be forgiven for thinking that her husband's death was a case
of suicide. In the case of her son's suicide euphemism makes one almost
imagine that he had gone off to Australia or some similarly outlandish
place and had forgotten to send his mother his address. Mr Mabbot's remarks
are both false and extremely confused. They also contain a certain amount
of euphemism used by the society photographer. Imprisonment nearly always
involves a greater or lesser degree of psychological suffering. Only if
one regards house arrest as imprisonment can one find a form of imprisonment
that may perhaps tend to cajase comparatively little distress. Prisoners
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are normally fairly depressed simply because they are in prison.
Sometimes one meets prisoners who are in a state of acute distress
simply because they are in prison. Such a state tends to pass fairly
quickly but its existence refutes Mr Mabbot's idea. The two statements
made by Mr Mabbot about death caused by capital punishment are both
extremely unfortunate. If one says that someone has been deprived of
something it is reasonable to expect to be able to see that person
without the thing in question. And in such a case apart from the deprivation
of the thing in question one would expect the person to be much as he
always was. In dental surgery extractions are the deprivation of teeth
but the death sentence is not the deprivation of life, it is killing or
the ending of a person. If one sees a corpse one is not seeing a person
deprived of his life because a corpse is not a person. In trying to talk
about the deprivation of life one is trying to make death an event in
life rather than the end of life. The remark about suffering need not
detain us except to note that it is ambiguous. Suffering can be either
physical pain or psychological distress. The passing of a death sentence
inevitably causes the greatest possible amount of psychological distress.
We must regard Mabbot's remark about death as seriously confused and
misleading and slightly euphemistic.
The coming to an end of a human life is both a biological and a
social event. Prom the biological point of view death means the end of
the physiological processes which enable the individual to have the
capabilities discussed in section 3 and the start of the processes of
decay which in time turn a corpse into a skeleton. At the present time
the medical definition of death appears to be 'an irreversible coma'
and it is pointed out that the end of the functioning of the cerebral
cortex is much more important than the end of the functioning of the heart.
Prom the social point of view death means that certain roles became
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vacant. Corpses cannot fill any roles, not even that of unconscious
hospital patient although perhaps one should remember that cannibals eat
them and. necrophiliacs have intercourse with them. Modern technology
has increased the class of semi-corpses which can fill the role of
unconscious patient. The hearts of semi-corpses can be kept going long
after their brains have ceased to function. But it remains true that
corpses proper cannot fill any role. Most of an individual's role's are
easily filled when he dies but some of them such as parent of x sibling
of x and offspring of x may remain permanently vacant. When someone
one has known very well dies one may suffer a permanent loss despite the
disappearance of the immediate shock and agony caused by the death. Both
the corpses and the empty roles produced by death present us with problems.
For a short time until decay becomes obvious a corpse has a status
roughly mid way between that of a person and a skeleton. People do not
worry about how they treat skeletons but they often worry a great deal
about how they treat corpses. Decay forces people to see corpses as
dead biological organisms rather than as people. Embalming postpones
decay often indefinitely and embalmed corpses are often treated with
great respect. It should be noted however that, although corpses are
treated with great respect in most cultures when they appear singly or
in small numbers and until they start to decay, large numbers of corpses
are often inevitably treated as waste material of a fairly dangerous kind.
If Aunt Agatha dies in her bed the tyranny of social convention forces
her corpse into a coffin which has to be taken to either a crematorium
or a cemetery. There is no corpse disposal service which will send an
official round to remove the corpse in a utilitarian plastic bag to an
appropriate incinerator or rubbish dump. But if Aunt Agatha's corpse
is simply one of several hundred produced by a large disaster at London
A
Heathrow airport it will, according to one bizarre rumour, find its way
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into one of the hundreds of plastic bags allegedly kept for such disasters
at a certain establishment. In general the empty roles produced by death
are not a problem if no great difficulties are caused when they remain
empty for some time. Grave consequences are however likely to fellow
even a brief vacancy in some roles. The expression, 'the king is dead,
long live the king' shows us how the British manage to avoid a vacancy
in the role of head of state. Clearly a vacancy in such a role is likely
to have fairly serious political consquences. With other roles such as
parent of a young child the fact that they never can be satisfactorily
filled after the death of the original holder is likely to cause at least
some psychological damage to certain people.
Trying to discuss the life history of individuals without reference
to roles is in many ways an almost impossible enterprise because their
life history is bound up with the chronological roles we looked at in
chapter I. Our discussion of childhood in this chapter has really been
a discussion of a biological role. What we have said here must be seen
in the context of what we said in chapter I. As we have just seen it
is impossible to talk about even birth and death without mentioning roles.
Section 3 - ®ie Capabilities of Individuals
It is traditional to draw a distinction between the rational and the
emotional capabilities of individuals. Plato, Hume and many others
contrast reason and the passions. Possibly the distinction has been too
sharply drawn and emotional factors can enter into so called rational
activities but it may still be useful to refer to an individual's cognitive,
communicative and linguistic capabilities on the one hand and to his
emotional capabilities on the other. We have already discussed CCL
abilities.
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The emotional capabilities of individuals make society and social
life possible. Only if we are capable of taking a friendly interest in
others can we engage in group and co-operative enterprises. The autistic
person and the psychopath are at the emotional extremes and must be
regarded as being on the fringes of humanity. The autistic person has
no interest in others and so cannot communicate with them or engage in
any kind of enterprise with them. A psychopath may be defined as someone
who regards others simply as physical objects which can be disposed of
in any way that pleases him. It is not important to know whether or
not there are autistic and psychopathic people in the senses in which
I have used these terms. These logically possible people simply
represent the boundaries of the friendly interest in others which is
essential for communication, society and social life. The emotional
ability to take a friendly interest in others is only a bare minimum
for social life. The ability to go far beyond that emotionally limited
and shallow level to intense friendship and love is highly desirable.
Indeed an ability to experience the emotional extremes of passionate
love, hatred, mourning and rejoicing is probably also highly desirable.
These extremes do possibly represent the limits of social and communic¬
ative emotional experience as opposed to the anti-social extremes of
autism and psychopathy. As we have already seen in chapter III there
can be both formal or ritualistic and informal or non ritualistic
expression of the extremes of social emotion, e.g. a royal funeral and
tearful embracing are formal and informal expressions of mourning.
Human individuals are capable of having private experiences. I
do not intend to examine this matter in any detail in this work since I
have tried to deal with it in Private Experiences. In the conclusion
of that work I wrote :
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"It is perhaps appropriate now to have a brief look at the notion
of privacy. There are two distinct types of privacy, social
prixracy and what for want of a better word I shall call mental
privacy. This thesis has been concerned with mental privacy
which can be either factual or logical. Thoughts, as we have
seen, are factually private and dreams are logically private.
But although thoughts are mentally private they may be socially
public or private. In order to make this point clear let us
look at the nature of social privacy. What goes on in bedrooms,
bathrooms, and doctors' consulting rooms is private but what
goes on in streets, trains and theatres is public, and what is
written in newspapers is public but what is written in personal
letters is private. A similar sort of distinction is drawn between
someone's personal or private life and his public or business or
professional life. In other words the differences between social
publicity and privacy is the difference between what anyone at all
is allowed by social conventions or rules to know or perceive and
what only one or more selected people may know or perceive. Thus
anyone may see me fully dressed but generally speaking only my
wife or my doctor may see me naked and anyone may see my car but
only I or my bank manager and his assistants may see my bank
statement. If one were studying the distinction betxfeen social
privacy and publicity for its own sake then there would be a
great deal more to be said and one would for instance require to
examine the legal distinction between public and private property.
But enough has been said for our purposes and the important point
for us to see is the relationship between social publicity and
privacy on the one hand and mental publicity and privacy on the
other. Mental privacy can be found in the most socially public
place imaginable and mental publicity can be found in conditions
of great social privacy. Thus at a public meeting or in a law
court I may keep my thoughts to myself and in a doctor's consulting
room I may pour out my innermost secrets, i.e. I may make my thoughts
public in the sense of communicating them to my doctor. But what
is logically private can never be made public, i.e. only I can have
my dreams and my pains. So we see that what is logically private
is naturally also socially private yet what is factually private
may be either socially pablic or socially private.
In the chapters on pains and dreams, in the note on consciousness
and in the section on images in chapter III a defence of the notion
of logical privacy has been advanced. The chapter on thoughts and
volitions was concerned with two cases of factual privacy. Finally
it should be noted that we have been concered with only two types
of private entity, viz pains and images. Dreams do not involve
any third entity for they are successions of images. There are
possibly other private entities with which we have not been
concerned, e.g. sensations of many kinds and feelings states which
may be involved in emotions. But pains and images are probably
the most common and precisely identifiable private entities and a
discussion Sf them has I think been sufficient to establish the
case for logically private experiences. It is also interesting to
note that from the point of view of the philosophy of the person
pains and images are essentially unimportant because the fact that
a being never experienced either pains or images would not disqualify
it for the status of a person. But the study of the philosophy of
a person lies completely beyond this work. I have merely tried to
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add a most inadequate footnote to the very important work which
the leading philosophers of our day have done in the philosophy
of mind."
Since we have now seen that emotional abilities are essential to human
status the question of the nature of emotional experience cannot be ignored
as easily in this work as it was in Private Experiences. A complete
account of emotions on the other hand is beyond the scope of this work.
In general it is probably best to say that emotions are a matter of a
vigorous or extreme behavioural response to a situation which normally
at least iB retrospect seems to the agent to justify or warrant some
such response. An. angry man is usually only too. keen to tell us what
he is angry about and normally expects that we shall at least feel that
anger was an appropriate response to the situation he describes. And a
mourning man and a rejoicing man are in the same position. In addition
to the behavioural response to the situation which can be argued about
and regarded as a matter that requires justification there may also be
a physiological response such as a flushing of the face which is completely
causal and involuntary and cannot involve the question of justification.
Panic may be regarded as an extreme type of physiological reaction which
excludes behaviour which requires or is capable of justification. As
well as the behavioural and physiological aspects of emotion there may
also be a subjective feeling state which may be regarded as psychological
in the traditional and social work sense of that term and which simple
minded people such as the man in the street and his sympathetic insightful
social caseworker may regard as all that is involved in the complex
question of emotion. The angry man may behave in an angry fashion,
exhibit certain physiological responses and simply feel angry. In the
case of endogenous depression or euphoria subjective feelings are the
cause of behaviour which is not principally a response to any situation
in the agent's environment and which must be explained rather than
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justified by reference to the subjective feelings. The friendly interest
in others which we saw is the minimum emotional requirement for social
life does not necessarily involve much if anything in the way of subjective
feeling states.
Section 4 - Describing individuals
Individuals, both human and non-human, can be described either
nomothetically or idiographicallyj or at least it is possible to argue
that they can be. Mr R R Holt in an interesting and important paper
entitled 'Individuality and generalization in the psychology of personality'
argues against the idiographic approach. At one point he writes 'There
can be and is scientific study of all sorts of individuals. Particular
hurricanes are individualized to the extent of being given personal siames
and are studied by all the scientific means at the mete»rologist's
cQmiaand. A great deal of the science of astronomy is given over to the
study of a number of unique individuals; the sun, moon and planets, and
even individual stars and nebulae ..... and no one has ever considered
suggesting that astronomy is for these reasons not a science nor that
there should be two entirely different astronomical sciences one to study
individual heavenly bodies and the other to seek general laws '
There is a sense in which any study of individuals of any type, either
human or non-human, is general rather than particular because most
words other than proper names are general in the sense that they are not
primarily individuating and ostensive. Once we have said that however
we can go on to say that the study of individuals can range from naming
which is simply a matter of picking out and distinguishing individuals
from each other, if we ignore any social significance it may have to a
very detailed knowledge and description such as we find in extensive
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biographies. Holt's examples seem to have more in common with names than
with biographies. The qualitative differences between one hurricane and
another are probably not very great. Indeed if we had a great spate of
hurricanes we should probably distinguish between them on basically spatial
and temporal rather than qualitative grounds. And astronomy cannot really
claim to have begun the study of unique individuals. We are just beginning
to explore and understand the moon. The more remote celestial bodies are
still almost entirely beyond the reach of our scientific instruments.
Telescopes, regardless of whether they are light telescopes or radio
telescopes may enable us to make a few guesses about the structure and
constitution of planets but really they do not take us much beyond the
distinguishing and naming stage. The one planet we know something about,
namely the earth, is studied principally in the subjects of geology and
geography. If a thorough exploration and study of remote celestial bodies
does one day become possible there will be a special subject equivalent
to at least the descriptive parts of geography for each individual planet.
These idiographic subjects will take us far beyond the meagre knowledge
of individual bodies supplied by astronomy. If there are astronomers
on some remote celestial body who have picked out the earth with their
telescopes they will almost certainly know as little about it as we know-
about say Saturn.
There are other complex non-human individuals apart from the earth
which can help us to understand idiographic knowledge. Large cities,
languages,universities roles and historical events are possibly some of
the best types of individuals to consider. We can say some general
things about cities, universites and certain types of historial events
e.g. revolutions but idiographic knowledge is required if we wish to
know and understand e.g. London and Paris, the universities of Edinburgh
and Oxford and the French §nd Russian revolutions. Works of art are other
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individuals which require idbgraphic study. Although we can say some
general things about novels they do not take us very far if we wish to
understand and appreciate 'Sense and Sensibility' and 'Dombey and Son*
for example. Similarly with language and roles although we can talk
about occupational roles and Semitic languages such talk does not take
us very far if we wish to achieve any real understanding of e.g. the role
of the diplomat and the Hewbrew language. We can go further and say that
in general idiography is of fundamental importance both for knowledge end
action. Unfortunately that fact does not yet seem to be appreciated
in philosophy and it is not normally mentioned in epistemology or ethics
or the philosophy of action* If however we consider the knowledge and
actions of lawyers, administrators and politicians for example it should
be obvious how important idiography is. It is a great pity that so far
at any rate in philosophy the attention that lias been paid to nomotheticity
has led to virtually a complete neglect of idiography.
In psychology the great advocate of idiographic knowledge is the
late Prof 3 W Allport. A useful expression of his views can be found
in his paper 'The General and the Unique in Psychological Science'. The
article can be regarded as an excellent reply to Holt's article as far as
it s concerned with psychology rather than with knowledge in general.
The following quotation from Allport's article may help to emphasise
that point
"We forgive Ebbinghaus for performing 163 experiments on himself,
since almost immediately his findings were confirmed on other
subjects. Luckily these subjects, like him, displayed a
logarithmic relationship between the percentage of material
forgotten and the time elapsing after the original act of
learning. We forgive Kohler and Wallach for intensive work
on their own figural after-effects, for it was soon confirmed
that others too show a displacement of the percent, after long
stimulation, away from the retinal area stimulated.
But imagine the consternation if some deviant psychologist
169
(perhaps I myself) were to say 'Can't we linger longer with
Ebbinghaus and discover in his life what relationships might
exist between his memory functions and his motives and his
cognitive style and his aspirations?' The objections would be:
'Of what use is that? Even if we find the relationship we'd
have to generalize to other people or else we'd have nothing of
any scientific value.'
Such is the prevailing 'response set' of our speciality. The
intricacy of internal structure in concrete lives seldom challenges
or detains us. Our concern is with commonalities and comparabilities
across individuals.
This response set is undoubtedly derived from our submissiveness
to the goals and procedures of natural science. And this
submissiveness is not in itself a bad thing. Up to now it has
taught much. The question is whether we have become so enslaved
that we overlook an important half of our particular professional
assignment which is 'increasing man's understanding of man'.
It does no good to argue that every individual system in nature
is unique; every rat, every porpoise, every worm; and that it is
only the general laws of their functioning that lead to comprehension.
No, we can't take this easy way out of the dilemma. The human
system, unlike all others, possesses a degree of openness to the
world, a degree of foresight and self-awareness, a flexibility
and binding of functions and goals that present a unique structural
challenge far more insistent than that presented by any other
living system. It is because of their essential stereotype and
lack of variation that psychologists like to draw their generalizations
from lower animals. But for my part I venture the opinion that all
of the infrahuman vertebrates in the world differ less from one
another in psychological functioning and in complexity of organization
than one human being does from any other."
At the present time there is almost a large and nourishing industry
devoted to one type of totally non idiographic description or rather
evaluation of people. Social workers who are a quickly multiplying
breed very often talk of their clients as immature or much more rarely
as mature. There is little doubt that social workers generally think
that they are describing their client when in fact as we shall see they
are actually evaluating them. Many psychiatrists and some psychologists
also engage in the highly confused maturity business. It is important
to notice that although one can qualify and even quantify the term
'maturity' it is nevertheless generally applied to people in a totally
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non idiographic fashion. A person may be evaluated as very immature or
highly immature or even given a rating on a maturity scale but none of
these qualifications or quantifications is even slightly idiographic.
Because of the" diversity of both actual and possible adult life styles
it is probably unwise to use term like 'mature' and 'immature' with
reference to the social and psychological characteristics of adults.
But if one is going to use them one should use them as idiographically
as possible. One maturity scale can never be sufficient for an adult
human being although it may be sufficient for a tree, a wine or the
human physique* Before we go any further with the matter it might be a
good idea to look at the meaning of the word 'mature'. According to
Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary it means 'fully developed: perfect:
ripe'. The other meanings given are not relevant to this discussion.
The verb 'to mature' (intransitive) is -defined as 'to come to or approach
ripeness, full development or perfection'. The Concise Oxford. Dictionary
go. yes the meaning of 'mature' as 'complete in natural development, with
fully developed powers of body and mind'. Drevers Dictionary of Psychology
does not list the word 'mature' but defines 'maturation' as 'in general
biology, the attainment of maturity, or the completion of growth; in
psychology, rather the process of growth and development itself as
contrasted with the learning process*. Perhaps one can say that 'mature'
is basically a biological and an evaluative term. When we describe anything
as perfect or as having reached perfection we are being highly evaluative.
On the other hand when we describe something as fully developed we are
being comparatively descriptive. We must note however that although it
is easy to reach agreement about what constitutes full development of a
plant or an animal or the human body it is not at all easy to reach agreement
about what constitutes such development of the psychological and
social characteristics of people.
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One might reasonably expect that if any psychologist is likely to
talk sense about the concept of maturity it xrould be 5 I Allport. And
certainly although Allport's account of maturity is very disappointing
it is by the standards of the subject extremely good. In his book
'Pattern and Grown in Personality' Allport devotes chapter 12 to
'The Mature Personality' He begins the chapter by saying (p 275)
"Our long survey of the development of selfhood, of motivation,
of cognitive styles brings us at last to the crucial question:
What is the mature personality like?
We cannot answer this question solely in terms of pure
psychology. In order to say that a person is mentally healthy,
sound, mature we need to know what healthy, soundness, and
maturity are. Psychology alone cannot tell u . To some degree
ethical judgement is involved."
But in fact it is not at all clear why the question 'What is the mature
personality like?* arises at all or why it is alleged to be crucial.
When Allport admits that ethical judgement is involved in answering
the question he should see that there are possibly as many answers to the
question as there are people. Anyone who feels that his answer is
decidedly better than those of others is claiming to be not a psychological
but a moral expert in a sense in which there cannot be moral experts.
On the next page Allport writes (p 276)
^Different cultures have somewhat different conceptions of
healthiness. In some regions the only "sound" person is on®
who loses himself completely in following the traditions and
advancing the welfare of his tribe. In the Western world the
standard places more emphasis on individuality, on realizing
one's own personal potentialities.
Fortunately in Western culture there is considerable agreement
on the norms for soundness, health, or maturity (we shall use
these terms interchangeably."
We have not keen given any evidence to support the sweeping claim that
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in Western culture there is considerable agreement on the norms for
soundness, health or maturity. It is very doubtful if there is any suhh
agreement. In addition Allport here makes it perfectly clear that he is
dealing with social and cultural convention and ideals. People may decide
to pick and choose amongst such ideals or they may decide to reject
the lot. Allport it would appear simply wishes to be the champion of
his type of Western culture. Any definition of human maturity is simply
a formulation of one set of values. Matters become very clear when
Allport brings the word 'soundness1 into the discussion. It is
perhaps possible to imagine that one is being descriptive if one calls
someone 'healthy' or 'mature* hut calling someone 'sound' is clearly an
evaluation.
Allport goes on to say (p 276)
"Today we witness a great burst of interest in this problem.
It is discussed up and down, before and behind, by psychologists,
psychiatrists, and by others. Hie burst of interest is due in part
to the acute menace of mental disorder and emotional ill-health
that alarms all nations today. In part also the interest
springs from a desire to discover common values among sound
mortals as a groundwork on which to build a more peaceable
wo^ld society."
♦
The sentence about the 'acute menace of mental disorders' is simply
alarmist. There is no attempt to show that mental disorder has recently
increased. It would in any event be rather difficult to prove an
absolute increase in mental disorder since mental illness statistics
like crime statistics are capable of various interpretations. The
whole concept of mental disorder or mental illness raises considerable
problems that Allport does not either mention or consider. These
problems are seen at their simplest in cases in which several people
take the view that someone is mentally ill but the person concerned
totally disagrees with their opinion. Such a situation is comparatively
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common in the field of so called mental illness but is much less
common in the field of physical illness and should make it fairly
clear that talk about mental illness is necessarily different from
talk about physical illness. The idea that 'sound mortals' can give
its 'a more peaceable world society' is naive and simple minded.
Conflict in society is caused principally by the clash of economic,
political, racial territorial and ideological interests and has remarkably
little to do with the soundness or otherwise of individuals. After
advancing that absurd claim for maturity Allport appears to see the
futility of the whole enterprise for he writes (p 276)
"The distinctive richness and congruence of a fully mature
personality are not easy to describe. There are as many ways
of growing up as there are individuals who grow, , and in each
case the healthy edd-product is unique. Although in this
chapter we seek universal criteria of wholesome adult lives,
we must never forget the wide play of individuality of pattern."
i
Better still he writes (p 276 - 277)
"It is questionable whether we should ever expect to find in
the flesh a paragon of maturity. We shall be talking more
about an ideal than about an actual person."
It follows from that quotation that 'maturity* like 'saintliness' is
primarily a moral and an evaluative and not a descriptive concept.
Indeed we can say that just as many Victorians under the influence of
religion aimed at saintliness so many people at the present time under
the influence of social work and psychiatry aim at maturity. Both
saintliness and maturity are ideological ideals. The ideology of social
work is generally the ideology of conformism.
If Allport actually understood some of the things he has said
so far chapter 12 of his book would stop at the last sentence we quoted
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from it. But unfortunately he does not seem to understand exactly what
he has said and so the chapter continues and a few lines further on from
the last quotation Allport writes (p 27?)
"One terse definition says that a healthy personality actively
masters his environment, shows a certain unity of personality,
and is able to perceive the world and himself correctly. Such
a personality stands on his own two feet without making excessive
demands on others. So far as it goes, this definition is
satisfactory."
But what is highly ambiguous cannot be satisfactory. If by 'perceiving
the world correctly' one simply means not suffering from visual or
auditory hallucinations or from colour blindness and simply seeing
physical objects as they really are all is well. The phrase 'perceiving
the world' mijjht however refer to social and ideological perception in
the sense in which one man might say i:hat British society is fascist
and another might say that it is communist. Both these extremists
and all the middle of the road men who disagree with them would want
to claim that they perceive the world correctly. Deciding who is right
in this matter is a question of individual moral and evaluative decision
based on a consideration of what one regards as the relevant evidence.
Neither psychology nor the concept of maturity can help us here.
Immediately after the passage we have just discussed Allport writes (p 277/.
"A fuller set of criteria is offered by Srikson, who specifies
the period of life at which each attribute is (or should be)
normally achieved:
Infancy: a basic sense of trust
Early childhood:a sense of autonomy
Play age: a sense of initiative




Mature age: integrity and acceptance."
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Industrious school children are doubtless what many parents and teachers
want but it would be unfair to ignore the large number of working class
children who find school boring and repressive and so are not industrious
in that setting and it would also be unfair to label them immature. Many
of these male children like their fathers have a strong dislike of
spending the working day indoors. They strongly prefer open air occupations
to any type of indoor work. Sometimes working class adolescents who
disliked school say that they hated sitting in a classroom at a desk with
books in front of them. Such children may of course be very industrious
at pursuits such as football which they enjoy. In. any event the ideal
of industry and competence during the 'school age' can be regarded as a
piece of Victorian morality. Furthermore the whole concept of 'the
school age' requires examination. Infancy is certainly a universal
feature of human life and so almost certainly is play but going to
school is not. Universal compulsory schooling was established comparatively
recently in certain societies but it has never been established in others.
Its establishment raises considerable moral problems which were debated
in Britain in the nineteenth century and which have been brought to our
attention again recently by certain people who are sometimes called
deschoolers. Whatever one's moral position on compulsory universal
school attendance may be it is clear that one cannot talk about 'the
school age' if one is concerned with some kind of universal human nature.
Possibly certain social anthropologists would want to point out that
adolescence is no more universal than the school age. In other words
Erikson is simply expanding a particular set of values which have meaning
only in certain societies. What he says about the later stages of life
is no more satisfactory than what he says about the earlier stages.
Vast numbers of young adults are certainly concerned with intimacy and
vast numbers of adults are concerned with generativity but neither young
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adults nor adults will survive unless they are concerned with many
things, besides intimacy and generativity. Also soma young adults
are quite happily not concerned with intimacy and some adults are quite
happily not concerned with generativity. If * acceptance' in the 'mature
age' means acceptance of the social status quo it is to he hoped that at
least some people are able to emulate Bertrand Russell's ability to see
many of the faults of the existing social order until his dying day.
In the middle of the chapter we see Allport at his very hest
and his very worst as far as handling the topic of maturity is concerned.
At one point he comments on a piece of imaginative psycho-analytic
theorising about sex from Erikson which runs as follows (p 286-287).
"Psychoanalysis has emphasized genitality as one of the chief
signs of a healthy personality. Genitality is the potential
capacity to develop orgastic potency in relation to a loved
partner of the opposite sex. Orgastic potency here means not
the discharge of sex products in the sense of Kinsey's "outlets,"
but hetrosexual mutuality, with full genital sensitivity and with
an over-all discharge of tension from the whole body..... The
idea clearly is that the experience of climactic mutuality of
orgasm provides a supreme example of the mutual regulation of
complicated patterns and in some way appeases the potential
rages caused by the daily evidence of the oppositeness of male
and female, of fact and fancy, of love and hate, of work and
play. Satisfactory sex relations make sex less obsessive and
sadistic control superfluous."
Allport's comment in that passage is excellent,and really cannot be
improved within the context of the idea of maturity* He writes (p 287)
"Persuasive as the argument is, we are nonetheless aware of
exceptions. It is not proved that every genitally mature
individual is healthy in all regions of his life. Hor is
it clear that sex drive is so closely tied to all regions
of the personality as the theory requires. Finally, there are
the innumerable instances of celibates, both male and female,
and even of sexual deviants, whose accomplishments and whose
conduct are so outstanding that we cannot possibly consider
them as "immature.""
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What, then, shall we conclude? It seems wise to admit that in
many lives genital maturity does accompany general personal
maturity. At the same time, we cannot possibly maintain that
mature people experience no frustrations and no deviations
in handling their drive impulses, including the ramified
impulses of sex. The difficulty here seems to lie in identifying
adult motivation almost exclusively with the sex-drive. One can
readily concede that such an important drive, if handled in a
mature way, may well harmonize with, and reinforce, general
maturity, without at the same time reducing the entire problem
of maturity to genitality."
The first of these two paragraphs is possibly the more important of
the two. In it Allport criticises Erikson's ideas from an idiographic
point of view and so from a point of view which is able to appreciate
the wide variety of possible adult life styles. Very unfortunately
Allport does not at any stage show that he is aware of the conflict
between his own idiographic principles and the whole idea of human
maturity. Prom time to time as in the above passage he shows an
implicit awareness of the conflict. At other times even an implicit
awareness of it is entirely lacking. And sometimes we come across almost
unbelievable nonsense. Allport writes (p 287 - 288)
"We readily note the difference between the person who has
emotional poise and one who is emotionally clamorous and
who gives way to outbrusts of anger and passion - including
overindulgence in alcohol and obsessive outbursts of profanity
and obscenity. The egotist, the roue, the infantile person
have not passed successfully through the normal stages of
development. They are still preoccupied with bits and pieces
of emotional experience.
Many writers speak of self-acceptance. This feature of maturity
includes the ability to avoid overreaction to matters pertaining
to segmental drives. One accepts his sex drive and does the
best he can to handle it with the minimum of conflict in himself
and with society; he does not constantly seek the salacious
and the scatological, nor is he prudish and repressed. Everyone
has fears, both of immediate dangers and of ultimate death, but
these can be handled with acceptance. If not, there develops a
neurotic preoccupation with the danger of knives, of high places,




Possibly Allport should have kept these comments for his own children
instead of publishing them. They could possibly form part of a headmaster's
sermon in a school chapel. But they are not a contribution to public
knowledge although they do show us how almost inevitably personal tastes
and prejudices creep into anyone's account of maturity. What one thinks
of profanity, obscenity, heavy indulgence in alcohol and of all things
health foods is very much a matter of private opinion and of very little
if any public interest. Allport we know was religous and so profanity
may in some ways have been a problem for him but it really cannot be a
problem for a non religous person.
The worfct however is yet to come. On page 290 Allport writes
"Here we should add a word concerning "economic maturity". For
most people the struggle to earn a living, to remain solvent,
to meet fierce economic competition is a major demand of life.
It causes strain and begets crises often more devastating than
the crises of sex and self identity. College students do not
always estimate correctly the challenge they will face when
they enter into competition for the dollar. Youthful personalities
sometimes seem relased (even serene) prior to their ordeal of the
market place. To be able to support oneself and one's family
(in America with an ever-advancing standard of living) is a
frightening demand. To meet it without panic, without self-pity,
without giving way to defensive hostile, self-deceiving behaviour
is one of the acid tests of maturity."
Here Allport is stating his belief in American capitalism and in the
'fierce economic competition' of the American market place. hy that
belief should have anything to do with maturity is not at all clear.
In any event in this passage Allport seems to come very near to the
extreme social work view one sometimes meets that the cause of poverty
is emotional inadequacy. In certain cases this may of course be true
especially in conditions of full employment. But in general the causes
of poverty are purely economic. One explains the grim poverty of millions
in India by reference to the economics of underdeveloped countries and
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not by reference to the individual characteristics of Indians.
Similarly one explains the different unemployment rates in different parts
of the UK by reference to the regional structure of the UK economy and
not by reference to any difference in psychological characteristics
between eg. Glaswegians and Londoners-. The point is almost painfully
elementary but one can meet social workers who are confused about it
and Allport's unfortunage passage about 'economic maturity' might very
well increase their confusion.
At the end of the chapter we find Allport's usual mixture of the
ability to see what is wrong with the concept of maturity and at the
same tine a wholly uncritical acceptance of its absurdities. One page
305 he writes
"An important postcript to this brief discussion should be added.
Is maturity the only ultimate "good" value for personality? Do we
not all know immature people who are highly creative, heroic in
special ways, and possessed of other desirable attributes? It
seems that especially the value of creativity is present in
many lives that are otherwise warped, retarded, even neurotic
and psychotic. And the world needs creativity. We must concede
this point, and admit that there are many good things in life
beside soundness and maturity of personality. We can yield on
this matter, but still maintain as a generally desirable goal
the development of personalities toward the highest attainable
level of maturity. We shall always fall short of this goal,
but when we do so, fortunately many sound values remain".
In this passage Allport comes very near to saying that the maturity is
of comparatively little importance. And he also comes very near to
saying that universal maturity would lead to a decline in creativity.
Accordingly the sentence which begins 'We can yield on this matter ....'
is unsatisfactory because the possibility that universal maturity
would lead to a decline in creativity calls into question the value of
Allport's generally desirable goal*. Perhaps one should really say
that 'we shall always fall short of this goal but fortunately because
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we do many sound values remain', Wen Allport says that 'there are
many good things in life besides soundness and maturity of personality*
it is really necessary to establish some kind of hierarchy of values in
order to make it clear just how important maturity is supposed to be.
On the last page of the chapter we find the following passage (p 30?)
"Psychologists cannot tell us what normality, health, or maturity
of personality mean. Yet every practical-minded person, including
psychologists and psychotherapists would like to know. Surveying
some of the vast literature on the subject, we find considerable
agreement, at least so far as the value-conceptions of Western
culture are concerned. In particular we find six criteria that
sum up the area of agreement. The mature personality will (l)
have a widely extended sense of self; (2) be able to relate himself
warmly to others in both intimate and nonintiraate contacts; (3)
possess a fundamental emotional security and accept himself; (4)
perceive, thinfc, and act with zest in accordance with outer
reality; (5) be capable of self-objectification of insight and
humor; (6) live in harmony with a unifying philosophy of life".
Of the points Allport mentions possibly (l), (4) and (6) call for some
comment, (l) is really unintelligible as it stands since it is quite
impossible to say what it means. The word 'self' is nearly always
difficult to understand and it is certainly a great deal more difficult
than usual to understand in (l). On pp 283 - 285 Allport discusses a
topic called 'Extension of the Sense of Self. As far as one can judge
from that discussion the phrase 'extension of the sense of self may
simply mean 'not being too self centred*. If that view is correct then
(l) simply means 'will not be too self centred' and that is unobjectionable
and unremarkable. Unfortunately some parts of the discussion on P 283 - 285
are very far from clear. The story about 'Citizen Sam' does not really
prove anything and the best reply to Allport's question 'What precisely
is wrong with Sam?, (p 284) may be 'Absolutely nothing, he may be
perfectly happy' (4) on P 307 raises the problem of 'outer reality'
which is in many ways the same as the problem of 'perceiving the world
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correctly* which we discussed earlier. The Christian and the Communist
doubtless both fee}, that they 'perceive, think and act with zest in
accordance with outer reality' but they perceive think and act very
differently from each other. (6) is perhaps the most questionable of
a very questionable series of points. On p294 Allport writes; 'maturity
requires, in addition to humor, a clear comprehension of life's purpose
in terms of an intelligible theory. Or, in brief, some form of a
unifying philosophy of life.' It seems that by 'a unifying philosophy of
life' Allport means some kind of religion or ideology. It is however
possible to argue that all religious and ideologies give a distorted
view of the world and that it is best as far as possible to remain free
of them all. Unfortunately Allport does not expand the point about
the value conceptions of Western culture. It certainly cannot be claimed
that there is only one admired adult life style in western society at
the present time but it appears that Allport is trying to suggest that
there is. And it is not remotely clear why we should concern ourselves
with only western values.
In Allport's discussion of maturity we have come across a strange
mixture of criticism and acceptance of the idea of maturity. His
critical passages should lead him to reject the idea entirely but
unfortunately they do not and at times as we saw he lapses into unfortunate
moralising based on personal prejudice. The essentially arbitrary nature
of any psychological or psychiatric definition of maturity can be seen
if we look at a definition which owes nothing to either psychology or
psychiatry. One suspects that many people at the present time would
doubt if such a definition were possible or could possibly make sense.
Theological definitions of maturity do however exist and within their
own terms and on their own assumptions they undoubtedly make sense.
Prof John Macquarrie is one of the leading English speaking liberal
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Protestant theologians of the present time and in his book 'Three Issues
in Ethics' he gives us a theological definition of maturity which runs
as follows (p 109)
"The Christian, we have seen, defines mature manhood in terms
of Jesus Christ, and especially his self-giving love. But
Christ himself is no static figure, nor are Christians called
to imitate him as a static model. Christ is an eschatologieal
figure, always before usj and the doctrine of his coming again
"with gloay" implies that there are dimensions of christhood
not manifest in the historical Jesus and not yet fully grasped
by the disciples. Thus discipleship does not restrict human
development to some fixed pattern, but summons into freedoms,
the full depth of which is unknown, except that they will
always be consonant with self-giving love".
Judged from a purely secular point of view this definition has a lot
to recommend it because it lays emphasis on the idea of not restricting
human development to a fixed pattern. In many ways it is as good if
not better than Allport at his best. It is liberal in the best tradition
of liberal Protestant theology. Prom our point of view however its main
value lies in illustrating that definitions of maturity are all inevitably
subjective in the sense that they are formulations of their authors'
basic beliefs and values. Erickson's definition of maturity is a
reflexion of his belief in a certain school of psycho-analysis and
Macquarrie's definition is a reflexion of his theological position.
Somewhat ironically Macquarrie may have greater insight or self awareness
than Erikson since he makes it clear that he is talking within the frame¬
work of Christianity and about Christians. Often psycho-analysts give
the impression that they think that their beliefs should apply to every¬
one and not just to those who believe in psycho-analysis which may at
times be a less tolerant ideology than certain types of Christianity.
Anyone who wants a definition of maturity should compile his own and
apply it only to himself. Naturally of course one can if one wishes adopt
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a definition compiled by someone else if one feels that it adequately
reflects one's own beliefs and values. But precisely why anyone should
actually want a definition of maturity is not perhaps entirely clear.
In this chapter we have considered human individuals from both
idiographic and nomothetic points of view. Our talk about the human life
history and about human capabilities was entirely nomothetic. But then
we saw that our understanding and evaluation of particular human
individuals must be idiographic. At this stage a critic of role theory
might want to suggest that an emphasis on the importance of roles for
an understanding of human action cannot be combined with a belief in the
importance of an idiographic approach to human individuals. Although
we have already noted that individual roles must be understood
idiographically it is true that role explanations of human action are
primarily nomothetic. They tell us for instance how all butlers and
librarians normally behave. It might seem therefore that they cannot
help us when we are faced with the strange behaviour of the few butlers
and librarians that most of us know. The main answer to our problem
are role style, the idiographic features of the particular instance of
the role in question and the roles other than librarians or butler held
by the individual we are considering. A general knowledge of the role
of librarians can take us so far but it cannot take us far enough^ if
we are considering the behaviour of librarians at such institutions
as the London Library, University College Oxford, the Prison Service
Staff College and Edinburgh University. It cannot be easy to be a
librarian in a library which has sections on such grim topics as capital
punishment, sexual deviation and physical education. At University
College Oxford matters are complicated because the librarian is likely
to be a fellow in some unfortunate subject such as ancient history.
Perhaps we should end this chapter by saying something about the
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centre and fringes of humanity in relation to the general concerns
of this part of the work (chapter IV and V) as well as in relation
to popular definitions of humanity and even in relation to Hitler's
definition of humanity. The popular definition of humanity would
seem to be a biological Homo sapiens birth to death definition. In
other words all who are born of Homo sapiens parents and only those
born of such parents are completely human from at least the moment of
birth to the moment of death. The difficulties posed for this definition
of humanity by such problems as autism, psychopathy, infancy, senility,
mongolism, severe brain damage and prolonged comas are so great that it
is hardly surprising thfct some people have sought to involve metaphysics
to justify it. According to what is possibly the most popular
metaphysical justification of the definition souls appear on the scene
when Homo sapiens conception takes place and hang around until death.
Unfortunately there are no good reasons for believing in the existence
of any metaphysical entities. Hitler had a narrow and exclusive
definition of humanity which involved excluding certainly Jews and
possibly others from the human race. In this work we have proposed an
inclusive definition of humanity which recognises the possibility of
non-biological people. Also we have seen that each Homo sapiens
individual starts life beyond the fringes of humanity as a purely
biological foetus and then moves towards the centre of humanity
through infancy and early childhood. Senility may take an individual
out to the fringes of humanity before death. Apart from accidents and
disease senility may produce comas or severe brain damage which take
individuals prematurely to the fringes of humanity. An awareness of
one's own journey from the fringes to the centre of humanity and also
of the possibility that one may at any moment through accident or disease
move suddenly to the fringes once again should I think make
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Section 1 - Approaching and Ignoring Roles
In the Introduction we said that in order to understand what people
are we must understand what they do. All our talk about roles has
been very much concerned with action but it is now time to bring out
the full implications of that talk. Before we do that however we must
look at the strange field of philosophy that is known as the philosophy
of action. Since we are writing within what can be called a philosophical
context it is necessary to see if there is any relationship between the
role theory account of action and what philosophers have said about
action. One of the fundamental points of this work is that human
action cannot be understood without the use of the concept of a social
role. From the point of view of philosophy that claim is a very bold
one because the philosophy of action attempts to explain human action
without making use of that concept. It cannot be said that the philosophy
of action is a primitive or an undeveloped field of philosophy. On the
contrary it is both complicated and sophisticated. The complexity arises
from the fact that a consideration of action involves several other
major topics notably causality, freedom of the will, teleology, motives
and intentions. The sophistication arises from the vast amount of
attention which has been devoted to the field in recent years. It is
possible to say that in the philosophy of action roles are approached
but never quite reached. Let us therefore examine the philosopher's
approach to roles.
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A common starting point for discussions of action is limb movements.
What is the difference between moving one's arm and one's arm moving is
a common question. Alternatively the starting point can be a deliberate
muscular contraction though presumably such a contraction is normally
envisaged as taking place in a limb muscle. Actions are sometimes
distinguished from limb movements because it is rightly pointed out
that the same limb movements can be used for different actions and that
conversely an action can be carried nut by different limb movements.
In order to understand the difference between limb movements and
actions motives, intentions circumstances and consequences are brought
into the picture . The point is made that we must look at them rather
than at muscular physiology if we wish to understand what people do.
Activities such as playing tennis are regarded as a rather special case
and it is argued that we can never begin to understand what tennis
players are doing unless we understand what tennis is, i.e. know' its
rules etc. Actions which are not strictly rule governed are said to
be comprehensible if viewed in their social context but at this point
the line of thought peters out in a somewhat vague and unsatisfactory
sort of way. The last paragraph of Mr A I Melden's paper entitled
'Action' shows the end of the line of thought admirably. He writes :~
"There are cases, of course, in which sentences are employed
in describing the behaviour pf our fellows and in which there
is no ascription of responsibility. I have already mentioned
the language of, coroners and physiologists, in which a position
of neutrality is taken with respect to the responsibility of the
individual. But in what sorts of cases of an admittedly
responsible agent would the question of common practices including
that of observing moral rules be irrelevant? Would it be a case
in which the individual raises his arm? But in that case we must
not describe what the individual does as signaling, saluting,
leading others in physical exercise drill, and so on. For these
descriptions at once bring us within the social arena in which
common forms of life have been achieved and by reference to which
action statements can be understood and bodily movements treated
as actions. Ho, we shall even have to deny that in raising his
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arm the individual was even pretending to engage in these
activities, exercising, following the instructions of his
physician, and so on. We shall have to rest content with
the statement that he was simply raising his arm and never
mind any further queries. But in that case, when the
individual raises his arm what happens is that a bodily
movement, not an action, occurs."
The development of this line of thought which I propose is that
instead of talcing rather vaguely about the social arena in which
common forms of life have been achieved we should talk about roles.
If one 'understands the relevant role one can normally understand what
the person in question is doing. And in order to understand a role
one must understand other roles as well because one cannot understand
what one person is doing without understanding what other people are
doing. The tennis example is really much more illuminating and of
much wider importance than is commonly realised. Tennis players
engage in a rule governed activity which involves a setting namely
the court and equipment namely balls and raquets being used in a certain
way. And what one player does is not comprehensible without reference to
what the other players do. The role of tennis player implies the role
of tennis opponent and may imply the role of tennis partner. But must
human activities can be seen as analogous to games like tennis with the
provislo that they are not so tightly rule governed and the verbal
element may very well be very much greater. Consider for example
retail work or office work. The setting and the equipment are important
in each case and the role of shop assistant implies the role of customer
and the role of secretary implies the role of boss. One cannot under¬
stand what a shop assistant is doing unless one appreciates the
"
significance of money and merchandise and understand what customers
are doing. Equally one cannot understand what a secretary does unless
one understands what an official letter is and what files and records
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are and what managerial activity is because bosses engage in that
activity to a greater or lesser extent.
It might be appropriate to consider another passage from writings
on the philosophy of action in the light of the remarks above. Even
although the passage has been written without direct reference to the
concept of a role it may nevertheless be possible to clarify it with
the aid of that concept. In his book Human Acts Dr Jric D'Arcy quotes
an example given by Prof J J C Smart (pp 2-3)• In the example a US
sheriff shot a man in special circumstances. D'Arcy gives twelve
possible descriptions of the sheriff's act.
"1 He tensed his forefinger.
2 He pressed a piece of metal.
3 He released a spring.
4 He pulled the trigger of a gun.
5 He fired a gun.
6 He fired a bullet.
7 He shot a bullet at a man.
8 He shot a bullet towards a man.
9 He shot a man.
10 He killed a man.




12 He saved four lives."
i » " V.
I t v.,
i \\
Later on (p 10) D'Arcy supports the view that 'There is not necessarily
one and only one correct description of a given act'. He gobs on to
\
say 'The description of an act appropriate to a giveni occasion may vary
with the specialized interest of the inquirer or narrator.' It 'may be
more illuminating to say that it can vary with the role of the inquirer
or narrator. D'Arcy goes on
/
"a person who is being introduced to fire-arms for.the first time,
and learning to shoot, may have got as far as loading and cocking
the gun, holding and aiming it, and crooking his right forefinger
on the trigger. Later he happens to be watching a newsreel film
of the execution, and sees the sheriff cavzf out the movements
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which he himself has learnt5 then there is a report, and
the negro falls; and he asks, 'What did the sheriff do after
he got his hands and fingers right?' The answer, 'He tensed,
ofc suddenly squeezed, his forefinger', would then be perfectly
in place. Again, a student of elementary ballistics may know
that the bullet is driven out of the barrel by the gases which
are suddenly released when the cartridge explodes, and that the
cartridge is exploded by the sudden impact of the hammer upon
it; but why did the hammer make such an impact when the sheriff
pulled the trigger? The answer will begin with an explanation
of the way that trigger and hammer are connected by a spring-
mechanism, and conclude with some such words as, 'So you see,
when he pulled the trigger he released the spring,' "
The questions and answers given by D'Arcy are best understood if we
consider the roles of both the questioner and the respondent and their
relations. ' /hat did the sheriff do after he got his hands and fingers
right?' is asked in D'Arcy's example by a trainee marksman and the
ansx-rer 'He tensed or suddenly squeezed his forefinger' is the answer
given by a shooting instructor. Knowing someone's roles is a valuable
clue to understanding his interests and questions. By itself the
question does not suggest the type of answer required or its implications.
Perhaps the sheriff had recently been released from hospital where he
had been treated for a complaint trhich required extensive physiotherapy
and occupational therapy. A physiotherapist may have been watching
his shooting with professional interest and if she were asked 'What
did the sheriff do after he got his hands and fingers right?' she might
reply 'He moved his weight on to his right foot, held on to the back
of a chair with his left hand and it was clear that his co-ordination
had greatly improved.' Alternatively the physiotherapist like the
shooting instructor might reply 'He tensed or suddenly squeezed his
forefinger' but the implication of her remark would be very different
from those of the shooting instructor. D'Arcy develops the example
further by suggesting that a student of elementary ballistics might
ask why the hammer made such an impact when the sheriff pulled the
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trigger. And the answer we are told might end with some such words as
•So you see, when he pulled the trigger he released the spring.' But
if the question had been asked by a representative of the manufacturers
of the gun who was concerned not with the general principles of ballistics
but with the performance of his firm's guns compared with those of other
firms the answer might be very different. Such a person might say
something such as 'Because we have started to use new very powerful
springs which greatly improve the performance of that model' or
'Because we have worked hard to produce a gun which does not require a
lot of pressure on the trigger. Even a child could use that gun.' Again
both the question and answer given by D'Arcy could be given in a lesson
not in ballistics but in physics. Since ballistics is presumably a
branch of applied physics the differences between a physics lesson and
a ballistics lesson might not be very great but they would none the
less be important. The frame of reference of ballistics is guns and that
of physics matter and energy. In ballistics one sees as it were types
of guns but in physics one sees guns as types of machines. Accordingly
the roles of physics instructor and physics student differ from the
roles of ballistics instructor and ballistics student.
D'Arcy gives an example which is one more illuminating from
our point of view a few lines further on where he writes
"Think of a clerk still at his desk two hours after the time
that the office usually closes. To the question, 'What are you
doing?', he may give different answers to different inquirers.
For instance, to his wife on the telephone he may say,'I'm
working late'; to the manager of the firm,'I'm finishing the
Blair contract at the request of the Department Head'; to
the Department Head, 'I'm just beginning the last clause';
to a policeman who has noticed a light burning unusually
late, 'It's quite all right, Officer, I work here'; to a
trade union official, 'It's all right, I'm getting double
rates for xrorking overtime'. Each of these different answers
may be perfectly true and, according to the particular concern
of each questioner, perfectly appropriate."
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The questions and answers in this example are clearly role governed.
To say that the clerk may give different answers to different inquirers
is to say less than one should. He gives different answers to different
categories of inquirers. If all his inquirers were e.g. policemen he
would probably give much the same answer to each. And the categories are
defined by the relevant tole relationship to himself. In our society wives
expect to have their husbands' company after working hours and so the clerk's
wife expects to be told why her normal expectations are being frustrated.
Employers are likely to be concerned when staff who are paid over time
for late work continue working after their normal finishing time and
so it is not surprising that the clerk avoided blare by mentioning the
instructions of the Department Head. Expenditure on overtime has
probably got to be justified by the appropriate Department Head so it
is not surprising that he is concerned with the clerk's rate of profress.
PoIcemen are required to take a suspicious view of people in work places
after normal working hours so the clerk's reply to the policeman is
designed to allay suspicion. Likewise the role of trade union official
in relation to the role of trade union member explains the last answer
in the example. D'Arcy's comment that each of these answers may be
perfectly appropriate according to the particular concern of each
questioner is not as illuminating as it might be because the particular
concern of each questioner in this example is determined by his or her
role and not by individual whims and fancies..
At time philosophers come so close to talking about roles that
it really is almost impossible to understand why the next extremely
obvious and one would have thought really inevitable step of actually
talking about them is not taken. A very clear example of this situation
is provided by Dr Donald Davidson in his paper 'Action. Reasons and Causes'
where he writes
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"When we ask why someone acted as he did, we want to be provided
with an interpretation. His behaviour seems strange, alien,
outre, pointless, out of character, disconnected; or perhaps
we cannot even recognize an action in it. When we learn his
reason, we have an interpretation, a new description of what
he did which fits it into a familiar picture. The picture
certainly includes some of the agent's beliefs and attitudes;
perhaps also goals, ends, principles,general character traits,
virtues or vices. Beyond this, the reaescription of an action
afforded by a reason may place the action in a wider social,
economic, linguistic, or evaluative contest. To learn, through
learning the reason, that the agent conceived his action as a lie,
a repayment of a debt, an insult, the fulfilment of an avuncular
obligation, or a knight's gambit is to grasp the point of the
action in its setting of rules, practices, conventions, and
expectations."
At the end of the passage instead of talking about 'rules, practices,
conventions and expectations' Davidson should simply have talked about
roles. He has after all given us a simple description of roles in the
words of his we have just quoted. Only an uncle can fulfill an avuncular
obligation and only a chess player can produce, if that is the word, a
knight's gambit. The agent could conceive of his action as the
fulfilment of an avuncular obligation or as a knight's gambit only if
he occupied the role of uncle or of chess player. One might just
possibly want to talk of the roles of debtor, liar or insulting person
but it is much more likely that we would want to place debts, lies, and
insults in a wider role context. There may in some ways be a difference
between insulting a bus conductor and insulting one's wife. Similarly
there may be difference between telling lies to the espionage agents
of foreign powers and telling lies to one's valet.
A somewhat different example of not paying sufficient attention
to roles can be found in the writings of Prof Alasdair Maclntyre who
certainly cannot be accused of ignorance of sociology. In 1971 the
BBC broadcast a series of radio dialogues entitled 'Conversations with
Philosophers'. These dialogues i-fere later published in The Listener
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and later still as a book. In the number of The Listener dated
25th February 1971 a dialogue between Prof Maclntyre and Mr Bryan Magee
was published under the journalistic and highly questionable title
'Alasdair Maclntyre talks to Bryan Magee about political philosophy and
its emergence from the doldrums'. At one point in that dialogue
Maclntyre said
"The work of the later Wittgenstein, the work of Austin,
the work of Professor Hart - all these brings out the need
for patient descriptive labour in answering the question of
how concepts of different kinds are used, of how the widely
ranging vocabulary of political and social life is deployed.
Austin showed us how what some have taken for minute differences
between negligence, inadvertence, and irresponsibility of other
kinds, can be extremely important in characterising the way in
which an agent's intentions was or was not embodied in his
actions on a particular occasion. These descriptive labours
result, of course, in reports of how people do actually use
discourse, and therefore they have an empirical basis. They
provide some of the data which we need if we are to return to
the problems of classical political philosophy. At the core
of such inquiries, both of the later Wittgenstein and of
Austin, there is the large general question of how we do
and how we ought to characterise what a man is doing when he
does something. How do we distinguish between his action
and its effects, consequences and results?. Notice that
the notions of effect, consequence and result are by no
means the same notion. This whole family of questions
raises the issue of how to understand the actions of ourselves
and others in our social relationships. Thus, what contemporary
philosophy has brought us to is a realisation that we do not as
yet understand how to understand what we are doing in those
elementary social relationships which are relationships of
everyday action and everyday conversation, just because we
have not yet adequately clarified our basic aoncepts."
It seems obvious that one of the basic concepts that must be involved
here is that of a social role because roles provide the structure of
'those elementary social relationships which are the relationships of
everyday action and everyday conversation.' If it is surprising that
Maclntyre does not mention roles at that point it is a great deal more
surprising that he does not mention them later on in the dialogue when
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he turns his attention to sociology. He says ~
"At this point in the argument it is profitable to consider the
condition of sociology. Sociologists have gathered a great
quantity of data and provided us with large amounts of not
hitherto available information. Yet this accumulation of data -
so great an accumulation that we have more facts than we know
how to cope with - does not have its meaning written on its
face. I suggested earlier that the social sciences do not
just as a matter of fact seem to be able to formulate any
laws in the way in which the natural sciences do. We do indeed
very often make factual discoveries in sociology, but these
factual discoveries tend to be of the same order as the factual
discoveries that we make in ordinary life, and do not derive
from any kind of understanding specific to the social sciences.
So we may learn, for instance, as one European sociologist has
discovered, that in passing sentence on criminals, some judges
at least tend to have have more regard to the social class of
the criminal than they do to the nature of the offence, what
follows, what generalisations can be framed, we are not at all
clear, because we are not at all clear how we should understand
the phenomena of a legal system in such a way as to be able to
generalise about them. This is in part because we are not clear
at what level we should be looking for a theory: a theory of
evaluative behaviour in general, or a theory of legal behaviour,
or a theory of the behaviour of officials such as judges? How
ought we to group together the phenomena of social life? How
ought we to categorise them in such a way that we can begin
to frame exp-.anations ? We do not know."
Perhaps we do know that we should start with roles. Indeed we have
started with roles roles because we have talked of judges and criminals.
If we are considering evaluative behaviour in general and human action
is what is being evaluated then it is essential to know about the roles
of the person who evaluates and the person whose action is evaluated.
Since the role of judge is a middle class role it is hardly surprising
if some judges tend to react to middle class criminals in one way and
to working class criminals in another possibly quite different way. The
behaviour of judges is probably quite different from the behaviour of
trade union officials when they are evaluating the actions of trade
union members and so on. Those who want to consider legal behaviour
must pay attention to legal roles and their relationships. Such people
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will note for example that the shortest route to the bench in England
lies through prosecution rather than defence work and that in Scotland
the Lord Advocate tends to recommend himself for elevation to the bench.
Above all those who want to study the behaviour of 'officials such as
judges' must pay close attention to roles so that they may learn that
in the UK at any rate judges are not at least in theory, officials in
one sense of the term at all. And they really are sui generis although
there are a lot of quasi judicial characters in many places. In defence
of Maclntyre it could be said that he might consider my point too
obvious to be stated. He may perhaps in a sense be pointing out that
a consideration of the relevant roles does not tell us which theory to
adopt. At the same tine it is important to state that roles are the
essential foundation of all the theories and that there really is no
question of adopting one theory and discarding the others. Each one of
the theories is potentially as useful and as valuable as the other two
except perhaps the third. 1 "hich theory anyone adopts at any given time
will depend on his interests and on the nature of his enquiry.
One of the strangest examples of a philosopher ignoring roles is
to be found in Prof Alvin I Goldman's book 'A Theory of Human Action*.
In the preface to that book he writes
"As is evident from the problems that occupy most of ray attention,
the book is aimed primarily at a philosophical audience. But
it should also be of interest to behavioral scientists. First,
any inquiry into human behaviour faces the problem of choosing
appropriate units of behaviour. The principles of act-
individuation and act-interrelation I propose may prove useful
for social science as well as for philosophy. Secondly, after
elucidating the role of wants and beliefs in our everyday
explanations of human action, I spend some time discussing
the extent to which our common sense model of action accords
with the sorts of models and theories of action found in the
behavioural sciences. At first glance, common sense and
behavioural science seem to be miles apart. But I contend
that there is less incompatibility than initially appears between
explanations of the sort sought by behavioural scientists."
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And Chapter V is entitled 'Explanations of Actions in the Behavioural
Sciences'. Because of what he says in his preface and because of the title
of Chapter ¥ it would be reasonable to expect that he would be
bound to discuss sociological explanations of action and therefore
to consider social roles. In actual fact however Goldman totally
ignores both sociology and roles. Evidently by the phrase 'behavioural
sciences' Goldman means just one behavioural science namely psychology.
On p 129 Goldman writes
"I shall defend the thesis that most of the prominent studies and
theories of behaviour in the social sciences are not really
incompatible with the commonsense model elucidated in Chapter
three and four. On my view, much of the work done in the
behavioural sciences either presupposes concepts quite similar
to those of wanting and believing or frames hypotheses which
are compatible with the operation of wants and beliefs. The
fact that an hypothesis makes no reference to wants and beliefs
does not entail that its truth would preclude the causal role
of wants and beliefs. Hence, even those theories in the
behavioural sciences which ignore mentalistic or teleological.
factors need not be incompatible with commonsense explanations
which reply on such factors.
Heedless to say, there is no room in a single chapter to discuss
all or even a significant proportion of the relevant literature
in the behavioural sciences. The best I can do is select
representative studies to illustrate the points I wish to make."
If one is claiming to discuss 'representative studies' from the field
of 'most of the prominent studies and theories of behaviour in social
sciences' in relation to wants and beliefs one has absolutely no academic
justification whatsoever for ignoring sociology in general and role
theory in particular. Sociology is at least a paradigm case of a
social science and it really is very difficult to argue against the
very much more extreme view that it is the primary and fundamental
social science. In addition one cannot understand wants and beliefs
without discussing the roles which play such an important part In
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shaping peoples wants and beliefs. Also it is not possible to use the
phrase 'social sciences' to mean 'psychology' unless one is trying to
use some sort of private language. The question 'How is it possible for
someone to ignore sociology in general and role theory in particular in
the manner and in the circumstances in which Goldman has ignored them?
is not a purely philosophical question, because Goldman does not try to
justify his omission, rather it is a question which involves the sociology
of knowledge. The answer would seem to be that philosophical and
psychological explanations of action are linked because they both
individualise social phenomena and so a philosopher who discusses action
is likely to have much more in common with a psychologist than with a
sociologist. The important topic of individualising social phenomena
is discussed in the General Conclusion. Perhaps we can rest for a
second from academic matters and enjoy the amusing irony of the situation
in which I came across Goldman's book quite by accident in the sociology
section of Foyles bookshop in London. Whoever placed it there made a
double mistake.
Before the almost painful end of this section two matters should
be mentioned. Firstly it has to be said that from the philosophical
point of view these philosophers such as Professors Emmet, Downie,
Mayo and Mr Cohen who have paid at least some attention to roles are
very strange eccentrics. Secondly certain questions asked by Mr Urmson
help us to see yet again the importance of roles in understanding action
although that is most certainly not what Mr Urmson had in mind when he
asked the questions. In his paper entitled 'Motives and Causes'
Urmson considers eight questions which may be asked about an action viz.
"1 What was the point of his doing that?
2 What was his reason for doing that?
3 What led him to do that?
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4 What prompted him to do that?
5 What made him do that?
6 What possessed him to do that?
7 How did he come to do that?
8 How did it come about that he did that?"
It is easy to imagine answers to these questions which will refer
directly to roles. Urrason however gives answers to specific instances
of these questions which appear at first sight to have nothirg whatsoever
to do with roles and which therefore might appear to support the view
that roles are not essential to the understanding of action. His specific
questions with his answers to them are :-
"la Q What was the point of his buying a slow-combustion stove?
A To save coal.
2a Q What was his reason for buying a cheaper model?
A He could not afford the better one.
3a Q What led him to undertake so many offices?
A Vanity. (One may also be led, or even spurred, by
ambition, or anxiety, or pride).
4a Q What prompted him to clean out his desk?
A Noticing that his papers were getting dirty.
5a Q What made him sell on a falling market?
A Panic. (Or stupidity).
6a Q What possessed him to strike a woman?
A Blind fury. (Or ungovernable rage, or an evil demon,
possibly).
7a Q How did he come to take up law?
A His father was a solicitor.
8a Q How did it come about that he emigrated?
A Well, it is a long story. The Australian Government ...."
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But the answers assume role situations without which they are not really
totally comprehensible. We need to know why someone wanted to save
coal. Perhaps his pay forced him to economise and so his poorly paid
occupational role is the relevant context of his action. Alternatively
it might be the case that there was a national coal shortage and the
government had issued an appeal for severe restraint in the use of coal.
In that case his action is explained by reference to his conscientious
performance of the duties imposed on him by the role of citizen. If a
man strikes a woman we desperately need to know their role relationship.
In order to understand the blind fury we need to know if a man was
striking his wife or his mistress or a policewoman or if a patient was
striking a nurse. Also we need to know the precise circumstances of
the event within the context of the role relationship. Perhaps the
policewoman was trying to arrest the man or his wife had announced that
she was going to leave him. And roles are equally relevant to the
answers to the other questions.
It is necessary to end this section on a cruel note. The
strangeness of some of the philosophy of action has been shown quite
unintentionally by a philosopher. In his book 'The Campus ar'
Prof John Searle explains certain human actions in order to make them,
comprehensible to people in general and particularly to those concerned
with or interested in universities. The manner in which he does this
is not unlike the manner in which philosophers explain the strange
examples given in papers and books on the philosophy of action for the
academic edification of other philosophers. Indeed Searle shows
us implicitly and quite by accident that explaining human action and
contributing to the philosophy of action often are totally unrelated
activities. The separation of the two activities arises from the fact
that the examples in some works on the philosophy of action are generally
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speaking most unlikely to be given in answer to such questions as
•What did you do yesterday evening?' or 'What did he do yesterday
evening?' which are the kind of questions that people actually ask about
what people do. In reply to such a question it is quite possible to answer
'I took part in a demonstration on the campus' or 'He took part in a
demonstration on the campus*. In 'The Campus War' Searle is concerned
with the world in which that sort of answer is given to that sort of
question. That world is far removed from the world of the type of
philosophy of action where we find Goldman writing (op cit Preface PV)
'What is an act? What is the relationship between act and agent? Is
John's flipping the switch identical with his turning on the light?
If not, how are they related?' The world of that type of philosophy of
action is the world of arm raising, switch flipping and nose scratching.
It is often not the world of taking part in demonstrations or going
shopping or buying a pair of shoes or phoning a friend or taking a
bath. Indeed at times it is not even the world of arm raising and
switch flipping. When I was a postgraduate philosophy student at
Oxford I knew a sound man from Cambridge who took much the same
sceptical view of the philosophical activity around him as I did. Once
he returned from the Lower Gondal Room of the Indian Institute in a
somewhat distressed state and alleged that he had sat through a
philosophy seminar devoted to a discussion of coughing and sneezing.
At first I simply assumed that he had wandered into a physiology
seminar by mistake but he told me which philosophers had taken part
and what they had said. One would not wish to say that there are no
philosophical points to be made about coughing and sneezing but rather
that they are comparativeljr minor. All would have been well if at
a less subterranean level than the Lower Go&dal Room important topics
such as roles were being discussed but they were not. And it did not
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occur to me to stop drinking coffee and reading newspapers and to
start a discussion of them. The concept of collective responsibility
is an uncomfortable one and will not be discussed here.
In order to understand the relationship between the world of the
philosophy of action and the world of talk about what people actually do
it is necessary to consider the question of time scale and also the analogy
of the relationship between motor parts and cars. If one asks someone what
he did two seconds ago one might very well get an answer such as 'I turned
on the light' or even 'I flicked the switch' or 'I scratched ray nose' or
just possibly 'I coughed' or 'I sneezed.'. The question is however an odd
one and is as unilluminating as the question 'What did you do as a child?'
More usual and more illuminating questions about action would be 'What did
you do in the afternoon?' or 'What did you do yesterday?' One cannot say
exactly what the most illuminating part of the action time scale is but
in general one can say that the two extreme ends of it are generally
speaking not very illuminating. Certainly one can say to a retired person.
'What did you do before you retired?' and after someone dies one can simply
say 'What did he do?' The conventional type of answer to such questions
consists of naming the major occupational role involved and so we get
answers such as 'I was a belly dancer' and 'he was an astrologer' But
the most honest and accurate if unilluminating answer would simply be
'many things'. At the other extreme there are situations in which there
is either a temporary or a permanent shortage of water. In such situations
turning on and turning off water taps are extremely important major actions
and so statements such as 'Two seconds ago I turned on the tap' can
sometimes be important. But in general we are unlikely to understand
human action if our time scale uses either too small or too large units.
And if someone says that limb movements are the components of human action
and that we cannot understand action unless we first understand its
components then he needs to consider the important analogy of the relationship
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between motor parts and cars. The expert on motor parts is not necessarily
an expert on cars and vice versa. Although clearly the expert on cars
needs to know something about motor parts is is perhaps not quite so
essential for the expert on motor parts to know something about cars. The
specialist in the philosophy of action is rather like the expert on motor
parts. Being an expert on limb movements and possible answers to the
question 'What did you do two seconds ago?' is similar to being an expert
on hub caps. Doubtless there is a great deal more to know about hub caps than
most of us appreciate and certainly specialists in the philosophy of action
have shown the complexity of limb movements in relation to possible answers
to the question 'What did you do two seconds ago?' But if we want to know
about cars we must go to someone who knows about the workings of the
internal combustion engine and if we want to understand possible answers
to the question 'What did you do yesterday' we must go to someone who
knows about social roles.
Before we actually start to consider Searle's book there is a
small point of academic ethics that perhaps has to be considered. Some
people might wish to say that an academic's non academic xwitings
should not be considered in an academic_context. According to such a
view if one is considering Prof R Wollheim's academic work one does
not take into account his popular and totally uncritical book on Freud.
Clearly if a philosopher happens to be a keen gardener and writes a
book on gardening one would not normally take it into account if one is
considering his academic work. Even if in the course of the book the
philosopher happens to remind us how illogical it would be to cultivate
weeks and xvhat it means to say that the effluent from the Oxford sewage
farm is good effluent and hence possibly good fertiliser for one's
garden we would still not aonsider that the work was of any academic
importance. One can give practical advice about gardening techniques
without touching on any philosophical problems. But any
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rational discussion of Freud's work must inevitably involve a
consideration of types of explanation of human action and of questions
concerning proof and evidence in relation to theories. Similarly if
one is explaining any human action such as participation in campus
demonstrations it is inevitably possible to ask what type of explanation
is being given and a consideration of types of explanation of human
action is a philosophical matter. Indirectly Searle's book raises
philosophical issues. It is however a great pity that the philosophical
issues are raised only indirectly.
In his book Searle adopts Goffman's approach to the study and
explanation of human action in the sense that he does not carry out
empirical research but instead tries to provide a coherent and convincing
explanation of itfhat he has observed. His most general thesis is that
the students who were involved in the 'student revolts that spread
across the United States, France and England, beginning at Berkeley in
1964' (p 11) were engaged in religious or quasi religious activity which
was aimed at converting the university into a youth city. Inevitably
Searle has to talk about roles but only once does he do so explicity
when he writes (p 163 - 164)
"It is, I believe, humiliating, degrading, and above all
frustrating for a man of twenty-eight, with a wife and two
children, to be, into the indefinite future, a 'graduate student'.
These not-so-young men are raging about the ineffectual position
they have placed themselves into. Much of the desire for 'student
power' comes from grown men and women who, as they would put it,
want to have a share in making the decisions that affect their
lives. The role of the students, in so far as the university
remains an intellectual community with a clear roledivision
between faculty and students, is likely to deny them any
effective decision-making power in the areas in which they most
demand it. Their position is paradoxical: they are at an age
and level of maturity where they want and are ready for positions
of leadership and responsibility, but they have chosen a role -
that of the student -.which is precisely one that does not and
cannot confer leadership and responsibility. It is designed as
a transitory role; they have made it a role of indefinite duration.
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The Sources of an impending eruption are apparent in this alone."
At many other places in the book Searle writes implicitly about roles.
A good example is to be found on pp 124 - 126 where we find Searle
saying
"A second feature of the academic liberal mode of sensibility,
one which infects the academic profession generally, though
liberals to an unusual extent, is that its possessors are not
in the habit of considering the consequences of academic actions.
The professors* most important actions as professors have few
consequences of a practical or political kind. The basic actions
of the faculty member, the core of his professional activity so
to speak, lie in teaching students and conducting and publishing
research. In each case he seeks to impart the truth or as nearly
what is the truth as he can get according to professional standards
of evidence and reason. In each case what matters is the quality
of the content of his utterances, and not the consequences of
the act of uttering them. He would regard it correctly as a
violation of professional ethics if he made his utterances for
the purpose of achieving some practical effects rather than
for the purpose of communicating the truth. Hot only does he not
consider the consequences of his actions when making utterances but
would consider it somewhat immoral to do so.
When he goes to a meeting of the faculty to vote on some
resolutions about a campus crisis, he takes this habit of mind
to the meeting with him. When a resolution is proposed, he
asks himself, 'Do I agree with the resolution?' He then listens
to the speeches pro and con, makes up his mind, and if he
agrees with the resolution he votes yes, if not, he votes no.
It is an engaging exercise in political innocence, and would be
completely commendable if it were not so easily manupulated by
those with more political sophistication. When faced with such
a political situation, the intelligent person has to ask himself
at least three questions: not only 'Do I agree with the contents
of the resolution?' but also 'What are the consequences of our
passing it?' and 'Do I regard them as desirable?' A political
situation is precisely one in which it is incumbent on one to
consider the consequences of performing one's speech acts, as
well as the content of the speech acts performed.
Consider how this works in actual cases. At the height of Stage
Three, when the police are still on the campus, the stench of
tear gas remains in the air, and everyone is aroused, an emergency
meeting of the faculty is held. A group of left wing professors,
prepared in advance, will propose a resolution which, among other
things, condemns the administration for calling the police. The
average faculty member, 'le professeur moyen sensuel', as it were,
asks himself, as he should, 'Do I think it was a good idea to
call the police?' But he does not ask himself, as he should,
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'What are the long-and short-term consequences to ourselves,
the administration, and the university in general of our
publicly condemning the administration at this particular
point in the history of the university?* and 'Do I welcome those
consequences?"'
Another example is to be found on p 106 where we read
"An entirely unnecessary and artificial adversary relationship
is created by the existence of an independent administration.
This is most strikingly obvious to the faculty member who
accepts an administrative post. He suddenly discovers that
the attitude of his faculty colleagues to him has changed.
He may think he is in the administration to defend their
shared values, and he may think of himself as primarily a
professional scholar, but his colleagues think of him as
having 'stepped over the line', as one professor once put it to
me. The administrator becomes one of them and is no longer one
of us." i
On p 162 we find yet another example where Searle writes of 'the endless,
tiresome, and humiliating trial by publication and patience endured
by the assistant professor before he is recognized as a fully fledged
member of the intellectual community, the period in which his elders
and betters 'look him over'
/
It is interesting to see what precise use Searle makes of philosophy
in his book. In general he makes very little use of it except for
occasional matters of elucidation. We have already noted that in P 125
Searle says inter alia, 'A political situation is precisely one in
which it is incumbent on one to aonsider the consequences of performing
one's speech acts, as well as the content of the speech acts performed'.
In a similar sort of way from the point of view of elucidation we find
Searle saying on p 130
"The faculty cannot forgiv«j>Q^he administration for giving in
on matters of principle in order to increase the probability
that the university will benefit from the sacrifice in the
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long run. The administration cannot forgive the faculty for
their insistence on their principles without any regard of the
consequences. Technically speaking, the faculty are deontologists;
whereas the administrators are teleologists, usually act utilitarians.
The faculty member asks, 'Is it in accordance with my principles?';
the administrator asks, 'How does it affect the future of the
university, will it work to our benefit in the long run?' "
Possibly Searle's most elaborate point of philosophical elucidation
is to be found on p 145 where he writes
"My epistemological upbringing forces me to say that in this area -
as in, say, the study of history - any causal analysis must have
a residue of speculation simply because there is no direct way
to test the hypotheses. You can read the statistical data of
the American Council of Education or the Center for the Study
of Higher Education or the various opinion surveys until you
are dizzy, but they do not by themselves yield up the causal
answers. Not only does one have the usual difficulty that
there is no discovery procedure for getting from the data
to the right hypothesis, but even after you invent a hypothesis
that fits the data you have no direct way to test the hypothesis.
You can only look for more data, and that usually means you wait
to see what happens next. What I have tried to do is provide a
causal story that fits the data I have seen, and more importantly
fits my own experiences. I shall proceed by baldly listing
about a dozen of the more important causal factors, and then I
shall try to show how they add up."
Finally we should note that at one point Searle makes a semi
philosophical comment which is valuable and illuminating. On pp 156 - 157
he writes
"In short, the dominant tradition in our high culture is one of
being against authority. We celebrate the rebel but not the
bureaucrat, the revolt but not the institutions. Instead of
teaching our youngto see freedoms (and when you use the plural,
you force yourself to look at concrete examples) as necessarily
presupposing stable and established institutions, we teach them
to see freedom (the unmodified singular is a largely meaningless
abstraction) as being constantly at war with authority and
institutions. As long as forces for institutional stability
are powerful, this kind of ideology is a useful counterweight:
but in periods of institutional instability it produces
unexpected results (such as, for example, the Terror of 1793-4).
Mill is a good example of the kind of philosopher who wrote
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against a background ofVictorian institutional stability and
smugness, and defined the problems of liberty accordingly.
De Tocqueville, who had experienced social instability, was
more aware of the institutional character of freedoms, and
in consequence his writings emerge as more ambiguous but
more profound."
Indirectly Searle's book sheds a lot of interesting light on
the philosophy of action. It enables us to see clearly that the
relationships amongst action, explanations of action and the philosophy
of action are most unlike the relationships amongst natural phenomena,
explanations of natural phenomena or simply science and the philosophy
of science. Science is the study of natural phenomena and the
philosophy of science is the philosophical study of science and its
presuppositions. It could perhaps be argued that part of the philosophy
of action is similar to and indeed part of the philosophy of science.
If one regards psychology as the study of human behaviour then that
part of the philosophy of action which is the philosophical study of
psychology is also part of the philosophy of science. Unfortunately
some philosophers still seem to be living in a world in which the claim
that psychology is the scientific study of human behaviour has not
been challenged by sociology and so we find that sociology is not
considered in the philosophy of action but only if at all in the
philosophy of science. Presumably such philosophers consider that
sociology is the study of something called society and has nothing to
do with the study of individual human action and behaviour. Apart
from the philosophical consideration of psychology however the philosophy
of action also consists of a consideration of what is alleged to be
ordinary language talk about action. The philosopher's claim to study
ordinary language has always been totally suspect. If one wants to
find out what ordinary language is one must carry out a vast amount of
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empirical research. The ordinary language studied by philosophers
is at best the ordinary language of philosophers and at worst it is a
language of its own, the language of philosophical examples. It is
strange that philosophers examples are always examples of middle class
and not working class language. And it should be remembered that the
work of Prof Bernstein has shown us that working class language is not
simply a colourful and ungramraatical version of middle class language.
A serious study of ordinary language could not possibly ignore working
class language. In my experience borstal boys for example do not try
to excuse themselves by saying that they acted accidentally or
inadvertently in the way that the so called ordinary chap who swerves
in his Austin car in order to avoid duck rabbits is supposed to excuse
himself. It should he noted that we are here talking about the kind of
Austin carso that are red and green all over. In minor disciplinary
proceedings with borstal boys I have found that they tend to use the
one word 'habit' as a general escuse. And so if one asks Jones why he
hit Brown one is likely to get the reply 'habit sir' pronounced in such
a way that one is likely to cause much amusement by one's puzzled
'i
response 'who is Abbot?* Any serious study of ordinary language would
have to pay a lot of attention to the working class habit of ending
a statement with a question. Thjts if I say to a borstal boy 'Where is
your girl friend?' he may very well reply 'She's in Holloway, isn't she?'
Prison officials and many others hear that type of question at the end
of a statement endlessly but it is very difficult to be sure of its
meaning. Perhaps it means 'as one would expect' or 'as everyone
knows' or 'and that's a satisfactory state of affairs.' Certainly it
is not in any sense a genuine question. Such gloriously plcbian
matters were not discussed during the endless hours spent on linguistic'
and so called 'ordinary language' philosophy during my undergraduate
210
days. In fairness to my tutors however I must record that one of them
did teach me the meaning of the phrase 'a winged teater* which I had
imagined had something to do with engines and machines. Now perhaps
one can see that parts of the philosophy of action are highly unsatisfactory
and are based on serious mistakes and confusions. On the other hand one
must remember in fairness to the better parts of this field of philosophy
that particularly where it shares common ground with moral philosophy
it deals with major problems which are only slightly affected by the
points made in this chapter.
In this section we have seen that at times writers in the field of
the philosophy of action come very near to a consideration of roles
but for some strange reason they never seem to reach that point. We
have also seen that certain writings of philosophers in this field are
considerably illumined when the inevitable but unfortunately only
implicit references to roles they contain are made explicit. Goldman
and Searle both figure prominently in this section because Goldman shows
us a dangerous form of philosophical blindness and confusion and Searle
presumably unwittingly shows us the irrelevance of much of the philosophy
of action to the explanation of action. In general perhaps we can say
that the philosophy of action tends to ignore the essentially group
nature of action especially in an industrial and bureaucratic society.
Philosophers examples tend to be unduly individualistic. Most people
are probably aware of the change from individual to group action in the
field of scientific invention and discovery. In the past an invention
or a discovery was usually made by one particular person. But now
the individual inventor or discoverer has been replaced by a team of
scientific workers. Joint authorship of papers in academic journals
is evidently the rule rather than the exception in the scientific world.
After the first British heart transplant several newspapers carried
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photographs of the group of people who were given the credit for the
work. Although there was one man in the centre who was regarded as the
prime mover in the operation the team was a large one and included
anaesthetists, technicians, nurses and hospital administrators. And
what is true of heart operations is true also of most human activity.
Family life, work and leisure account for most of most peoples lives
and in each of these fields it is extremely difficult to understand
what one person is doing without understanding what others are doing.
The study of roles makes this clear because it is impossible to under¬
stand one role without also understanding other roles related to it.
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Section 2 - The Language of Action
It is now time to try to make explicit what has been implicit, from
the very beginning of the work. Action, we can perhaps now see is
communication and roles are the language of action. 'Communication* is
difficult to define but we can call it 'conscious interaction'. It is
not relevant to our purposes to enter into a discussion df the concept
of unconscious communication or interaction except to note that it is
parasitic on the concept of conscious communication. All paradigm cases
of communication are certainly cases of conscious communication. Talk
about communication tends to be limited to distinguishing between verbal
and non verbal communication and tends to stop short of pointing out
that both verbal and non verbal communication take place in a state
of integration or opposition within the framework of social roles.
There must be a language of action because when we act we want at
least some people to understand at least something of what we are doing.
Precisely who these people are and how much of what we are doing we want
them to understand depends on our roles and on theirs. A doctor for
example may act in such a way that nurses understand much more of
what he is doing than patients and his medical colleagues much more
than nurses. We have already discussed the notion of linguistic
secrets and what was said about them can also be said about non
linguistic or at least partially non linguistic secrets.
Roles serve the same function as language in the sense that just
as in order to understand what someone is saying we must first and
foremost understand the language he is speaking so in order to
understand what someone is doing we must first and foremost understand
the roles he is occupying. Knowing something about the speaker's or
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actor's individual characteristics is helpful but of entirely secondary
importance. It is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of
understanding what the speaker is saying or the agent is doing.
Certainly everyone has a language style and a role style but style is
parasitic on language and roles. Perhaps it is just possible that
someone might want to argue that a language of action is unnecessary
because actions can always be explained and described in language.
There are both practical and theoretical objections to this idea. Prom
the practical point of view life would simply grind to a rather horrible
linguistic halt' if actions had to be explained and described before
they could be understood. One can for example imagine what it would
be like if whenever a motorist saw a man in the middle of the road
wearing a certain kind of uniform and waving his arms about the motorist
had to stop and go up to the man and ask i^hat he was doing. The
resulting traffic delays would be quite considerable because it
requires a certain amount of time to explain exactly what policemen
do in relation to traffic and why they do it. At an early stage in
life we learn a great deal about common roles and a lot of the learning
involves verbal descriptions and explanations from parents, teachers
and others. In order to understand the importance of roles one really
needs to be able to recapture something of the child's sense of wonder
and confusion when faced with adult activity. Young children are
amazed by what goes on in shops and in streets because they do not
understand the roles of the people who are to be found in such places.
Possibly the only adults who can really see human action in the way
that young children see it are anthropologists when they are carrying
out field work. We can say that for children and anthropologists human
action can seem as confusing and incomprehensible as a foreign language
one does not know. Prom the theoretical point of view descriptions of
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action are in many ways as inadequate as descriptions of language. If
one wants to know what German is like one has simply got to learn the
language and to use it. Reading accounts of the German language is
really no use at all. Similarly if one wants to know what a role is
like one has got to occupy it. Many of us< for example have ideas
and possibly suspicions about what the police do but unless one has
been a policeman for a reasonable length of time one is most unlikely
to know in any satisfactory sense of the term what policemen actually
do. The issue is not solved by sending academic researchers into
police stations because although such people might discover a great deal
they are also likely to be effectively prevented from seeing and under¬
standing a vast amount of what policemen see and understand. Even if
one wants to know how the police treat motorists one has got to drive
around to find out. As far as roles are concerned the gap between
knowledge by description and knowledge by acquaintance is very great
indeed. All accounts of roles, even when they are as honest as possible
are more or less misleading or inadequate. In his book (op cit) Searle
gives an excellent account of some aspects of the role of an American
university administrator under the somewhat optimistic section heading
•What It is Really Like*. Part of that section runs as follows
"A third feature of the life of the college executive is its
persistent unpleasantness. As he walks about the campus,
people shout obscene insults at him; his office is haunted
both by hysterical radicals and irate citizens, he is
portrayed in the newspapers both on and off the campus as a
fool or a knave or both. Wot the lightest of the crosses he
has to bear is the monthly regents' meeting.
The students the professor deals with in his classes are, for
the most part, a joy to be with. They are bright, lively,
intelligent, and often eager to learn. The students the top-
level combat administrator deals with tend to be a different
breed altogether. Many of them are in a frenzy of hatred, and
normally the college authorities are the targets of the hatred.
A sizeable percentage of the revolutionary extremists I have
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dealt with have been clinically ill| and this is not my lay
judgement, but is based on discussions I have had about them
with university psychiatrists, and on the medical histories
of some of them. In situations of social instability people
who are themselves messed up psychologically can attain
positions of great prestige and prominence. It helps in dealing
with extreme radicals to have a therapeutic attitude."
Despite the excellence and liveliness of Searle's account of the
role however there can be little doubt that only by becoming a
university administrator in America rather than by readying his book
can one discover 'what it is really like'. At this point we should
in passing note what a pity it is that Searle did not consider the
very important philosophical and practical problems raised by the
concept of mental illness particularly in relation to radicals,
militants and universities. Mr S Maddison's paper Mindless Militants?
Psychiatry and the University is now required reading in this field.
One gets the impression that Searle adopts a very uncritical attitude
to the views of psychiatrists.
At the beginning of this work we noticed that analogies are
sometimes important. Now we are considering an analogy between language
and action. There are three important points to he made about this
analogy. Firstly one cannot take this analogy too far. Ore can make
a variety of synchronic and diachronic analyses of language which have
no equivalents in role theory. It would not for example be very wise
to look for role equivalents of words and sentences nor for role
equivalents of written and spoken language. There might on the other
hand be role equivalents of dialects. Possibly language games provide
one of the most important if not the most important meeting points
and points of similarity between language and roles. Only if one under¬
stands the roles of the participants can one hope to understand a
language game. Generally speaking language games are also action games
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and in these cases the importance of roles is extremely obvious.
But even if a language game is simply a discussion which involves
virtually no non linguistic action we are unlikely to be able to
understand it unless we understand the relevant roles. It is perhaps
difficult for example to understand the remark 'Edinburgh, this is
London. Can you help me to Crail?' unless one knows that it was made
by a telephone operator who was speaking to another telphone operator
despite the fact that there was absolutely no non linguistic action
involved in that language game. Secondly one must remeber that language
is simply a part of roles in the sense that lirguistic action is part
of the totality of action which consists of both linguistic and non
linguistic action. And roles are the language of the totality of
action. Any attempt to study language apart from its social context
or in other words apart from roles is extremely myopic. At the same
time we must bear in mind, thirdly, that both roles and lagguage exist
in the context of culture. It is not exactly easy to say what culture
is but here we are using the term in the social anthropological rather
than in the artistic sense and so we might perhaps describe it as the
totality of ideologies, social customs, s&ience, technology, artistic
activities and political and economic structures and activities to be
found in one place at one time. Ideally only when one understands
the relevant culture can one understand roles and only when one under¬
stands roles can one understand language in anything other than a very
limited way.
In the Introduction vre pointed out that this work is concerned
with synoptic and synthetic statement and not, except perhaps
incidentally, with analytic argument. Now we can see very clearly the
difference between the synoptic and the analytic approach to the study
of action. If we ask what action is or what in the most general sense,
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peoples or perhaps persons, do then there can be little doubt that
, the synoptic answer to the question is much more meaningful and illuminating
than the analytic answer. The synoptic answer is that they communicate
with each other, sometimes in order to achieve certain purposes and
ends and sometimes simply because they enjoy communicating with each
other. Human communication can be either and end in itself or a means
to the achievement of other ends. The extreme analytic answer would
seem to be that they produce limb and muscle movements or perhaps willed
muscular contractions. From our undergraduate days we can all remember
how ridiculous it would be to ask someone how many volitions he had
before breakfast or indeed before any other meal. For very different
reasons it would be equally ridiculous to ask someone how many limb or
muscle movements he had produced before breakfast. Talking about willed
contractions would certainly not make the situation any less ridiculous.
Asking someone what he had done before breakfast would be a very
different matter and would be likely to be understood and to produce
a sensible answer. Saying that action is a matter of limb and muscle
movements is like saying that speech is a matter of the movements of
the speech organs such as the lips and the tongue. Most people are
aware of what they say but generally speaking only speech therapists,
actors, phoneticians and teachers of speech and drama are aware of the
movements of their speech organs. Similarly most people are aware of
what they do but generally speaking only ballet dancers, gymnasts,
athletes and teachers of physical education are aware of their limb and
muscle movements. We must note in passing that it is possible though
comparatively difficult to be aware both of what one is doing and of
one's limb and muscle movements just as it is possible but equally
difficult to be aware of what one is saying and of the movements of
one's speech organs. Just as a knowledge of the workings of the internal
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combustion engine is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition
of knowing how to drive or of understanding driving so a knowledge of
limb and muscle movements is neither a necessary nor a sufficient
condition of knowing how to act or of understanding action despite
the fact there is no driving without a functioning engine and no
action without muscular movements.
The analytic vidw of action is so strange that it is interesting
to enquire into the reasons and causes behind it. The reaons are the
mistaken assumptions behind the analytical and atomistic approach to
philosophical problems. The main assumption is that understanding is a
matter of analysis and not synthesis. It is simply unwise to be doctrinaire
about this matter. Both analysis and synthesis have a part to place in
knowledge and understanding. We may say that biologists should concern
themselves with both ecology and biochemistry. But they should not
confuse one with the other. In the same way philosophers should not
confuse the philosophy of action with the philosophy of limb and muscle
movements. Perhaps we can now see why we said in the Preface that the
philosophy of action is part of social philosophy. The causes of the
analytic view of action may not be very important but we may note in
passing that they may arise out of the activity of sitting at a table
writing philosophy. When one is sitting at a table one's arms and
hands are the most prominent parts of one's body in one's own field
of vision. One's feet and legs and possibly also at least one's
lower trunk are hidden by the table. Only one's hands, arms, head
and neck are likely to move very much and the movements of the hands
and arms are the most prominent in one's own field of vision. It is
perhaps because of factors such as these that questions 3uch as 'What
is the difference between moving my arm and my arm moving?' have come
to be regarded by some as central to the philosophy of action. More
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accurately reasons and causes have probably combined to produce intense
philosophical myopia which can quite easily be cured by the study of
synthetic and social philosophy.
There is nothing new under the sun and certainly not in philosophy.
Although we have just spent a page or two trying to expound the notion
of the language of action Miss Iris Murdoch accomplished the task in
two sentences when she wrote in her paper 'The Idea of Perfection'
(The Sovereignty of Good p 20) 'I can decide what to say but not what
the words mean which I have said. I can decide what to do but I am
not the master of the significance of my act*. She could equally well
have said 'I can decide what to do but not what the actions mean which
I have done' La Rochefoucauld also seems to have been perceptive in this
field. Searle writes (op cit p 71) *La Rochefoucauld says somewhere
that few people would fall in love if they had never read about it.
Part of what he means by that is that the possession of the dramatic
category, falling in love, makes possible certain sorts of experience
which would not be possible or would be different without that category'.
Perhaps that remark can help us to see that just as language makes
perception and thought possible so roles also help to make them possible.
.Knowing someone's role enables us to see what he is doing. And knowing
about roles enables us to think about action and about possibilities
of action. Similarly both language and roles make communication
possible. The idea of action as language is a very old one and is
certainly a great deal older than the idea of language as action.
Much has been said in recent years about performative utterances but
for centuries people have spoken of the language of action. In
Christian theology the incarnation is called God's supreme act in history
and is also called God's word. St John's gospel has much to say about
the matter.
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It is necessary to redraw the map of philosophy, or at least a
corner of it. We began the task in the Preface where we tried to
indicate a few points in the area of social philosophy which is a region
that is not explored in our deplorable universities. Now it should be
obvious why the philosophy of action in the sense in which we have been
using the term at the end of this chapter must be placed in the field
of social philosophy. The branch of philosophy which is commonly
called the philosophy of action is however a totally different matter.
At the beginning of this chapter we talked about the philosophy of
action in that sense of the term and part of it should be renamed
the philosophy of limb and muscle movements. There can be little
doubt that the philosophy of limb and muscle movements is not part
of social philosophy. Strictly speaking the philosophy of action can
also be called the philosophy of communication and it consists of
role theory and the philosophy of language which is of course a very
different matter from linguistic philosophy. The philosophy of the
person links the philosophy of action or communication with moral
philosophy and philosophical psychology or the philosophy of mind
Perhaps we should end this chapter by looking at a puzzling
passage in the paper by Mayo which we considered in chapter II. At
one point he writes :«
The concept of role is irreducibly sociological; it cannot be
reduced to elements of individual behaviour or belief. To
describe someone's behaviour in terms of a role is never merely
to describe, but to give a condensed explanation of his behaviour.
Take, for example, the role of bus conductor. No conduction of
statements about an individual's beliefs and actions can amount
to a description of what he does as a bus conductor; the
qualifiers 'as', 'qua', 'in his capacity as', are essential.
And his actions qua bus conductor can be understood only in
terms of other people in other, correlative, roles, such as
passenger, driver, or manager.
Now although a role is not reducible to behaviour and belief
on the part of an individual, it most certainly enters into
an individual's behaviour and beliefs, especially into his
beliefs about his own behaviour, his thinking about what he is
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doing.
I cannot pretend to understand exactly what Mayo is saying here.
j
9.
It is not clear what he means by 'actions* in this passage but it
looks very much as if he means limb or muscle movements. In addition
it is always difficult to draw a sharp dividing line between description
and explanation. For some reason which is not at all clear Mayo seems
to think that the fact that roles elucidate the links between what
one person does and what other do counts against the idea that roles
enable us to describe actions. The opposite point of view would seem
to be rnuoh more reasonable since what one person does is closely
involved with what others do. The last sentence of Mayo's that we
have quoted does seem in certain respects to run counter to the
paragraph immediately before it. In rejecting what Mayo says as far as it
can be understood it. is necessary to notice that in an indirect sort
of way he gives us clues about what we should say. We should say that
the concept of action is irreducibly social, it cannot be reduced to
elements of an individual person's behaviour or belief because what
one person does can only be understood and described by reference to
what others do. As we have already seen the same points can he made





Perhaps we can now see that a person is an individual and his roles.
A biological human individual starts as a fertilised ovum and ends as a
skeleton. A biological person starts with birth when his roles start
and ends with death when his roles end. At the present time it is
rather difficult to say much about the individual element of non biological
people except that it might very well be electronic. As we have from
time to time pointed out in the course of the work it is not really
possible to separate an individual and his roles. One might say that
a person is the totality of an individual and his complete role history.
Our definition is both prescriptive and descriptive. Aristotle's
definition of man as a political animal has certain features in common
with our own which may be regarded as part of a tradition in which
emphasis has been laid on the biological and social aspects of people.
Other traditions liave been concerned with metaphysical entities such
as minds and souls. Although it can be claimed that there are
descriptive elements in the definition it is also to a large extent
prescriptive. It should be noted that there is a certain element of
repetition in the definition because one cannot define a role without
making some reference to the individual who actually or potentially
occupies the role.
Throughout the work we have tried to do justice to the social
dimension in human life by paying close attention to role theory. There
is a strong tradition which ignores and in effect denies the social
dimension in human life. We can say that those who support that
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tradition individualise social phenomena by trying to explain by
reference to the characteristics of individual people what can only
be satisfactorily explained by reference to social factors and structures.
Two examples may help to make matters clear. It is sometimes said
that since there is a high divorce rate in Sweden and a nil divorce
rate in the Republic of Ireland it follows that the people of Sweden are
much more moral or whatever than the people of Eire or vice versa depending
on one's point of view. In actual fact however divorce is not allowed
by the laws of the Republic of Ireland and is easily allowed by the
laws of Sweden so a comparison of the divorce rates of the two countries
does not tell us anything directly about the characteristics of the
individual citizens of these two countfcies but does tell us something
about their legal and social structure. Explaining the divorce rates
by direct reference to the characteristics of the individual citizens
of the countries concerned is a case of individualising social phenemena.
The second example is much more philosophical. At one point
in the paper of his to which we have already referred Prof Mayo says
'One does not just do things; one does the sort of things one does
because one is the sort of person ore is. And, as Aristotle stresses,
one becomes the sort of person one is by doing the sort of things one
does'. One could scarcely come across a clearer case of leaving out
the social dimensions of life than that. An extreme social view of the
situation would be that one does the sort of things one does because
of the social and role situations one is in and that one becomes the
sort of person one is because of the social situations one has been in.
A more moderate view would allow some place for personality in the
psychological sense of the term by saying that one does the sort of
things one does both because one is the sort of person one is and
because of the social situations one is in. The other half of that view
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woulc|s Toe that one becomes the sort of person one is because of the
interaction of the social situations one has been in and of one's
biological inheritance and constitution. Because Mayo leaves out the social
dimension of life he is guilty of individualising social phenemena. Very
interestingly from the point of view of British academic philosophy Mayo
is not being myopically analytic when he makes the point we have just
quoted. On the contrary he is being commendably synoptic and is concerned
to bring together the Kantian ethics of rules and of the right act
and the Aristotelian ethics of character and of the good man. The
fact that when he does so he is guilty of individualising social
phenomena shows us that leaving out the social dimensions and aspects
of life is in some ways a fundamental error of Western philosophy.
The error spreads far and wide beyond the limits of philosophy
and we can study its grim and important ramification if we look
at psychology and traditional criminology. Let us take psychology
first. Since the word 'psychology' is, like the word 'philosophy',
totally ambiguous it is perhaps as well to start off by saying that by
psychology I mean academic and experimental psychology. In the BBC
series of talks Conversations with Philosophers to which we have
already referred one famous philosopher said that Freud was the only
man of genius in psychology. For the man in the street who cannot
distinguish between a psychologist and a psychiatrist and who has not
the faintest idea what a clinical psychologist is that point of vidw
may seem sound enough. It is however possible to argue strongly that
Freud was not a psychologist at all and it is as well to remember that
although he was almost certainly a psychiatrist a great many psychiatrist's
disagree strongly with his ideas. When we talk about psychology in this
work we mean the subject of Binet, Bartlett and Piaget and also the
subject of the psychologists to whose work we have referred from time
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to time. Before we start to criticise psychologists it might be
appropriate to praise them. We have seen that psychologists have
said sound things about attitudes and about language learning. At the
present time when many people including many philosophers who ought
to know better have become uncritically enthusiastic about the x-rark
of Chomsky it lias been left to psychologists to uphold the cause of
scepticism and empiricism against a very fashionable and popular form
of rationalism.
The trouble starts however when poeple assert that psychology is
the scientific study of human behaviour. It would be much more reasonable
to say that psychology is the study of certain fundamental elements or
aspects of behaviour such as memory, perception and problem solving.
Differential psychology can also tell us something about populations
of people and about an individual person's standing in relation to
the rest of a given population. The idea that one can in any
acceptable sense study human behaviour by taking people into
laboratories and performing experiments on them is an extraordinary
one and strongly suggests that in its early days psychology made
the mistake of accepting the methodology of nineteenth century biology.
The first step in studying human behaviour is simply a matter of
observing it carefully in its social context. Social anthropologists
have known this for a long time and the ever growing tribe of
ethnomethodologists are bringing it to our attention again at the
present time. The motto of nineteenth century biology or at least
the part of it that x?as concerned with morphology and morphological
taxonomy may well have been 'first catch your specimen and then
take it to the laboratory for examination.' Clearly specimens which
are collected at random tell us everything about plant and animal
morphology and dissections of both plants and animals are much more
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satisfactorily carried out in a laboratory than elsewhere. But as
soon as we take people into laboratories for the purposes of
psychological experiment we place them in the role of subject in a
psychological experiment and that role will influence their behaviour.
In addition since human action and behaviour are essentially social
a basic laboratory for the study of human behaviour would have to be a
specially built small town. The study of human physiology is of course
a very different matter and human metabolism can be studied by taking
human specimen^ into laboratories because metabolism unlike action and
behaviour is not a social matter. Some evidence is now required to
support what we have been saying and it is provided in a concise and
interesting form by Broadbent.
In his book In Defence of Empirical Psychology he introduces us
as it were to the experimental psychologist when he says (p 5)
•traditionally, the pasture of experimental psychologist has been to
show a low profile. He concerns himself with tiny details the.learning
of nonsense syllables,, of the refinement of psychophysical methods, of
the meaning to be attached to statistical tests using one tail rather
than two tails of the distribution* and on the same page he talks
about 'the concern of the experimental psychologist for detail, his
apparent lack of interest in ideology and his reluctance to talk about
broader issues* One can perhaps say at this stage that experimental
psychologists have a lot in common with linguistic and analytic
philosophers. Both groups approach human action in a totally misleading
way. The case of the philosophers has been examined in chapter VI
and Broadbent shows how close the psychologists* errors are to theirs
when he writes (op cit pp 12 - 13)
Let us take an example of a human action. Being who I am, I
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think naturally of the act of drinking a cup of tea. My hand
moves out, contacts the handle of the cup, riises it to my
lips, and tips the contents down my throat. But only in a very
general and abstract sense can it be said that my picking up of a
teacup today is the same as the operations which took place
yesterday. Examination of the muscular contractions and detailed
movements would show that they were quite different each time. To
make observation easy, let us concentrate on one part of the process,
the movement of my hand to the teacup. In order to get the
measurements out into observable form, let us furthermore replace
the motion of my hand, which is difficult to instrument
satisfactorily, „by' the motion of some object under my control,
which has got to be brought to a satisfactory coincidence with
some target points.
I can now introduce an experimental facility which was far some
years an ornament of our lab in Cambridge, and which was used
by my colleague, Dr Hammerton. Outside our building, there is
a large and attractive English garden; and across the back of
the house there ran a small model railway. On this railway
there was a trolley, which could run along the track; and at
the side of the track were small target markets which lay
concealed behind the track until the experimenter wanted them,
but which when he chose could rise suddently into a visible
position standing at the side of the track.
The experimental subject was at the far end of the garden, and
therefore as he looked in the direction of the laboratory, he saw
the trolley move across his field of view. In one hand he held a
small control, by moving which he could vary the speed of the
trolley; so what he had to do was to watch for the target marker;
appearing somewhere in his range of vision, and then to move the
trolley as fast as possible to line it up with the marker.
If one actually wishes to study tea drinking as apposed to games with
model railways one has to consider its social context in relation to
such factors as coffee drinking, the decline of tea rooms and the
rise of Indian and Ceylon tea centres. . Broadbent is not however
interested in the act of drinking a cup of tea, he is interested in
muscular co-ordination. And since muscular co-ordination is really
virtually a physiological subject it can be appropriately studied by the
use of speciments or subjects in psychological or physiological
laboratories. Analysis leads Broadbent away from action to physiology
when he writes 'My hand moves out, contacts the handle of the cup'
raises it to my lips, and tips the contents down my throat.' Best of
all the limitations of experimental technique are allowed to alter
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what is being studied and so Broadbent writes 'To make observations
easy let us concentrate on one part of the process, the movement of
my hand to the teacup* The essentially social nature of action
inevitably eludes those who are primarily interested in analysis and
msucular contractions regardless of whether they are philosophers or
psychologists.
Fnat we are saying about psychology has been said before,Trof
D G Ritchie who held the chair of logic and metaphysics at St Andrews
until his death in 1903 wrote (Philosophical Studies (p 35)
•The truth is that there is no such thing as wholly individual
experience beyond mere uninterpreted feeling and blind willing. It
is human society, with its accumulated stock of concepts, that makes
our experience a more or less organic system. The psychologists with
their individualistic standpoint are, I think, responsible for much
more confusion than even Mr Ward admits. It takes more than one man
to know anything, or to have an ideal end for volition. Introducing
Ward into the discussion at this point may help to make it respectable
or at least so it seems to me since my earliest philosophical memory
is of hearing a paternal account of what Prof G F Stout of St Andrews
thought about Ward. More seriously we can see that perhaps ideas about
the social nature of language are not nearly as recent as many people
like to imagine. Ritchie also reminds us that at one time philosophers
did not individualise social phenomena. Unfortunately however the neo
Hegelian philosophers or at least some of them socialised individual
phenomena to such an extent that they ended up by advocating social
surgery by which they meant killing people.
One of the most disturbing cases of individualising social phenomena
is criminology which rests to a large extent on a simple verbal confusion
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The word •criminal* gives rise to the word 'criminality* which has been
reified into the subject matter of criminology. Recently a young
psychologist took up a post at a prison and on his arrival he was told
that he was expected to carry out research into some aspect ofcriminality.
The young psychologist did not happen to believe in criminality and so
he felt that his head of department's instruction was meaningless and
could not be carried out. The other members of that psychology
department spend their days carrying out research into aspects of
criminality and at the same time pride themselves on their empirical
and experimental approach to problems. If instead of talking about
criminals and criminality we talk about law breakers and law breaking,
we at once cease to individualise social phenomena and become aware of
the cause of crime which is the criminal law and its agencies such as the
criminal courts and the police. The abolition of the criminal law
and its agencies will at a stroke abolish crime. We may feel that
the price is too high to pay and that some rather nasty feuds and
vendettasmight break out if the criminal law were removed. But there
is no excuse for continuing to establish chairs in criminology and for
continuing to promote research into aspects of criminality. Those who
are interested in reifications can always turn their attention to
substance which can be regarded as a reification of the logical notion
of subject in the sense of the subject of a proposition. At this point
perhaps we should notice how sad it is that very few philosophers have
been involved in elucidating the problems of criminology and in
supporting the vital work of those concerned with deviance theory.
Prof Flew; is perhaps the major exception here, and his suggestion
in his book Crime ar Disease? that criminology should be renamed
'Home Office ftudies' reminds us that the confusions of traditional
criminology complement the confusions of those whose misfortune in
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life it is to run a penal system.
Now perhaps we should say something more about the study o f
criminality and also consider the idea that it is possible to have a
situation in which there is criminal law along with its associated
agencies but no criminals or criminal law breakers. For Lombroso,
the founding father of criminology.criminals were obviously different
from other people because their facial features were different
from those of non criminals. That idea strikes us as amusing now but
some of those who laugh at it seem to be unable to see that undertaking
a study of the physique of borstal boys and carrying out research into
the perceptual and cognitive differences between criminals and non
criminals are just as amusing. Such enterprises which have been or
aire being undertaken are simply slightly sophisticated versions of
< >
Lombroso*s original idea that criminals are different in biological
and psychological ways from the rest of us. Not very surprisingly
no one has yet been able to tell us what criminality is and amongst
traditional criminologists one can now meet the idea that criminality
should not be regarded as a monolithic concept. Since property offences
are very different from sexual offences it is said that one should
expect to find that the criminality of property offenders is very
different from the criminality of sexual offenders. Motoring offenders
one presumes have yet another type of criminality. At this point the
criminality game is really up and it should be obvious that all that
criminals have in common is the fact that they have been convicted of
offences against the criminal law which concerns itself with a wide
variety of activities including forgery, sex and motoring.
It is possible to imagine a state of affairs in which the criminal
law and its agencies are totally inactive. In stich a state of affairs
criminal jtidges snore endlessly in their clubs, members of the criminal
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bar wonder if being a judge is actually more boring than being a
barrister and policemen devote all their time to helping old women across
the roads. But as long as policemen are encouraged to regard criminal
prosecutions as a good thing there is no chance of such a state of
affairs actually appearing in our midst. A good example of this point
is provided by Br Stanley Cohen in his book Polk Devils and Moral Panics
where he writes (pp 166 - 167)
The police - the main control agents operating during the impact
period - had tfo types of effect on the behaviour; the one
immediate and the other more sustained. The immediate effect of
police policy and action was to create deviance - not only in the
sense of provoking the more labile members of the crowd into
losing their tempers but in Becker's sense of making the rules
whose infraction constituted deviance. The type of control
tactics adopted by the police under the impact of sensitization
and symbolization involved a certain arbitrary element. The
practice, for example,of designating certain areas in advance
as 'trouble spots' meant that youths with the appropriate
symbols could be moved along even if they were causing no
apparent harm. In one case in the Brighton court, a constable
from Eastbourne, who had been helping the local force, gave
evidence that he had seen a number of youths standing under a
bus shelter; they were not doing anything, but he 'had heard
that this was a trouble spot' and had told them to move away.
Not all moved away quickly enough one was arrested. 'If you
allow him to get away with, what he did', the constable told
the court, 'and not move when the police told him to, then
others would be free to come down. It was necessary in the
public's interest that these youths should not shelter from
the rain in this particular shelter.•
Another example is given by Mr P Swart in his book on Islington
where he tells us (p 163) that when Winston Churchill was Home
Secretary it was said that many of the hoys who at that time were
in prison for using obscene language had simply put their tongues
out at policemen;.. It is possible to argue at the present time that
the Industiral Relations Court is provoking certain trade unions and
trade unionists in the way that the police sometimes provoke some
people. That point may not tell us very much about courts in general
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because the Industrial Relations Court is not exactly like other
spurts. In a recent BBC radio talk Prof Yaispy pointed out that if
a judge frequently asserts in public that he is a judge just like any
other judge and that his court is a court just like any other court
then the very fact that these assertions are made suggests that they
are false. And such assertions are evidently made in the Industrial
Relations Court. Possibly we can say however that the Industiral
Relations Court does show us that criminal law agencies other than
the police can at times play an active part in the creation of crime.
Although in a fundamental sense all crime is caused by the
criminal law not all crime is caused by the agencies of the criminal
law and so not all crime is like the rather exceptional cases we have
just been looking at. One possible answer to the question 'why do
people break the criminal law when they are not actively provoked
by the criminal law agencies? may be that parts of the criminal law
are opposed to the interests of large sections of the population.
All that we can say about criminals in general is that they tend to
be young,male and working class. Many of the laws about property
may not reflect the interests of such people or at least they may not
if they are taken in conjunction with the present distribution of
property in our society. But in any event looking at the interests
of law breakers in relation to the interests of law makers places the
study of crime in its correct social and sociological context and takes
us EiKay from the individualising of social phenomena which leads to
criminology and the belief in criminality,
A discussion of the ramifications of individualising social phenomena
could go on endlessly but perhaps we have said enough for our purposes.
Since quotations have been something of a feature of this work it is
perhaps fitting that we should end by looking at the conclusion of
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Prof R W Balch's article The Police Mentality; .Fact or Fiction? where
he writes
The controversy over the police mentality will probably persist
for some time to come. There is simply not enough good evidence
to support or refute any side of the controversy, Even the
existence of modal personality characteristics among policemen
is open to serious question. The devotion of social scientists
to the personality model has obscured the important role that
organizational factors play in shaping police behaviour.
Attracting better people to the same old job is not necessarily an
improvement. In the case of police work, it may simply mean,
that college graduates will be'busting heads'instead of high
school drop outs.
Prof Balch only hints at the error of individualising social
phenomena but he reminds us of the dangers of psychologising and of
the importance of roles. In addition he indirectly points out that
those who hope to change or reform or alter society through education
make a serious mistake. Altering social strcture and social roles is
the only way of altering society. A sound education may of course
help people to bring about social change in the sense of altering
social structures but what it cannot do is to reform society by-
filling the existing social structure with superior people who
preserve the status quo. It is unfortunate that Balch seems to make
the mistake that we found a philosopher making at one stage of regarding
psychologists as the only social scientists. In fact calling them
social scientists is a serious linguistic aisoane. Sociologists who
are paradigm cases of social scientists certainly cannot be accused of
devotion to the personality model. Looking at the grim prospect
of college graduate policemen 'blasting heads' is perhaps an appropriate
way in which to end an academic study of the concepts of a person and of
human action that has,(with I hope some justification^paid a considerable
amount of attention to roles.
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